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G. A. KURENKOV

FROM SECRET TO SECRET

PROTECTION OF PARTY AND STATE SECRETS IN THE RKP(B)-VKP(B) 1918-1941

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With.

The monograph is devoted to the little-known side of the activities of the Bolshevik Central Committee as a whole, highlighting the mechanism and level of decisions on the protection of party-state and military secrets in party bodies and in the country, a different range of issues and information not subject to disclosure, secret divisions and complexes of documents of the RCP (6) - VKP (6). And most importantly, how justified was the system of information protection in party committees and in the country as a whole in 1918-1941.

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INTRODUCTION

The formation and formation of a multipolar world and globalization, on the one hand, and attempts to create a structure of international relations based on the dominant importance of Western countries, and the importance of military, intelligence and counterintelligence aspects continues to be significant, is the reality of today. The relevance of the topic is determined by the presence of threats and challenges that currently exist for our country, the intensification of attempts to ignore or weaken Russia's position in the political, economic, military and other fields, one of the ways to counter which is the information security system. At present, much is said about secrecy, about the protection of information, about the attitude to state secrets. Historians, jurists, politicians, military men express different opinions on this matter. One thing is clear; Every state has the right to protection of state secrets. But what is important is in whose interests the work on information protection is carried out, what exactly, what information is classified, what secrecy criteria existed and still exist in the state in a given historical period.

In my opinion, there is no doubt that the state secret as a phenomenon is specifically historical and depends on such fundamental pillars of statehood as the socio-political system and political power and, of course, on the historical time frame associated with a certain socio-economic formation. It is also undeniable that as long as there are states, each with its own interests, there is also a "secret war" of intelligence and counterintelligence. It knows no other laws to achieve success, such as the protection of its own secrets and the disclosure of the secrets of other states.

This activity is not only specifically historical, but also dialectical, changing in time and space, and the approach to protection

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mysteries, like any activity, changes over time. The protection of secrets as a human activity and a social phenomenon has existed for a long time, starting from prehistoric times of protecting the secrets of a primitive tribe and clan. At first, these were certain taboos, then secrets were protected by unwritten and written traditions, regulations and rules, then by laws. But the type of integral system and activity, protection of information, was developed with the formation of classes and state institutions. In the process of development, it was modified and improved, only one thing became a thing of the past and new forms, methods, subjects and objects arose - information carriers or structures that carry out and control this work. It is also obvious that certain information that was considered secret, in the process of developing socio-economic relations, lost the status of secrecy, or vice versa, unclassified information, due to political and other circumstances, became secret. Information acquired a secret status due to changes in the conditions of the functioning of society, mainly such defining moments as the transition from peacetime to wartime, the internal political transfer of power in the state, the aggravation of the class, internal political and internal party struggle, etc. Always on a special place in terms of limitation and protection was the information of foreign policy, intelligence and counterintelligence activities.

Information constituting a secret was classified into certain categories. In modern and recent times, along with information that leaves a state secret (in the initial period it could be or was meant as a dynastic, monarchical in the sense of the figurative expression "the state is me"), there appear the so-called departmental, confidential, commercial secrets, as well as private information that is not subject to disclosure. With the advent of parties and other socio-political organizations, certain systems of protecting party, political secrets also developed within these political formations. Thus, the statutes of political parties contained clauses where members of organizations were obliged to keep party secrets, and violators were threatened with parting with their party card. Organizations that were in an illegal or semi-legal position (parties, organizations, lodges, sects, etc.) had (and still have) a certain specific system for protecting secrets, conspiracies. Information constituting a certain secret was put aside in special documentary sources and was in a special position.

These documents contain, for the most part, information (and the documents themselves as information carriers) that have not yet been fully introduced into scientific circulation and represent

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great informational value, because the facts contained in this material are little known or not known to the scientific community at all. All this, figuratively speaking, gives the historian, after declassification, the right of a discoverer.

In recent times, to protect secrets in state structures, certain regime-secret services were created to protect and further store secret information. The work of these structures was regulated either by departmental necessity or by the framework of the law. In the process of using classified materials, after the expiration of the operational need, the documents were transferred to the archives of organizations for special storage, and then, were handed over for permanent storage or to a departmental or state archive for special storage until declassified or destroyed. In any case, access to these documents has always been and remains strictly limited.

At present, researchers have the opportunity to get acquainted with many documents that were previously kept in secret. These documents are of particular interest to historical science, because they sometimes contain specific information that can no longer be found in other documentary complexes. Of particular interest in this regard are the documents of the central authorities and administration. But, as a rule, most documents of state departments and institutions contain information related specifically to a certain area of activity in the specialization of departments.

The documents of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which has been the ruling party for more than 70 years, are specific documents reflecting almost all aspects of the state's activities. The Communist Party, under the conditions of a one-party system, controlled and directed all aspects of the state's activities. During the reign of the RCP (b) - the CPSU, a certain party-state mechanism of power has developed in the state and it is sometimes difficult to determine the delimitation of the activities of the functions of the party and the state. Although there was a certain regulation in the decision-making mechanism and the implementation of power functions, it was often conditional, since many of the most important state issues were determined by joint decisions of the party and government.

As is known, the Bolsheviks before the Great October Socialist Revolution were in an illegal or semi-legal position. With coming to power in October 1917 and having become the ruling party under a one-party system due to political and historical circumstances, the issue of information protection has turned from a purely party one into a party-state one. Moreover, burst

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The Civil War intensified the trend towards secrecy. After the war, little has changed. The country continued to be in a hostile encirclement of capitalist countries, under the constant threat of new intervention and war. During the Civil War, the party structure of the RCP(b) was created and a certain system of information protection was created in party bodies, starting with the Central Committee and ending with local party organizations. Based on the fundamental principles of information protection, such as the principle of reasonable access (access to information is the authorized acquaintance of a specific person with information constituting state and party secrets), i.e. - restrictions - "is known only to those who are supposed to know on official necessity", the principle of personal responsibility, the principle of material and moral incentives for "bearers of secrets", the system of information protection in the party bodies of the RCP (b) - VKP (b) developed within the framework of the established party-state system ... Having broken the "old" state machine, it was necessary to build a new, in its essence, state. It needed to be rebuilt

party work on the terms of state administration, now in a legal, moreover, in a ruling position. Many issues resolved at the party level now belonged to the state. The Bolsheviks reorganized the party structures, from the Central Committee to the grass-roots party cells, orienting them towards the fulfillment of not only purely party, but also state tasks. Thus, the documents of the Council of People's Commissars - resolutions and orders on certain sectors of the national economy, the defense complex, foreign and domestic policy were closely connected with the documents of the Politburo, the Orgburo, the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party. Often the Politburo and the Council of People's Commissars, and then the Council of Ministers, made joint decisions, and therefore it is extremely difficult to separate such materials into purely party and state (decided in the Soviet order) materials.

In this regard, in the course of the activity of party organs, documents containing information constituting not only party, but party-state secrets were put aside. A significant part of party documents is accompanied by a secrecy stamp. These restrictions were motivated by state interests, the interests of political expediency, and sometimes political reinsurance against unwanted leakage of party and state information. Taking into account that the information security system in the Bolshevik Party took shape during the period of illegal, conspiratorial work, and then under the influence of the Civil War, a difficult and controversial time with constant external pressure, internal

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political struggle and moral and psychological strain of forces - one can understand the reasons for secrecy.

The chronological framework of the monograph covers the period from 1918 to until June 1941, i.e. the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. They affect the period of organization and formation of information protection in the RCP (b) - VKP (b), in conjunction with the formation and strengthening of the party and Soviet system of statehood. It was during this period that a one-party state system took shape in the development of the country. At the same time, in this period, the formation of the information protection system in the party bodies is taking place, as one of the important components of the functioning of the party-state mechanism of power in Soviet Russia - the USSR in 1918 - 1941. XX century. The starting date from 1918 is due to the holding of the Bolshevik Party Congress of the Bolshevik Party, the first congress that took place under legal conditions, when the development of a new party program, organizational measures for the creation of the party apparatus were planned, and conditions were created for organizing the protection of information in party structures, in relation to the legal conditions of the ruling party. The end date is June 1941, i.e. the beginning of the Great Patriotic War and is due to the end of a relatively peaceful period and the beginning of the war, when the conditions for the functioning of the state (the creation of emergency authorities and the implementation of emergency measures) and the conditions for ensuring secrecy in general, a significant expansion of the range of information constituting military and state secrets, based on the "List of information constituting state secrets" in force at that time. Thus, this work highlights the period of the Soviet state, when the party-state system was taking shape, which went through the Civil War, the construction of a new state structure and its strengthening in the "Stalin period", and at the same time the formation of an information protection system in the party bodies of the RCP (b) - VKP(b), as one of the important aspects of the functioning of the party-state mechanism.

It should be noted that the work on the problem of information security in the party structures of the RCP (b) - VKP (b), in 1918 - 1941. are practically non-existent in open publications. This topic, as an independent aspect, does not yet have its own historiography. Historiography seemed to be general works of various scientific significance, in which individual problems were only indirectly or insufficiently addressed. In the Soviet and post-Soviet periods, the topic of a comprehensive study of the protection of information in party bodies was not specifically covered in open sources. Efforts towards

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the identification of studies on this topic showed that we can only talk about its segmental study. The specialized literature on information security as a whole was engaged in the analysis of the origins of the modern information security system and the study of its specifics.

The study of the problem posed was impossible without understanding the political system in the USSR in 1920-1950. Some questions on this topic were raised in connection with the scientific understanding of the mechanism of political power. In the Soviet period, political power was considered from the point of view of studying the process of state building in conjunction with party building. Needless to say, the leading role of the party in the mechanism of political power and its role in state building was presented only on the positive side. The process of critical rethinking began in the period of "perestroika" journalism and historiography. But most of the authors "... stopped at the stage of vulgar anti-Stalinism, focusing more on the question "who is to blame?" rather than asking "why?" As for the documentary base of the presented topic, then, basically, the materials covering the presented issue to one degree or another were secret until recently, were stored in the party archives, access to which was limited. Only in the 1990s did it become possible for the bulk of researchers to work with previously secret, party documents. This explains the small number of works on this topic. In particular, there is still no full-fledged historical work that specifically comprehends the problem of information protection, questions of criteria and the expediency of maintaining secrecy (conspiracy) in party bodies in the 1920s-1930s. However, the presence, identification and introduction into scientific circulation of declassified archival documents and the planned development of individual components of the topic made it possible to formulate and solve research problems. Thus, in the 1990s, the problem of political power was touched upon in connection with the study of the general process of the emergence and functioning of a one-party party nomenklatura political system in the 1920s-1930s. In a collection of articles published in 1991, in the article by T. P. Korzhikhina "The Political System in the USSR in the 20-30s", the author notes that the existing administrative-command system was balancing between the bureaucratic apparatus and the working masses; between emergency measures and the enthusiasm of the masses; between the dictatorship of the proletariat and the dictatorship. In the article by I. V. Pavlova

1 Tsakunov S. V. In the labyrinth of doctrine. (From the experience of developing the country's economic course in the 1920s). M. S. 7.

2 See Political systems of the USSR and countries of Eastern Europe. 1920 - 60s. / Answer. ed. A. F. Noskova. M., 1991.

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"The Formation of the Party Apparatus System in the USSR", published in 1990 in the collection of works of the Institute of Philology and Philosophy of the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences!, the author notes that one of the reasons explaining why a single-party totalitarian political system has developed in the country, the author sees in the absence democratic traditions in Russia, and considers the beginning of the separation of the apparatus from the main party mass in the decision of the highest bodies of the RCP (6) in 1922-1923. in determining the circle of persons to familiarize themselves with the secret documents of the party. The study of the process of functioning of political power and economic analysis of the situation in the USSR in the 1920s, during the NEP period, from the point of view of doctrinal, political science and sociological approaches, is offered by S. V. Tsakunov in his work.

Specifically, the problem of protecting information in party bodies, to a certain extent, was touched upon in connection with the study of the general process of the functioning of political power in 1920-1930, in the monograph by O. V. Khlevnyukaz, published in 1996. This paper gives a brief history and general characteristics of the secret divisions of the Central Committee as part of the central party apparatus. In 1998, an article by I. V. Pavlova, mentioned in this work, was published in the journal Voprosy istorii. The most valuable for our research in the article by I.

V. Pavlova is that the author gives a more detailed account of the history of the creation of the structure and functioning of the secret organs of the Central Committee and local party committees, linking it with the mechanism of the formation of the party apparatus as a whole, and also the fact that the author for the first time mentions the secret party archives of the Central Committee, classified ("secret") complexes of party documents, such as "closed letters", "special folders", secret instructions, etc. Giving a general description of the mechanism of political power in the USSR in the 1920s - 1930s, I. V. Pavlova makes conclusion that secrecy was the main principle of the existence of the "communist authorities".

Of particular interest in terms of a general understanding of the problem of secrecy in Russia and the USSR by Western historians from the point of view of political, social and psychological functions is the article by the French historian Francis Comte "Secrecy and Glasnost in

1 See Actual problems of the history of Soviet Siberia. Collection of works of the Institute of Philology and Philosophy of the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences. / Answer. ed. V. I. Shishkin. Novosibirsk. 1990.

2 See Tsakunov SV In the Labyrinth of Doctrine. (From the experience of developing the country's economic course in the 1920s). M., 1994.

3 See O. V. Khlevnyuk, Politburo. Mechanisms of political power in the 1930s. M. 1996.

4 Pavlova I.V. The mechanism of political power in the USSR in the 20-30s. // Questions of history. 1998. No. 11-12. pp. 49-66.

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Russia and the Soviet Union" in a collection of his articles published in 2003. Noting that in any country there are certain zones of closedness, the USSR differed from other countries, among other things, in the exceptional importance attached to secrecy. Taking as a starting hypothesis that secrecy lies at the very heart of the Soviet system, he tried to determine the existence of a strategy in this area, structural features, forms of existence, goals, areas of application, as well as consequences, both constructive and destructive. F. Comte notes that the Bolsheviks, as professional sub-police revolutionaries, developed in themselves a certain type of thinking, expressed in the psychology of a "besieged fortress", when life under martial law requires maximum secrecy. Hence, the author notes, heightened vigilance, a constant mood to fight, to search for the enemy. The main goal of secrecy, according to the author, was the creation, preservation and strengthening of power through the manipulation of secrets and their exposure. The author considers the creation of "organized chaos" to be the highest achievement of secrecy. Secrecy, according to O. Comte, gave rise to social perversions and unproductive material costs.

For the first time, an analysis of the composition and content of one of the previously top-secret sets of party documents, the "special folder" of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, is given in the article by L.I. in the journal "Questions of History" No. 8 in 19962. The chronological framework of the article in the coverage of this type of source covers the period from 1929 to 1934. From the point of view of external criticism of the document, it is noted that the protocols are divided into general and especially secret - those that were put aside in the "special folder" of the Politburo. The author notes the brevity of the secret protocols, the lack of recordings of speeches, the fixation of debates ("deaf" form of the protocol), which naturally reduces their value as a historical source. But, at the same time, the list of issues of secret protocols gives a complete picture of the range (a kind of nomenclature of issues), their composition and significance - which issues were considered especially secret, the level of decisions made, and the decisions made on them - about the political external and internal course. As the author of the work notes, the range of issues recorded in the "special folder" was very wide. Basically, it was constant, but changed depending on the operational political situation - from the most important, requiring general



ÿ See Comte F. On the Political Anthropology of the Soviet System. Foreign policy aspects / Per. from fr. Ya. Yu. Bogdanova. M. 2003.

2 See Gintsberg L. I. Through the pages of the "special folders" of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6). // Questions of History No. 8. 1996. S. 16-30.

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party or state decision, to small, social, administrative and economic. It should be noted that when comparing the range of main and constantly passing questions recorded in the "special folder" with the "List of information constituting state secrets" for this period, we observe almost complete identity. In conclusion, the author gives a quite definite characterization of the "special folder" of the Politburo as a valuable historical source for studying the history of the USSR in the 1920s-1930s. He writes: "This source reveals such facts and circumstances, information about which cannot be found in any other source"<sup>2</sup>.

The most objective, in our opinion, work related to one of the areas of information protection - censorship policy, on the one hand, as a result of the development of any state, and on the other, as a component of the "totalitarian state", is the monograph by M. N. Zelenovaz. The monograph, based on previously closed archival materials (minutes of meetings of the Politburo, Orgburo, Secretariat of the Central Committee, documents of Istpart, the Lenin Institute, Glavlit, etc.), examines the formation and functioning of the censorship system of Soviet Russia, reveals the leading role of the highest organs of the party in solving data questions. A special place in the work is occupied by the source analysis of the documents of the highest party bodies and the Soviet state as a historical source, the analysis of the scheme, system and technology for the execution and passage of party documents, the adoption of managerial decisions, the relationship between the Central Committee and state structures in the field of censorship policy. In his work, the author notes that the restriction of access to archival information in Russia began, of course, not under the Bolsheviks. Their coming to power gave rise to the "discovery" of some documents, and at the same time, the intensification of the class struggle led to a tightening of control over the press.

Mentioned in the work of M. V. Zelenov and the secret divisions of the Central Committee. Giving them a brief description, the author notes the establishment of the monopoly of the Secret Department of the Central Committee on the formation of the agenda and the preparation of meetings of the Politburo, the Organizing Bureau, the Secretariat of the Central Committee. As you know, the secret divisions of the Central Committee were always headed by Stalin's first assistants, and that is why he could influence the procedure for considering issues and the course of meetings of the highest party bodies. WITH

1 Kurenkov G.A. 1922 What was a state and military secret in the RSFSR. // Domestic archives. No. 6. 1993. S. 80-86.

2 Gintsberg L. I. Through the pages of the "special folders" of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6). // Questions of History No. 8. 1996. P. 29.

3 Zelenov M. V. Apparatus of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) - VKP (6), censorship and historical science in the 1920s - further Zelenov M. V. Apparatus of the Central Committee of the RCP (6) ~ VKP (b) ...

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In my opinion, it is not always possible to agree with this opinion, but after all, the leading role in the preparation and order of issues and agendas of meetings and, especially, commissions of the Central Committee, was determined by the secretaries of the Central Committee in charge of certain issues. The author also notes that: "The gradual transfer of almost all the documentation of the departments of the Central Committee to the archive of the Secret Department made it possible for Stalin to control not only office work, but also the use of party documents for political purposes"! M. V. Zelenov defines the office work of the Central Committee as a technical and political function of the apparatus of the Central Committee, shows the main stages of document circulation, the conditions for the formation and nature of the agenda of meetings (open or

closed), since there was no specific instruction in this regard. The author, in his monograph, pays special attention to the characteristics of the types of protocols of the highest bodies of the Party and the preparatory materials for them. He defines them as a historical source by which one can trace the time and composition of the meeting participants, the procedure for familiarization, distribution and use of minutes, the relationship between the content of resolutions and decisions with the procedure for their adoption, the "mechanism" of decision-making (for example, voting "in a round-robin" etc.). From the point of view of external criticism, a certain place is given to the design of meetings of the highest bodies of the party. In particular, the author notes that V. I. Lenin was opposed to taking shorthand and minutes of Politburo meetings, since, in his opinion, this could be the subject of political speculation. JV Stalin was of the opposite opinion and often used the documents in his own interests. M. V. Zelenov notes that at the meetings of the Politburo, it was customary to draw up a "blind" protocol of the meetings, i.e. the shortest content. At the beginning, many meetings were not drawn up in the form of minutes at all or were not numbered. Some of the protocols of the early 1920s. not found, protocols P pol. 1920s almost completely preserved. In the work, the author also touched upon the issues of completing the archives of the Central Committee with documents, restricting access and preserving materials to the minutes of the Central Committee. Covering the main topic of his monograph, M. V. Zelenov noted that, in fact, by decision of the Central Committee, Glavlit and a system of censorship bodies are being created. But, as the author notes, at the beginning of the functioning of the censorship bodies, the main argument of the censors was "class instinct", personal motives and their own understanding. A certain place and as an important factor is determined by the value of self-censorship. In the late 1920s - early 1930s, in connection with the development and appearance of relevant regulatory documents and instructions, this work acquires an organized and

1 Zelenov M. V. Apparatus of the Central Committee of the RCP (6) - VKP (b) ... P. 93.

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directional character. As a result, the author draws a fundamental conclusion that: "The specifics of social development, determined not only by the revolution of 1917, but by the entire historical development of Russia, shaped both the censorship policy and the level of historical knowledge"!

As for the historiography of the issue directly related to the topic of our work (the dynamics and structure of the supreme bodies of the Bolshevik Party, the apparatus of the Central Committee and the secret divisions of the party in the 1920-1930s in particular), we can agree with the opinion of M. V. Zelenov that there is practically no modern historiography of this issue, although a serious study is planned?. In addition, the author also notes that: "Despite the appearance in recent years of a number of interesting and professional works on the history of the office work of the Central Committee apparatus in the 1920-1930s, the historiographic and source problems of the office work of the Central Committee require further study. niya"<sup>3</sup>. Of the same works that exist, in general, "positivism" is manifested in the methodology of analysis. M. V. Zelenov believes that at this stage and the level of historical knowledge on this issue, this is justified, since "there is no factual base and empirical material has not been accumulated." From the point of view of M. V. Zelenov: "It seems obvious that there is a need not only for publications on the history of the structure of the party apparatus, but also for serious research on this topic" <sup>5</sup>.

There are practically no published sources specifically devoted to the secrecy and protection of information in party bodies. The first documents concerning the issues of secrecy and party secret office work in party bodies were published in the journal *Istochnik* by V. Lebedevb, Candidate of Historical Sciences. In the introduction to this publication, the author negatively assesses the provision of secrecy in party bodies. He notes that "efforts were aimed at ensuring that posterity would never know the true goals and

1 Zelenov M. V. Apparatus of the Central Committee of the RCP (6) - VKP (b) ... P. 458

2 See Ginuberg L. I. Through the pages of the "special folders" of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6). // Questions of history. 1996. No. 8. From 16-30; Zelenov M. V. Apparatus of the Central Committee of the RCP (6) - VKP (b), censorship and historical science in

1920s. Nizhny Novgorod. 2000; Kurenkov G. A. The origin and formation of secret archives of the party. 1917 - 1941 // Bulletin of the archivist. 2003. No. 2. S. 111-121; Organization of secret units in the RCP (b) - VKP (b) in 1918 - 1941// Bulletin of the archivist. 2006. No. 2-3. pp. 255-272; Pavlova I.V. The mechanism of political power in the USSR in the 20-30s. // Questions of history. 1998. No. 11-12. pp. 49-66; Khlevnyuk O. V. Politburo. Mechanisms of political power in the 1930s. M., 1996.

3 Zelenov M. V. Apparatus of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) - VKP (b) ... S. 32

4 Ibid. S. 32.

5 Ibid. S. 28.

6 See V. Lebedev. The ruling party remained underground. // Source. 1993. No. 5/6. pp. 88-95.

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intentions of the communist leaders", "... suppressing any manifestation of dissent"! The author's conclusion is as follows: "The Bolshevik Party, having arisen as an underground organization, having come to power in October 1917, remained secret" 2.

The specifics of the topic and the fragmentation of the archives of the Politburo, the Orgburo, the Secretariat of the Central Committee, their closedness, create certain difficulties for researchers. But now the open documents of the Politburo, the Orgburo, the Secretariat and previously secret divisions of the Central Committee, the presence of a scientific and reference apparatus created by the employees of the RGASPI, in particular, the published agendas of the meetings of the Politburo of the RCP (b) - VKP (b), allow to some extent to illuminate problems of the functioning of the highest organs of the party. In this regard, in particular, it is necessary to note the collection of documents from the archival funds of the RGASPI "Stalin's Politburo in the 30s", published in 1995. For the topic of the monograph, the documents published in the subsection "Distribution of Decisions and Instructions on Conspiracy" are of interest. These documents cover general issues of secrecy, distribution, storage, familiarization and accounting of minutes of meetings and other secret documents. Together with the publication of V. Lebedev, these are the only published sources concerning the issues of secrecy (conspiracy) in party bodies in the 1920s-1930s.

In the work on the topic, the author used a number of special articles devoted to the protection of information." Of fundamental interest for solving the problems of the proposed topic from the point of view of the conceptual and methodological approach are the works of the candidate of historical sciences A. I. Aleksentsev<sup>5</sup>. In his articles, A. I. Aleksentsev gives the essence

1 Lebedev V. The ruling party remained underground. // Source. 1993. No. 5/6. S. 88.

2 Ibid.

3 Stalin's Politburo in the 1930s. Collection of documents. // Compiled by: O. V. Khlevnyuk, A. V. Kvashonkin, L. P. Kosheleva, L. A. Rogovaya. M., 1995.

4 Belyaev E. A., Lavrukhin Yu. N., Pitsik V. V. State system for protecting information in the Russian Federation from technical intelligence and its leakage through technical channels. Structure, tasks and development prospects. // Security of information technologies. 2000. No. 3. S. 25-39; About the Information Security Doctrine. // Security of information technologies 2000. No. 3. P. 21-24; Ananyin O. B., Gorbato V. S., Vasilyeva T. G. Information security and human factor. // Security of information technologies. 2000. No. 3 S. 60-61; Volobuev SV System approach in solving problems of information security. // Security of information technologies. 2000. No. 3 S. 94-97.

5 Aleksentsev A. I. The essence and correlation of the concepts of "information security", "information security", "information security". // Security of information technologies.

1999. No. 1. S. 16-20; Aleksentsev A.I. The concept and structure of threats to protected information. // Security of information technologies. 2000. No. 3. S. 79-85; Aleksentsev A. I. Channels and methods of unauthorized access to confidential information // Security of information technologies. 2001. No. 3. S. 69-75.

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functional characteristics of the concepts "information security", "information security", "information security", both the content and the method of their implementation, and concludes that there is a direct connection and dependence between all these concepts, and between "information security" and "information security" - indirect communication. AI Aleksentsev also outlined methodological approaches to the definition of the concept and disclosure of the essence of the threat to protected information, identified channels and methods of unauthorized access to confidential information.

Thus, the analysis of the modern literature used, directly related to the topic, allows us to identify three areas in its coverage: historical, political journalistic, special. It should be noted that mainly separate aspects were studied. These include the composition and content of some previously secret party documents, secret divisions of the party, the essence of the political system and some mechanisms for making political decisions on issues of secrecy in the historical period under study, the secret archives of the Bolshevik Party, the censorship policy of the apparatus of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (6) - VKP (6), special issues of information security. In general, it can be stated that, being one of the most interesting problems of Soviet political history, the organization of information protection and the activities of secret units to ensure secrecy in party bodies have not yet actually become the subject of a special in-depth study and remain poorly understood. In order to better understand the issue both from the point of view of studying the historical process and the specifics of information protection, in this work the author tried to combine the historical and special areas of research on this topic as a whole.

Currently, there are basically two laws that are in a certain contradiction with each other. These are the foundations of the legislation on the Archival Fund of Russia and archives, which provide for the possibility of declassifying documents, and the Law on State Secrets, which establishes the procedure for working with secret documents. The difficulty lies in the fact that the mechanism for launching normative acts on declassification has just taken shape, there are many overlays and ambiguities, especially related to party documents, when a significant part of these documents is classified. Here again the question arises of the relationship between secret and unclassified information, state and public interests, which do not always coincide, the statute of limitations for the expiration of secrecy, the definition of criteria, classification, focus, tasks and goals of work to protect state secrets.

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International experience and the course of modern history show that the number of secret documents is not decreasing. So, for example: "According to the American press, in 1983 the number of documents classified by US government departments increased by 24 percent compared to the previous year"! Especially when it comes to documents of special services. Thus: "The archive of the NSA [US National Security Agency - G.K.] contained millions of paper tape with interception. For its storage, a special storage was built, where a constant temperature and humidity were maintained. Data for 1980 indicated that the NSA classified an average of 50 to 100 million documents a year. They contained more classified information than the documents of the US military, the CIA, the State. department and all other US government agencies and departments combined. On average, about 40 tons of secret papers per day were subject to destruction. Likewise, the requirements for employees admitted to state secrets did not weaken: "...President Reagan issued an order in order to prevent the disclosure of secret data. Each civil servant gives a subscription to comply with these rules and, if necessary, is tested on a lie detector

...From now on, everyone with access to classified work must obtain permission for every publication or even a lecture at a university."

At the present time, the process of aggravation of the international situation as a whole and the process of globalization have begun to cause some concern. Political, economic, military conflicts may well lead to serious wars on a larger scale. They are especially dangerous on the European continent. An example of this is the general situation in Ukraine, where the opposing interests of Russia and European countries clashed. Of particular note are the position of the Western countries on the Chechen issue and the military conflict between Russia and Georgia and the situation in the Arab countries, as well as in Ukraine. The political situation that has developed in the world as a result of the end of the Cold War between the West and the East, in fact, has not affected intelligence activities. Although the leading states of the world to some extent have learned to negotiate with each other, but on the other hand, there is still a "secret war" of intelligence. Leading Western countries continue to modernize and develop their intelligence services. The intelligence priorities are the processes of formation of the new Russian statehood in the structure of the world community, its internal and

1 Shebarshin L. V. Hand of Moscow. Notes of the head of Soviet intelligence. P. 298. 2 Anin B., Petrovich A. Radio espionage. S. 98. 3 Citation. by Yakovlev N. N. CIA against the USSR. S. 398.

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external reference points, military policy, economic situation, direction of scientific research, technical work and experiments, etc. "They say that we have no enemies now. But this is no reason to be careless. We need to look at those who make such statements. Why did it happen? Meanwhile, the world retains huge nuclear arsenals, creates new military bases, and develops the most effective types of weapons. Plans to achieve decisive military superiority over the USSR have not been archived, although a country with that name no longer exists. The West, on the one hand, supports our reforms, but at the same time does not want, in particular, to lift restrictions on the supply of the latest equipment and technologies to Russia! Life shows that it is difficult to disagree with such arguments and statements. In this regard, the protection of information from external and internal threats remains relevant at the present time.

The most topical issues of secrecy and information protection faced the young Soviet state during the formation of a new state system, the struggle for survival in the ring of hostile capitalist states and internal enemies, and in the period between the two world wars in the 1920-1930s and directly before and during World War II. Ensuring secrecy, both in state bodies and in the structures of the CPSU (6), as the ruling party, especially during the preparation of the attack by Germany and its allies on the USSR, in our opinion, did not allow the enemy to collect sufficiently complete information about the economic, military and political potential of the country, which ultimately was one of the factors in the victory of our state in the Great Patriotic War.

This work consists of two chapters, each of which has the right to independent existence. In the first chapter, the author will highlight the issues of the history and formation of party information protection agencies, secret divisions of the Central Committee, the personnel of secret workers, types of documentary support, and the system for storing secret documents of the party.

In the second chapter, the author will touch upon both general and specific issues and areas of activity for the protection of party-state secrets, the system and functional responsibilities, regulatory support for secret party work, verification of compliance with the conspiracy regime, measures taken to eliminate information leaks, interaction of party committees with state security services for the protection of party-state secrets. Within each chapter, the issues will be covered in chronological order.

1 Sudoplatov A.P. The secret life of General Sudoplatov: Truth and fiction about my father. T.2. S. 413.

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The secret work on documentary support of management, including the maintenance of secret records management, technical maintenance of the activities of the highest bodies of the party, was in charge of subdivisions bearing different names: since 1920 - the Secret Department (in the structure of the Administrative Department); from September 1921 Secretariat Bureau; since 1926 - Secret Department; since 1934 - Special sector. But with some changes, the main functional responsibilities remained the same. So, on March 19, 1926, instead of the Bureau of the Secretariat, which dealt with the clerical work of the governing bodies of the Central Committee and the conduct of secret correspondence, a Secret Department was created with broader powers. In November 1933, the Secret Department was reorganized, it began to serve only the Politburo and reported directly to Stalin. After the adoption of the new charter of the CPSU (6) at the XUP Congress, in early 1934, the Secret Department was transformed into a Special Sector. All these divisions were always directly headed by assistants to I. V. Stalin; first I.P. Tovstukha, then A.N. Poskrebyshev.

The documentary basis for the study and disclosure of the topic of this work is the open minutes of the meetings of the Politburo, the Orgburo, the Secretariat. In RGASPI, along with a card index, where specific issues (agenda) of the meetings are fixed, materials are stored in the form of bound typewritten protocols and materials to them, "Until the end of the 30s, such protocols were replicated for distribution to officials, who were supposed to get acquainted with the decisions of the Politburo. Several copies of these protocols remained in the Central Committee!

Most of the documents of the highest bodies of the party were classified as "secret", "top secret", "strictly secret". So the usual protocols of the Politburo and the materials included in them (decrees, decisions, etc.) were classified as "top secret." Their publication in the press was carried out by decision of the Politburo, after which they lost their restrictive stamp. A number of resolutions were promulgated jointly or on behalf of Soviet bodies (SNK, STO, etc.). A certain part of the decisions of the Politburo, on the most important issues, had the stamp of the highest degree of secrecy and protection - "special folder". These decisions were recorded in special protocols and printed in only a few copies. An indication that a decision or resolution on a certain issue has this stamp was given in the usual protocols in a deaf form, for example: "Issues of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. The solution is a special folder." Along with the protocols of the Politburo, the protocols and other documents of the Orgburo and the Secretariat are of considerable interest.

I cit. according to O. V. Khlevnyuk, A. V. Kvashonkin, L. P. Kosheleva, L. A. Rogovaya. Stalin's Politburo in the 1930s. Collection of documents. S. 8.

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The Central Committee, which were also the highest organs of the party. A number of members of the Politburo were simultaneously members of the Orgburo and the Secretariat. The materials of these bodies, deposited in the RGASPI, are more complete, since in many cases they carried out all the preparatory work on a specific issue, submitting a decision for approval by the Politburo. A significant range of issues of the Orgburo and the Secretariat were solved independently (there was a certain regulation) or on behalf of the Politburo. Justified, in my opinion, in many cases at that historical moment, the closeness of the materials of the "special folder" creates certain difficulties for historians. However, the documents available today allow, to a certain extent, to highlight issues on the topic presented.

In this work, the author identified specific secret bodies, their structure from 1919 to 1941, noted the functions and tasks facing the secret divisions, determined the range of issues and information to be classified, criteria, interaction with the state

state structures, in particular, with the Cheka-GPU-NKVD-NKGB, responsible for maintaining secrecy and protecting state secrets throughout the country. The author also tried to answer such questions as how and how effective, expedient and justified the system of protecting party-state secrets was in this period, how much it reflected and protected issues of state building, internal political struggle and the international situation. The author also noted the importance attached to the issues of observance of the secrecy regime and the protection of information by the party bodies, and above all the highest party authorities of the Central Committee, at what level these issues were resolved.

The main purpose of the work is to familiarize researchers of the history of the Soviet period, party and state power with the mechanism and level of decision-making on secrecy, protection of party and state secrets, protection of information in general, some range of information to be classified, as well as a set of documents. comrades, covering these issues, which were deposited in the materials of the highest organs of the party. Using these materials, the author did not claim (and could not claim in terms of the vastness and diversity of aspects of the topic) to answer all questions related to the proposed topic. Because of this, the work gives a general idea of the problem and serves as a starting point for research based on the studied and new archival documents.

The proposed work does not consider the issues of ensuring the secrecy regime in the ECCI, as a specific international body that requires a separate study.

## I. SECRET PARTY UNITS. FROM TECHNICAL TO OPERATING SECRET AUTHORITY

### 1.1. STRUCTURE AND STAFFING OF SECRET DIVISIONS OF THE PARTY

At the UP congress in March 1918, the Bolshevik Party of the RSDLP (b) was renamed the RCP (b), the development of the structure of the party apparatus and a new program of the party was planned. A year later, at the US Congress, a new program was adopted, and the party structures and party apparatus were institutionalized. It should be noted that the Central Committee itself did not have an apparatus until 1919. All decisions of party bodies, including the Central Committee, were carried out through state authorities and administration. From April 1919, the Politburo became the highest political organ of the party, and the Orgburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee became the highest organizational bodies. Certain structures are also created in the party apparatus to carry out technical and secret work. The Bolsheviks acquired the experience of secret work during their conspiratorial, underground activities in the pre-revolutionary period. Under the new conditions, it was necessary to organize secret work, not being underground, but having the power of the ruling party. Until 1918 - 1920 all measures in the field of information protection were carried out within the framework of state building and were carried out through the state line.

No official document has yet been found on the time of the emergence of secret or regime-secret units in the apparatus of the Central Committee and local party bodies, not in published, not in archival party documents. But in the open protocols of the Orgburo and others

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documents of the Central Committee of the RCP for 1919, there are a number of references and indirect data. So, at the meeting of the Organizing Bureau of March 31, 1919, the issue "On the organization of general work in the Secretariat and those departments where it is necessary to immediately break down the work and find their heads" was discussed, along with the nine planned departments in the structure of the Secretariat, and A special department, and in the documents for 1920 of the Administration of Affairs of the Secretariat of the Central Committee there is a mention of a secret department of the Secretariat of the Central Committee. Here, perhaps, we are talking about the Secret Department of the Central Committee.

At a meeting of the Organizing Bureau on October 20, 1920, the issue of the Secret Operations Department of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) was considered, at which it was decided: "a) The Secret Operations sub-department of the secret directive part should be transformed into an independent department. 6) Head of secret

to appoint comrade G. I. Boki as the operational department! In the funds of the Central Committee of the RCP (6) documents denoting the functions and purpose of these units were not found.

The orders of the Department of Affairs of the Secretariat of the Central Committee for the first half of July 1921 mention: in the first case - the secret-directive part in the administrative subdivision of the Secret Department, and in the second case - the Secret Department with its parts (encryption, registry, general office, expedition, accounting of personnel). Later, in an order dated August 16, 1921 on the Administration of Affairs, an order is given from August 15, 1921 to abolish the administrative part of the Secret Department, and transfer all personal files of employees to the general office of the Secret Department. The general office was created from subdivisions: archival and executive with desks: personnel and orders. An order dated March 3, 1921 approved the Regulations on the General Office of the Secret Department. The Regulations indicated that the general office was part of the Secret Department, which consisted of four parts: executive, registration, archival, expeditionary. The executive part, in turn, was divided into tables: orders, personnel, current correspondence. The registration part was divided into tables: incoming mail, card bureau of incoming mail, outgoing mail, card bureau of outgoing mail. Along with this, there was also an archival and expeditionary part. By decree of the Organizing Bureau of the Secretariat of September 17, 1921, the Cipher Bureau was also transferred to the general bureau of the Secretariat. The general office of the Secret Department was in charge of orders. These orders were issued by the Administrative Department of the Central Committee, which followed the signatures of the Administrative Director I. K. Ksenofontov or A. A. Andreev, who was the head of the administrative department, and after its abolition, the assistant head of the general office.

1 Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (Central Committee of the CPSU) - hereinafter RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 112. D. 81. L. 6.

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In the documents of the Central Committee there is an order on the Administration of Affairs dated August 15, 1921, which declares that in order to improve the work of the apparatus of the Administration of Affairs of the Secretariat of the Central Committee, all heads of departments, subdivisions and tables must report daily to the assistants of the Administrator of Affairs. The order obligated the following officials to report on the past day of work to the Assistant Manager of Affairs N. L. Meshcheryakov: Secretary of the Politburo, Secretary of the Orgburo, the administrative part (it was abolished on August 15, 1921), the head of the general office, etc. From this it can be assumed that the secretaries of the Politburo and the Orgburo with their assistants were part of the Secret Department, as it included, for example, the Shifrburo, and that the Secret Department was part of the Administration of the Secretariat of the Central Committee. It can also be concluded that the Executive Director of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the RCP (6) in 1920 supervised the executive and technical work of such responsible sections of the Central Committee apparatus as the Secretariats of the Politburo, Orgburo, Shifrburo and other parts of the Secret Department.

From all this it follows that until September 1921 the general office of the Secret Department and, thus, the secret office work of the Central Committee, were under the jurisdiction of the Administrative Department. According to the resolution of the Orgburo (minutes of the meeting of the Orgburo No. 68) and the order of the Office of Affairs No. 85 of September 19, 1921, the offices of the Politburo, Orgburo, Shifrburo are separated from the Secretariat, and the Bureau of the Secretariat is organized on their basis. This order again confirms the assumption that the Secretaries of the Politburo, the Orgburo, as well as the Shifrburo, were previously part of the Secret Department. It can also be concluded from the documents that at that time the Secret Department was part of the Administrative Department and, finally, from Order No. 85 it follows that the Secretariat of the Administrative Department and the Secret Department may have been the same department or had two titles.

Thus, it can be stated that the Secret Department arose around 1920 as part of the Administration of the Secretariat of the Central Committee. The Secret Department included the secretaries of the Politburo, the Orgburo and the Administration of Affairs, the Shifrburo, the General Chancellery with its parts. throughout



Apparently, along with this, for some time (since October 20, 1920) there was an independent Secret Operations Department, the functions of which have not been clarified. The functions of the Secret Department were mainly to register all secret documents and conduct secret office work (correspondence, protocols, correspondence, etc.). The secret department also prepared materials for the meetings

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Litburo, Orgburo, Secretariat of the Central Committee, carried out encryption and transmission of documents through closed technical channels, and also (before the formation of the Bureau of the Secretariat) kept records of personnel and registration of incoming and outgoing documents of the entire apparatus of the Central Committee, and also kept records of the administrative part Case management.

The end of the Civil War, the economic and political crisis, which escalated along with the exhausted policy of "war communism" and, in connection with this, the transition of the party in 1921 to the New Economic Policy adopted at the Tenth Congress, required the strengthening of the political and organizational work of party structures. The technical apparatus of the Politburo, the Orgburo, and the Secretariat of the Central Committee during the period of "war communism" became more complex, became larger, and its functions became cumbersome and complex. In this regard, it was necessary to reorganize the apparatus of the Central Committee and separate it from the registry and other small units of clerical work.

In September 1921, the Secret Department, or rather, its main group (the secretaries of the Politburo, the Orgburo, and the Shifrburo) was transformed into the Bureau of the Secretariat and became one of the departments of the Central Committee of the RCP (6). Having become an independent structure, the role and influence of this division of the Central Committee increases. It is important to note that the employees of this structure will continue to actively participate in such an important matter for party work as the formation of agendas for meetings of the Central Committee. A less significant part of the Secret Department - the General Office, remained under the jurisdiction of the Administration, entering the newly formed General Department of the Central Committee.

From the very beginning, the large volume and range of issues to be resolved required a certain regulation of the work of the Bureau of the Secretariat. In this regard, in April 1922, a draft was prepared, and then the "Regulations on the Bureau of the Secretariat and the work of assistant secretaries of the Central Committee" were approved.

According to this Regulation, an important function of the apparatus was monopolized in the Bureau of the Secretariat - the first assistants of the Secretaries had to accept, open, prepare and systematize the material received for the report to the Secretaries, monitor the implementation of all resolutions on reports to the Central Committee and, finally, carry out individual instructions of the Secretaries of the Central Committee. In view of the unity of the technical apparatus of the Secretariat, the first assistants to the Secretaries formed the Bureau of the Secretariat. The work of the bureau was directed, as an assistant to the General Secretary by position, the first assistant to I. V. Stalin. Thus, the role and importance of the Secretary General increased not only as a simple technical executor of the decisions of the Central Committee, but also as an authority influencing the agenda of the meetings of the Central Committee, making decisions and monitoring their implementation,

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which will be of great importance in the political struggle in the future. Control over the implementation of the resolutions of the Politburo, the Orgburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee was entrusted to the assistant secretaries of the Central Committee (Bureau of the Secretariat). The head of the Bureau of the Secretariat (assistant to I. V. Stalin) at each meeting of the Secretariat was obliged to report on the results of this control. Moreover, it was also important that the Secret Department concentrated all the important and secret information coming to the Central Committee from various sources, both in the center and in the localities.

The assistants to the Secretaries of the Central Committee had at their disposal a technical apparatus, which consisted of the office, which included four departments: the registry, office work, typists, the secretariat reception; secretaries of the Politburo and Orgburo, cipher department and archive. To carry out urgent matters that arose outside school hours, a constant duty of assistants to the Secretaries of the Central Committee was established.

Simultaneously with the adoption of the regulation on the Bureau of the Secretariat, the distribution of functions was made directly between the Secretaries of the Central Committee: I. V. Stalin, V. V. Kuibyshev, V. M. Molotov, and the days of meetings of the Organizing Bureau, the Secretariat and the composition of those present at these meetings were determined. I. V. Stalin was entrusted with the task of managing matters related to the work of the Politburo of the Central Committee and relations primarily with the regional organizations of the RCP (6). The task of the Bureau of the Secretariat, as before of the Secret Department, included the unification of the technical work of the Politburo, the Orgburo and assistant Secretaries of the Central Committee, as well as the concentration of secret correspondence of the Secretariat, including encrypted. In the staffing table of the Central Committee of the RCP (6), approved by the Secretariat of the Central Committee on November 22, 1922, the staff of the Bureau of the Secretariat itself, the secret office work and the Cipher Bureau consisted of 59 people. But later, at a meeting of the Orgburo on December 14, 1922, a report was heard from the staff commission of the Central Committee, at which the staffs of the departments of the Central Committee, including the Bureau of the Secretariat, already 68 people were approved! It was the fourth largest department of the Central Committee. The real states were to come into effect on January 1, 1923. At a meeting of the Secretariat of the Central Committee on January 25, 1923, it was decided to increase the staff of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the RCP and RKSM by 5% - from 822 to 863 people. But already at the end of 1923, the staff of the Central Committee of the RCP was reorganized (6). The apparatus of the Central Committee was reduced by 10% - from 682 to 618 people, but it should be noted that the number of employees of the Bureau of the S

In 1924, the Commission for Personal Reduction of Staff worked again in the Central Committee. In total, the Bureau of the Secretariat at the moment had a staff of 93 people. By the decision of the Orgburo, it was reduced to

1 See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 112. D. 397. L. 295.

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9 people and amounted to 84 employees. Two assistants of V. M. Molotov, one assistant of A. A. Andreev and a courier were subject to reduction. But there were two vacancies for an assistant to I. V. Stalin and one typist. There was no other downsizing of the Bureau of the Secretariat, and at that time there were 85 people working there!

But the increase in the workload on the Bureau of the Secretariat, and in connection with this a large number of overtime work, required an increase in the staff of the Bureau of the Secretariat. So in 1924, at one of the meetings of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6), the question of the staffing of the Bureau of the Secretariat was considered. Since I.P. Tovstukha was on vacation, L. Z. Mekhlis made a report on this issue. As a result, in the middle of 1924, the expansion of the staff of the Bureau of the Secretariat to 112 people<sup>2</sup> was approved.

As a result, in 1924 the Bureau of the Secretariat included: directly the Bureau of the Secretariat, which included assistant secretaries of the Central Committee I. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov, A. A. Andreev, L. Z. Kaganovich, head Bureau of the Secretariat, secretary of the Bureau of the Secretariat, assistant head of the Bureau of the Secretariat, head of the reception, technical apparatus of the Politburo, Orgburo, Cipher Bureau, Secret Registry, Archive of the Bureau of the Secretariat. In addition, the Technical Secretariats of the Politburo and the Orgburo had their own archives.

By decision of the Orgburo on June 9, 1924, Stalin's assistant I.P. For a short period, A. M. Nazaretyan was the Head of the Bureau of the Secretariat. (judging by the minutes of the Organizing Bureau from the end of 1923 to June 1924) and L. Z. Mekhlis (at a meeting of the Secretariat on November 21, 1921, L. Z. Mekhlis was approved as the head of the Bureau of the Secretariat of the Central Committee). Both were also assistants to I.V. Stalin.

On March 19, 1926, by the decision of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee, the Bureau of the Secretariat was transformed into the Secret Department. After the transformation, the structure of the latter included: the head of the Secret Department, deputy heads of the Secret Department, assistants to the Secretaries of the Central Committee (I. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov, S. V. Kosiora, N. A. Uglanova, N. M. Shvernik, N. I. Bukharin), assistants to the head of the Secret Department, referents, assistants for assignments, head of the reception, translators, telegraph operators, Control Subsection, Reference Codification Subsection, Technical Secretariat of the Plenums and Politburo of the Central Committee, Technical Secretariat of the Orgburo and the Secretariat, the Encryption Sub-Department, the Secret Archive, the Sub-Department for Accounting and Return of Documents (duties included accounting, distribution of classified documents and control of return),

ÿ See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 84. D. 488. L. 75. 2 See Ibid. F. 17. Op. 112. D. 590. L. 11.

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General subdivision. The Secret Department also had a Typing Bureau with its especially secret part, the Expedition, the Secret Registry, the Current Office of the Secret Department, the Bureau of Stenographers (Stenographer's Section). In total, according to information as of April 1926 - 128 people! The archive of the Bureau of the Secretariat becomes the Secret Archive. As can be seen, here we observe a slight increase in the number of units and the number of working employees of the Secret Division compared to the Bureau of the Secretariat.

The functions of the Secret Department of the Central Committee remained the same as the Bureau of the Secretariat?. IP Tovstukha remained the head of the department. In May 1929, B. A. Dvinsky and A. N. Poskrebyshv were appointed deputies of I. P. Tovstukha.

As can be seen, in the 1920s, the Central Committee carried out certain work to reduce its apparatus, but, given the ever-increasing importance of secret units, their staff not only did not decrease, but even increased. By 1924, I. V. Stalin had an almost monopoly right to prepare questions for Politburo meetings and general leadership of the Central Committee Secretariat. Through his subordinate, an employee of the Bureau of the Secretariat - the duty secretary of the Politburo, the Organizing Bureau, the Secretariat, he almost completely prepared the meetings of the governing bodies of the Central Committee. That is why the Secretary General, having concentrated this function in his hands, could influence the course of meetings not only of the Secretariat, but also of the Politburo. With the next distribution of duties, I. V. Stalin was entrusted with the preparation of questions for the meetings of the Politburo and the general management of the work of the Secretariat as a whole. Thus, gradually, the organizational position of the General Secretary turns into the first political force. Since 1923, the Bureau of the Secretariat, and then the Secret Department, were located on the fifth floor of a new building at the address: Staraya Ploschad, 4. The increased importance of the Secret Department was evidenced by the fact that a pass to the Kremlin, for example, in 1927, had 29 people "responsible employees of this department.

Corresponding secret subdivisions were also created in local party committees. No documents were found when the secret subdivisions were originally formed in local party committees, as well as documents regulating their activities, but it can be assumed that they were formed simultaneously with the secret subdivisions of the Central Committee apparatus. In 1928, the Secret Department of the Central Committee developed and approved the "Rules for Conducting Secret Record Keeping and Handling Secret Materials in Party Committees". This regulation was

1 See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 84. D. 792. L. 208-209; F. 17. Op. 85. D. 539. L. 84-86. 2 See ibid. F. 17. Op. 113. D. 176. L. 9.

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the already existing "de facto" state of affairs is legally fixed. Party committees in the localities had secret departments or secret units, while party committees, where the number passing secret documents was small, the work was entrusted to a separate, specially dedicated trustee.

The basic principle of the work of these units and the prerequisite for secrecy was the principle of reasonable access and the principle of personal responsibility, where one rule was in effect: the fewer people have access (in one form or another) to secret materials, the more guarantees the preservation of secrecy. Persons guilty of violating secrecy (disclosure, loss and negligent handling of secret documents), on the basis of a decree of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, answered extrajudicially through the OGPU collegium.

The main duties of the secret organs of the party committees included:

- conducting secret office work (receiving, registering, printing, forwarding, maintaining and storing secret files, returning and destroying secret materials, etc.);
- observation, instruction and verification of secret office work, verification and registration of employees admitted to secret correspondence in subordinate party organizations and factions of the CPSU (6) in local Soviet, economic and public organizations;
- instructing, monitoring and assisting lower organizations in the conduct of secret work;
- conducting cipher correspondence (cipher business was conducted according to special instructions).

Responsible employees of these units, almost without fail, were members of the party. The appointment of heads of secret organs and commissioners passed through the decisions of the bureau of the party committee, agreed with the Secret Department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6) and only after verification and with the consent of local state security organs. All employees of the secret units were registered with the local department of the OGPU.

For the reception and return of secret documents in the Central Committee and party committees, there was a system of proxies for the 1st and 2nd categories. The trustee was appointed by the decision of the bureau of the party committee, previously agreed with the Secret Department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6). Basically they were: secret part, authorized to conduct secret office work or head of the encryption part. Upon dismissal, a former employee of the secret unit was given a non-disclosure agreement and an obligation to inform the party committee about the change of residence within 2 years. Employees of secret units were categorically forbidden to dedicate their friends and relatives about the nature of the work performed, the composition of secret

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workers, indicate in the documents issued to these employees the positions and secret bodies, but instead it was indicated: "employee of the party committee".

As can be seen from the areas of activity and terms of reference, as well as the status of employees of these units, the functions of a regime-secret unit are evident. At the beginning of their activities, secret subdivisions did not play an independent role in the formation of the information security system, but gradually their functions, role and significance as a special body for information security increased. If initially only the organization of the secret office work of the Central Committee was entrusted to them, then more and more secret units acted as the initiators of the decisions of the highest bodies of the party on the organization of information protection. They prepared draft administrative documents and developed organizational and regulatory documents (instructions, circulars, rules, regulations, etc.) clarifying and clarifying the policy of the Central Committee on the protection of information. For example, they developed instructions for conducting secret office work and maintaining secrecy, which had an impact on the formation and state of the information security system as a whole and, for example, on the state of the secret archives of the party. The heads of the secret divisions determined the procedure for access to the secret party archives, which laid the foundation for the folding of the party special stores.

May 10, 1929, in a note from the Head of the Secret Department of the Central Committee I. P. Tovstukha, to the Secretaries of the Central Committee I. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov, L. M. Kaganovich, I. N. Smirnov, K. Ya. was

it was proposed to introduce sectors instead of new names of parts of the department: "In order to more effectively duplicate the functions of the Secret Department, and also to avoid possible abuse of names such as the Politburo, Orgburo, Shifrburo, etc., I would consider it is advisable to rename the entire department, instead of the previous names of the parts: "apparatus of the Politburo", "apparatus of the Organizing Bureau", etc., to be renamed into 7 sectors:

[sector] - assistants of the secretaries of the Central Committee and their apparatuses (referents, guarantors);

P sector - the secretariat, conducting the office work of the P / B;

Sector III - clerical work O / B;

GU sector - cipher production;

Sector - accounting and control over the return of secret documents;

Sector VI - secret archive of the Central Committee; And

UP-th - office (registration, external and internal communications, typing and shorthand)!

I O.V. Khlevnyuk, A. V. Kvashonkin, L. P. Kosheleva, L. A. Rogovaya. Stalinist Politburov in the 1930s. Collection of documents L. 26-27. Cit. according to "Source" 1993. No. 5-6. S. 94.

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The names of the positions of employees of the Secret Department were also to be renamed.

The secretaries of the Central Committee did not object. On the text of the resolution note: For. Stalin. Molotov. Thus, since 1929, 7 sectors began to function in the Secret Department.

From December 1, 1929, new wage rates for employees of the Central Committee apparatus were introduced (they were approved by the Secretariat of the Central Committee on January 20, 1930), and there were two rates for employees - a responsible rate and a normalized rate. The "responsible employees", whose work was equated with mass party work, had a responsible rate, and was higher than the standard one. In the Secret Department it had: Head of Department, Deputy Heads, Heads of Departments, Assistants to the Secretary of the Central Committee!

The social composition of the employees of the Bureau of the Secretariat and the Secret Department in the 1920s is also noteworthy. So, on | November 1923, 55 women and 37 men worked in the Bureau, a total of 92 people, i.e. there were more women. Of the workers, the majority were party members - 85 people, but there were also 7 non-party people. According to the party seniority, there was a majority - 44 people who joined the party no earlier than 1919 (that means after the revolution); 29 people in 1915-1918; 8 people in 1906-1914, 4 people in 1898-1905. The vast majority of those employed were employees aged 23 to 32 years (55 people), then up to 22 years old (18 people), that is, the total number of young people was 73 people; from 33 to 53 years old - 17 people and only 2 people from 53 years old. Most of them had a secondary education (44 people), then 42 people had a lower education, and only 2 people had a higher education and 4 people were home and self-educated. By national composition, the majority were Russians (64 people), then Jews (15 people), Latvians (7 people) and Armenians (2 people). He also worked in the Bureau of the Secretariat | Ukrainian, Estonian, German, French. According to the pre-revolutionary class origin, the majority were peasants (51 people), then philistines (28 people), nobles (6 people), 2 people each from merchants and citizens, according to | a person from officials, military and spiritual rank. By social origin at that time, the majority were employees (60 people), then workers (22 people), peasants (3 people), others - 7 people<sup>2</sup>.

Thus, with a relatively equal number of women and men, the majority of employees were young people from 22 to 33 years old, party members with a minimum party experience of 4 years (slightly more - 9 years), employees mainly with secondary education, Russians,

ÿ See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 113. D. 868. L. 24 o6.-25. 2 See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 84. D. 488. L. 55.

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most of the peasants in the past (most likely by parents). It should be noted that here we observe, as in the entire party of that time as a whole, the phenomenon of the proletarian party of "workers from peasants." In one of the most important divisions of the Central Committee of the proletarian party in 1923 (six years after the revolution), out of 92 employees, the proletarian stratum consisted of only 22 people. It seems that this was due to the lack of literate and sufficiently educated people among the workers who could be recruited for this work. And also, here we see the social cross-section of the party: "According to party statistics, in 1922 there were 170-180 thousand party members who indicated in the questionnaires that they were employees. Apparently, most of these people worked in the party apparatus. They made up about 30 percent of all party members!

In 1923, out of 92 people in the total number of employees working in the Bureau of the Secretariat, there were 85 members of the party. In 1927, out of 125 employees, 115 people were party members, 19 of them with pre-October party experience; with party experience 1917-1919. - 67 people; 1920 - 1925 - 29 people. In addition, there were 2 candidate members of the CPSU (6), 5 Komsomol members and 2 non-party2.

In general, it can be stated that the majority of those working in the secret division of the Central Committee were party members, men and women of young and middle age, who joined it after the revolution, during the Civil War, considering themselves employees, but by origin most of the peasants, which was naturally in a peasant country. Such a situation in the social composition of employees was typical in that period and for all state institutions of the country. Unfortunately, we do not have data on the social composition of the employees of the secret divisions of the Central Committee who worked in the 1930s.

Carrying out accelerated super-industrialization and collectivization, the implementation of tough plans [five-year plans, and in connection with this, the complication of the tasks of party building associated with the expansion of the range of national economic issues, as well as the intensifying intra-party struggle over the methods and pace of industrialization and collectivization, party purges and displacements brought to the fore the issues of personnel and organizational support for Stalin's policy, strengthening his personal influence in the party and the state as a whole. It was necessary to restructure the party apparatus to solve the problems of both party and economic construction, as well as intra-party struggle and personnel policy, providing support for the course

1 Beladi L., Kraus. T. Stalin. - M. 1989, S. 112. 2 See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 85. D. 544. L. 696.

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IV Stalin and the majority of the Politburo to accelerate the pace of industrialization and collectivization. In this regard, it was necessary to reorganize the apparatus of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (6), national Central Committees, regional, regional and district committees of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, in the light of new decisions and instructions. The preamble to the issue of reorganizing the apparatus of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, considered and approved at a meeting of the Politburo on January 5, 1930, said: "It is necessary to reorganize the apparatus of the Central Committee, and in the future not only the apparatus of the Central Committee, but also the apparatuses of local party organizations ... Up - having grown and reduced the apparatus, it is necessary to differentiate it more according to functional characteristics! On January 5, 1930, the Politburo established and approved a new scheme for the apparatus of the Central Committee. As of January 1, 1930, there were 104 employees in the staff of the Secret Department, and a total of 467 people in the Central Committee, i.e., the staff of the secret division was slightly less than one-fourth of the staff of the entire Central Committee. At a meeting of the Politburo on January 1, 1930, along with other heads of departments, Head. I.P. Tovstukha was again approved as a secret department. Apparently, the Secret Department of the Central Committee, as well as its leader, were preserved.

The apparatuses of the national Central Committees, krai, oblast, and district committees were also reorganized according to the scheme of the apparatus of the Central Committee, but without the organizations of the Secret Departments and Administrations of Affairs. It was proposed to the party committees to carry out the reorganization within two weeks. The Organizing Bureau was instructed to reorganize the apparatuses of city district committees, village district committees and bring the work of party cells in accordance with the adopted reorganization of the party apparatus"<sup>2</sup>.

According to the staff list of the departments of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, approved by the Secretariat of the Central Committee on January 28, 1930, it was adopted: "According to the Secret Department - 103 units. units, transferring the transportation of secret correspondence to the maintenance of the technical apparatus of the OGPU ... 2) Accept the offer of comrade. Tovstukha instruct a group of comrade. Grossman (TsKK-NKRKI) to review the structure, staffing and work organization in the Secret Department in order to rationalize (improve) it. The same work should be entrusted to Comrade Grossman to be carried out within the same period according to the Administrative Department of the Central Committee."<sup>3</sup> The Secret Department was second in size only to the Administration of Affairs (123 employees) and significantly surpassed other departments: Distribution (51 employees), Organizational Instructor (41 employees), Department of Culture and Propaganda (36 employees), Agitation and Mass Commissions (21 employees) . The resolution of the Secretariat of the Central Committee provided that the staffs of the Secret Department would be additionally reviewed. In general, the staff of the departments of the Secretariat of the Central Committee

I RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 771. L. 24. 2 See Ibid. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 772. L. 12. 3 RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 819. L. 41.

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was reduced by 175 people or 31.7%, i.e. instead of 550 staff positions, 375 were approved.

For more efficient work and resolution of issues, especially those submitted to the Politburo, both in organizational and technical terms, it was necessary to territorially bring the apparatus of the Secret Department closer to the highest body of the party, which worked in the Kremlin. So the decision of the Politburo on October 20, 1930 was: "It was recognized as necessary to transfer the Secret Department of the Central Committee from Staraya Square to the Kremlin as soon as possible."

At a meeting of the Politburo on July 25, 1930, the question of the head of the Secret Department of the Central Committee was considered. Instead of I.P. Tovstukha, his deputy, A.N. Poskrebyshv, was approved as the new head. It should be noted that I.P. Tovstukha, at the same time being an assistant to I.V. Stalin, headed the Secret Department (Bureau of the Secretariat) since 1920. The Politburo released him from work in the Central Committee, as indicated, at his personal request and appointed him deputy director of the Lenin Institute, where he worked until 1935. In our opinion, this relocation was organized specifically to strengthen the personal influence of I. V. Stalin in the Lenin Institute, a party and ideological institution, where L. B. Kamenev's positions were then strong. At a meeting of the Secretariat on July 26, 1930, the First Deputy Head. The secret department of the Central Committee was approved by B. A. Dvinsky and the second - by K. R. Herzenberg.

The explanatory note of Head. The Secret Department of the Central Committee of A. N. Poskrebyshv "On the expenses of the Secret Department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (6) for 1932" and "Information on the estimated cost of maintaining the apparatus on the 5th floor of the building of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks" dated August 1932 (the secretaries of the Central Committee were located on the fifth floor of the Central Committee building on Staraya Square)<sup>2</sup>.

The composition of the Secret Department in terms of positions and functions remained almost unchanged. It still included assistants to the Secretaries of the Central Committee and their apparatuses. Four divisions were directly involved in office work. Of these, two - the clerical work of the Politburo and the Orgburo, the third - ensured the distribution of documents in encrypted form, the fourth - took into account the return of documents from the highest bodies of the party, sent for execution and information to the localities, as well as to a certain circle of party and state leaders and institutions, whose composition is constantly changing. Office of the Secret

ÿ See Ibid. F. 17. Op. 113. D. 819 L. 23.

2 RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 9. L. 54.

3 See O.V. Khlevnyuk, A. V. Kvashonkin, L. P. Kosheleva, L. A. Rogovaya. Stalin's Politburo in the 1930s. Collection of documents. L. 28-30.

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The department provided auxiliary operations: registration, communication, reprinting of documents, shorthand recording of meetings of the Politburo, the Organizing Bureau, the Secretariat. The Secret Department also included the Secret Archives of the Central Committee.

On November 13, 1933, the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (6) adopted a resolution on the reorganization of the Secret Department of the Central Committee. Based on this resolution, the Secret Department of the Central Committee was reorganized by separating from it the apparatus serving the Politburo of the Central Committee. The selected part became known as the Secret Department of the Central Committee. The essence of the reorganization boiled down not only to the fact that in the Secret Department of the Central Committee only the apparatus serving the Politburo was nominally left, but also to the fact that in this way the highest body of the party came under the control of the General Secretary personally to an even greater extent. The secret department, as before, reported directly to I. V. Stalin, and in his absence - to L. M. Kaganovich. The personnel of the Secret Department also remained completely under the control of the General Secretary. Hiring and dismissal of employees of the Secret Department was carried out only with the knowledge and consent of the Secretaries of the Central Committee, i.e., I. V. Stalin and L. M. Kaganovich.

Along with restrictions and the principle of personal responsibility, the employees of the secret divisions of the Central Committee were subjected to the method of moral and material incentives for the protection of information. So, for example, it was established that the salary of employees of the Secret Department of the Central Committee (cipher bureau, stenographers and typists) should be 30-40% higher than the rates of the corresponding categories of workers in other institutions. Thus, the Central Committee obliged T. P. Samsonov, Manager of the Affairs of the Central Committee, within a month to satisfy all applications for apartments of employees of the Secret Department of the Central Committee and to provide the Secret Department of the Central Committee with 5 dachas with maintenance by the apparatus of the Office of the Affairs of the Central Committee! In addition, there were "responsible employees" in the Secret Department of the Central Committee, whose work was equivalent to mass party work in terms of workload, which led to increased wages, certain benefits, and improved consumer services. The increased workload and status of work, the possession of secret state and party information all speak of both the degree of responsibility and the privileged position of this unit in the apparatus of the Central Committee. It was also significant that during certain reductions in the apparatus of the Central Committee, the number of employees of the Secret Department not only did not decrease, but even increased several times.

By decision of the KhUP Congress of the CPSU (b), the party apparatus was reorganized according to the production-territorial principle. underwent treason

1 See *ibid.* S. 27.

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niya and apparatus of the Central Committee. Eight departments and two sectors were formed in the Central Committee: the Special Sector and the Sector of the Administration. "... The essence of this reorganization is not yet clear. But, most likely, the Special Sector retained the functions of the Secret Department, reorganized at the end of 1933, that is, it was engaged only in office work of the Politburo and personally served Stalin. On March 10, 1934, the Politburo appointed A. N. Poskrebyshv as head of the Special Sector! B. A. Dvinsky and K. R. Herzenberg remained deputies.

In my opinion, the functions of the Special Sector were not limited to the clerical work of the Politburo and the service of Stalin personally. The range of responsibilities and the solution of issues was much wider (as discussed above) and there was even some expansion of functions. For example, already in February - April 1934, the Bureau of International Information, located in the apparatus of the Central Committee, was actually included in the Special Sector of the Central Committee.



By the resolution of the Politburo of June 4, 1934 "On the distribution of duties between the secretaries of the Central Committee", I.V. Stalin unambiguously remained in control of the Special Sector. In addition, he was also assigned control over the hiring and dismissal of employees already in the entire apparatus of the Central Committee, and not just employees of secret divisions. The Decree of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6) "On the admission of workers to the apparatus of the Central Committee" of January 17, 1934 established that the admission and dismissal of all employees, without exception, to the apparatus of the Central Committee, should be carried out only with the approval of I. V. Stalin or M. L. Kaganovich. The secretariat of the Central Committee obliged all heads of departments of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to strictly adhere to this resolution<sup>2</sup>

In the likeness of the Central Committee, the structures of party committees in the localities were also reorganized. Special sectors with similar functions were formed in the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the Union republics, regional committees, and regional committees. So in the localities, as in the Central Committee, it was assumed that there were cipher workers who were part of the staff of the Special Sectors. For example, in April - May 1930, the Secretariat of the Central Committee adopted a resolution: "To oblige the regional committees, regional committees and the Central Committee of the nat. Communist Parties to ensure the presence in the Special Sectors of full-time cipher workers working exclusively on cipher work ..."3.

After the 18th Congress of the CPSU (6), the structure of the Central Committee again underwent changes. Directorates and departments, the Office of Affairs and the Special Sector, as well as the Marx-Engels Lenin Institute, were created. As seen

1 See O. V. Khlevnyuk, Politburo. The mechanism of political power in the 30s. S. 275.

2 See O. V. Khlevnyuk, A. V. Kvashonkin, L. P. Kosheleva, L. A. Rogovaya. Stalin's Politburo in the 1930s. Collection of documents. S. 138.

3 RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 114. D. 562. L. 10-11.

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A special sector was preserved. The local party apparatus also retained the Special Sectors, where the heads of the Special Sectors simultaneously became heads of the Shifrburo. In addition, by decision of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (6), the regional committees, regional committees, Central Committees of the Union republics were forbidden to remove and transfer to another job the heads of the Special Sectors and cipher workers without the consent of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, and also not to allow access to the cipherbot employees not approved by the Central Committee of the AUCP (6). The secretariat obliged the regional committees, regional committees and the Central Committee of the national Communist Parties of the Union republics until August 1, 1939. to submit for approval to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (6) Heads of special sectors and cipher workers of regional committees, regional committees and the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the Union republics!

The staff of the Special Sectors in the field was quite large. For example, in the Special Sector of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, according to the staffing table, there were: "Responsible employees - 9 people; technical workers - 68 people. In the Moscow Regional Committee: Responsible employees — 6 people; technical workers - 53 people"2. As for the personnel, as noted above, the vast majority of employees of the secret divisions of the Central Committee had to be members of the party (except for small technical personnel) and any violation on their part, not only at work, but also in everyday life, was considered a violation of party discipline. . Moreover, according to the resolution of the Politburo of May 5, 1927, regarding employees conducting secret work, it was stated that: "In relation to crimes on secret cases, all employees of institutions and organizations conducting secret work are subject to extrajudicial liability"3.

As can be seen, the Central Committee paid special attention to the quality of personnel in the secret divisions. Secrecy determined the nature and specifics of the work - they were considered secret employees of the Secretariat of the Central Committee. Possession of secret party and state information imposed a certain heightened responsibility for its safety. Appointments, transfers and release of secret employees from work were approved by the Secretariat of the Central Committee on the proposal of the head of the secret division of the Central Committee. The employees of these units were to a certain extent limited in their rights and actions. No one, not even relatives, was to know about the nature of their work. For example, about the requirements

presented to the secret employees of the Central Committee can be judged by the "Instructions for secret employees of the Sec" approved on September 15, 1923 by the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the RCP (6).

1 See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 116. D. 8. L. 103-104.

2 See *ibid.* F. 17. Op. 3. D. 1011. L. 78.

3 Cit. according to O. V. Khlevnyuk, A. V. Kvashonkin, L. P. Kosheleva, L. A. Rogovaya. Stalin's Politburo in the 1930s. Collection of documents. S. 77.

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Secretariat of the Central Committee of the RCP (6). It was recorded in it that none of the secret employees could conduct negotiations and conversations not in the order of fulfilling their direct duties, not about the decisions of party organizations, not in everyday life. The employee did not have the right to disclose the composition of secret employees and to dedicate friends and relatives to the nature of his work. They could not visit foreign missions and any of their members on personal business. About all their acquaintances in foreign missions, their relatives and their families or acquaintances who are abroad, with whom they maintain contact, the secret employees had to notify the Head of the Bureau of the Secretariat. None of the secret employees could work part-time in another institution without the consent of the Secretariat of the Central Committee! This instruction was introduced to all secret employees against signature with the ensuing consequences in case of violation.

Also, the degree of secrecy of employees of the secret parts of the party committees and cryptographers can be judged by the secret circular instruction No. 6 dated November 25, 1926, sent to the places of all the Central Committees of the Communist Parties, regional bureaus of the Central Committee, regional committees, regional committees and district committees, signed by the Secretary of the Central Committee S. V. Kosior, about the passage of the All-Union Census. In the letter, without fail, it was recommended that employees of the secret parts of the party committees and cryptographers in the census cards in the columns about the place of service and occupation not indicate positions that reveal the existence of cryptographic parts and the specifics of the work performed. Instead, it was necessary to indicate the name of the department, which includes the cipher-part (coder) or secret part, and the billing position equal to the actual position. For example, instead of "ciphertext" indicate: "technical secretary of the general department", instead of "clerk of the secret part" indicate: "clerk of the general department", etc. This circular related only to the passage of the All-Union census and did not apply to the party census.

The status of secret workers was also determined by special resolutions of the Secretariat of the Central Committee. So at a meeting of the Secretariat of the Central Committee on December 19, 1924, the issue of secret employees of the Bureau of the Secretariat of the Central Committee was considered, at which it was decided: "a) The work of employees of the Bureau of the Secretariat is considered secret party work. 6) Establish that all employees of the Bureau of the Secretariat should, at the suggestion of the Head. The Bureau of the Secretariat should immediately carry out the work given to them, timing the execution of the instructions of the grass-roots professional and party organizations in their free time. c) Instruct TT. Shkiryatov and Mekhlis to submit a list of secret

1 See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 112. D. 482. L. 78.

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employees of the Bureau of the Secretariat, whose work in terms of workload should be equated to mass party work! On January 30, 1925, at a meeting of the Secretariat of the Central Committee, a list of secret employees of the Bureau of the Secretariat of the Central Committee was approved, whose work in terms of workload was equated to mass party work. There were 27 people on the list. The list shows which positions were included in the main composition of the so-called "responsible employees" of the Bureau of the Secretariat. The composition of the employees of the secret unit, due to various movements, was constantly changing. All changes in the list were approved at the meetings of the Secretariat or the Organizing Bureau of the

All appointments of employees of secret subdivisions also passed through the approval at the meetings of the Politburo, the Orgburo, the Secretariat, i.e. at the highest party level. The head of the Secret Department (Bureau of the Secretariat) was approved by the Politburo; deputies and other responsible employees - the Organizing Bureau, the Secretariat of the Central Committee.

Thus, having come to power, the Bolsheviks until 1919 had not yet created a non-party apparatus as such, not special structures for the protection of information. Many issues related to the protection of information and secrecy were resolved at the state level, mainly through the Council of People's Commissars, the Cheka and the Revolutionary Military Council. Only with the formation of a full-fledged party structure and party apparatus at the US Congress of the RCP (6) in March 1919 did the first secret divisions of the party appear precisely as party structures. They were created in parallel with the organization of the entire party apparatus and were intended, at first, to ensure the organizational and technical work of the highest bodies of the party and to carry out secrecy in work by organizing secret office work. Prior to the formation in September 1921 of the Bureau of the Secretariat as a department, these divisions were part of the Administration of the Central Committee. Due to the lack and limited information for 1918 - 1919. According to the structure of the Central Committee, as well as the specifics of these units as conspiratorial, it is difficult to talk about the exact time of their emergence. The author did not find documents covering, to any extent, the structure and functional purpose of the secret divisions of the Central Committee for this period as such. The need to create certain structures and measures to protect party information, and, having come to power, now state information, was dictated by life itself. Information protection only brings success when it takes the form of a system as a whole. The system includes information security objects and information security authorities that use specific methods, environments in their work.

I RGASPI F. 17 Op. 112. D. 621 L. 10. 2 Ibid. F. 17 Op. 112. D. 635. L.21. 3 See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 112. D. 707. L. 8; F. 17. Op. 113. D. 244. L.9.

#### 44 1. Secret party units

activities, forms and activities, there are also users of this information. The first organs for the protection of party-state information (secrets) were the secret divisions of the party. As a result, since 1919, a Special Department of the Secretariat has been created in the apparatus of the Central Committee; 1920 - 1921 Secret (conspiratorial) department. On November 20, 1920, an independent secret operations department was formed - its tasks and time of functioning are not known to the author of the work. In 1921-1926. the Bureau of the Secretariat functioned, in 1926-1934. — the newly formed Secret Department. In 1934, on the basis of the Secret Department, a Special Sector of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6) was created. The names of these divisions changed, but the functions, as well as the quantitative composition, not only remained the same, but also expanded. The secret department (Bureau of the Secretariat, Special Sector) were relatively numerous in terms of the number of employees. So, in the early 1930s, it was the second largest division, second only to the Administration. In fact, after each reduction in the apparatus of the Central Committee, the number of employees of secret divisions not only did not decrease, but was then revised upwards. The main backbone of the employees of the secret divisions of the Central Committee were assistants to the Secretaries of the Central Committee. Throughout the existence of these units, one of I. V. Stalin's assistants became the head of the unit and was personally subordinate to him. The secret department (Bureau of the Secretariat) was headed by I. V. Stalin's assistants, I. P. Tovstukha, then A. N. Poskrebyshev (for a short time there were A. M. Nazaretyan and L. Z. Mekhlis). These structures also included the technical services of the Politburo, the Orgburo, the Secretariat, subdivisions conducting secret office work, providing secret encrypted communications, secret storage of documents, and other, smaller services. Over time, the functions of the secret divisions of the Central Committee also expanded. The employees of the Secret Department (Bureau of the Secretariat), in addition to ensuring the technical, organizational, documentation work of the highest bodies of the party, conducting secret office work, carried out, in fact, also other regime-secret activities.

Initially, these divisions did not play an independent role in the formation of the information security system, but gradually their role and importance as a special body increased. Increasingly, the secret divisions of the Central Committee acted as the initiators of decisions (prepared draft resolutions of the highest bodies of the party, developed their own acts, instructions, circulars, etc.) in the field of information protection. From the documents studied, it is not yet entirely clear whether, in this period, the Central Committee, in addition to the listed units, had structures that fully performed the functions of a regime-secret

The structure and staffing of the secret divisions of the party 45

organ, or in part, another division of the Central Committee, which was entrusted with the execution of secret regime functions? But it can be said quite definitely that in addition to conducting secret office work, secret divisions carried out almost the entire complex of regime-secret activities: they checked the conditions for the storage and use of secret documents, investigated facts of violations of the requirements of instructions and rules on secret office work, storage and use of secret documents. Together with the bodies of the Cheka, the GPU, the NKVD, the NKGB, these divisions of the Central Committee investigated the facts of the loss of secret documents and the disclosure of secret information, developed secret legal documents, carried out encryption and decryption work, and carried out other regime-secret functions. In the early 1930s, the Secret Department was strengthened, its role increased, the department was transferred from Staraya Square directly to the Kremlin.

Thus, it can be stated that the Bureau of the Secretariat, the Secret Department, the Special Sector, were special operational secret divisions of the Central Committee, which ensured the work of the highest party bodies, the General Secretary, and almost completely performed the functions of a regime-secret division. In his likeness, such units were created in the local party committees, where their work was based on the principle of the Secret Department of the Central Committee and reported directly to the secretaries of the party committees, also performing, among other things, the functions of a regime-secret organ, ensured the safety of information constituting the party - a state secret. The work of responsible employees of these units was equated in terms of workload with mass party work and was considered secret.

Answering the question whether I. V. Stalin used the secret divisions of the party in the political struggle, it can be stated that he undoubtedly used them to the extent that he used the entire party apparatus, the head of which, as General Secretary, he was. The secret subdivisions of the Central Committee and in local party bodies in their dynamics have gone from purely technical to regime-secret subdivisions. Despite the constant reorganization of the apparatus of the Central Committee, the change in the names, functions and tasks of the Secret Department of the Central Committee and its successors, created in 1920, remained unchanged until the Great Patriotic War. This gave I. V. Stalin a certain advantage in the struggle for leadership and, ultimately, predetermined the outcome of the internal political struggle. Through the party apparatus subordinate to him, he possessed complete and reliable information, both in the center and in the localities. It was precisely "complete and reliable" information that was, for example, in the closed letters of the secretaries

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Scheme 1. Secret divisions of the Central Committee of the RKI (6) - VKP (6) in 1919 - 1941 (before World War II)

Special Department of the Secretariat (Conspiratorial) Department 1919 - February 1920

Secret-Secret-directive operational department part (subdivision)

10/20/1920

Secret department 1920 - 1921 (referring to the Department of Affairs of the Central Committee)

Bureau of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the RCP (6) - VKP (6) (1921 - 1926)

Secret Department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (6) (1926 - 1934) Reorganized in 1933

Special sector of the Central Committee of the CPSU (6) (since 1934)

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party committees and reports of the Cheka-OGPU-NKVD, which passed through the secret divisions of the Central Committee. And, apparently, the first place they got to was the desktop of I.V. Stalin. He knew more than his opponents and was aware of everything that was happening in the party and in the country, both in the center and in the localities, he was aware of the current state of affairs, the mood of the broad masses and party workers. JV Stalin, possessing certain information, could predict the reaction of the majority, both party workers and the people, to certain decisions being made. This gave him the opportunity to prepare and then implement adequate political decisions. To a certain extent, he either expressed the political sentiments of the majority (the people and the apparatus) or could oppose the majority with his own arguments. JV Stalin, being a good organizer and party functionary, understood the significance of this unit, since it was through him that the most reliable and important information passed. In the end, he owned the cadres, nominating for work, both in the apparatus and for mass party work, the people he needed, through whom he carried out his policy.

### 1.2. ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS OF WORK AND DOCUMENTATION OF INFORMATION PROTECTION IN THE STRUCTURES OF RCP(B)-VKP(B). "CLOSED LETTERS", "SPECIAL FOLDER"

In order to provide documentary support for management and create optimal conditions for working with documents in the activities of state and other structures, general office work is carried out, which carries management functions. At the same time, secret office work from the point of view of information protection is one of the organizational methods for protecting information. Party normative documents, starting from 1922, demarcated the conduct of party and state office work. In addition, oral or written reference to secret party documents was prohibited in state office work. Initially, secret divisions of the party were created to conduct secret office work, performing purely technical functions. Thus, in 1922, the Bureau of the Secretariat included the Secret Office with a staff of 18 people. The department was headed by the head, secret office work was conducted by senior clerks and clerks of the 1st category. The staff also had typists, telegraphers, couriers. Secret party records existed, but there were no general rules for its conduct. Thus, in a secret circular letter of the Central Committee to all Regional Bureaus of the Central Committee, national Communist Party, regional committees, city committees, sent in January 1923, the Central Committee suggested that all party committees be guided by the "Instruction on the procedure for storing and moving secret documents" established for Soviet institutions. . Moreover, the personal responsibility for the correct application of the instructions was assigned to responsible employees!.

1 See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 84. D. 697. L. 335.

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The first party instructions related to working with secret documents concerned only the most important secret documents, such as the minutes of meetings of the Politburo, the Organizing Bureau, the Secretariat. It was not until 1923 that the Central Committee developed a party "Instruction on the procedure for keeping and moving secret documents", as well as an instruction regulating the procedure for preparing, registering, sending, storing secret correspondence and the procedure for sending secret correspondence abroad! In the same year, incoming journals for registration of secret documents and peddling books were abolished in the apparatus of the Central Committee, which were replaced by a card registration system. In 1923, the Administration of the Central Committee carried out work to unify and put in order the office work and archives of the apparatus.

Central Committee. In May - June 1923, the "Regulations on a unified system of office work, registry and archive of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the RCP (6)"<sup>2</sup> were approved. A unified Central Registry was created in the Central Committee, where all incoming correspondence was received and registered. Secret correspondence addressed to the Politburo or the Secretariat of the Central Committee was received and registered on cards, then sent to the executors directly through the Bureau of the Secretariat, which had its own secret registry.

The attitude in the Central Committee to the execution of unclassified and secret documents was different. Ordinary correspondence was sent out according to the affiliation no later than two hours after receipt, and secret correspondence immediately after registration. After execution and temporary storage in office work, the documents were handed over to a special secret archive. Secret documents were not handed over to the Central Archive. If simple certificates could be received from the registry orally, then secret ones were issued at the written request of the Secretaries of the Central Committee, deputies and heads of departments.

In 1924, in the Bureau of the Secretariat, secret clerical work was under the authority of the Secretary of the Bureau of the Secretariat, who reported to senior clerks, assistants, translators, registrars, typists, etc. - a total of more than 40 employees. The number of secret documents passing through the secret registry and the expedition of the Bureau of the Secretariat was quite large. For example, during the period from April to September 1925, 15,960 documents were registered in the secret registry, an average of 103 to 109 documents per day. Sent to addresses through a secret expedition in April - September 1925, there were packages from other cities -

1 See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 84. D. 697. L. 343-346. 2 See *ibid.* F. 17. Op. 84. D. 488. L. 60-62v. 3 See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 84. D. 944. L. 268.

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11635; in Moscow - 27,095; parcels - 167. Out-of-town correspondence was sent from the Secretariat of the Politburo - 1508; from the Secret Registry - 9775; Central Committee of the Komsomol - 3765; Departments of the Central Committee - 2790. City correspondence was sent from the Secretariat of the Politburo - 7958; from the Secret Registry - 15817; Central Committee of the Komsomol - 1089; Departments of the Central Committee - 22281. Through the Secret Registry of the Bureau of the Secretariat from May 25, 1924 to January 25, 1925, 108142 packages were sent? As you can see, the numbers are significant, but it should be noted that this is only a fifth of the total correspondence of the Central Committee for this period, which is quite normal in terms of the ratio of unclassified and secret information.

By the second half of the twenties, the structure of subdivisions involved in secret clerical work also took shape. In 1926, after the creation on the basis of the Bureau of the Secretariat of the Secret Department of the Central Committee, it included several divisions that provided secret office work. These included: Current office work, Control sub-department, Reference and codification sub-department, Sub-department for accounting and return of documents, General sub-department, Secret registry, Typing Bureau with its special secret part, Expedition, Bureau (section) of stenographers. For example, Current Records Management was part of the Secret Registry and consisted of 9 parts. It was engaged in acceptance, classification, accounting of movement, layout of documents for relevant cases, keeping cards, control of outgoing documents. Their duties also included the layout of incoming newspapers and magazines, the storage and accounting of letters received by the Secretaries of the Central Committee, the preparation of materials for destruction, the issuance of certificates, etc. Documents on issues not subject to discussion at the Politburo, Orgburo, secretariat. This unit also had an archive consisting of a senior and three archivists. Through the Secret Expedition, secret correspondence was sent around Moscow, correspondence from other cities, and documents abroad. Correspondence was transported by self-rollers and through feldsvyazy agencies.

In 1926 - 1927. there is an intensification of all the secret work of the Central Committee, including work on the organization and regulation of the secret office work of the Central Committee. For example, in 1926 "Instructions for the Secret Expedition of the Bureau of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6)", instructions "On the procedure for registering and sending outgoing secret

ÿ See Ibid L. 265.

2 See Ibid L. 350.

3 See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 85. D. 539. L. 1-7. 4 See ibid. L. 62-70.

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papers! Based on this instruction, all secret correspondence, including those of departments of the Central Committee, was to be sent only through the secret registry. In 1927, the following provisions were prepared: "On the secret part of the Typewriting Bureau under the Administration of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6) and the Central Committee of the Komsomol", as well as "Instructions for registering secret incoming papers of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (6)"<sup>3</sup>. In the same year, the composition of the secret documents of the Central Committee was determined, which is of great operational importance for the regulation and determination of secret and non-secret documents of the Central Committee. The composition of incoming secret documents was recorded in the "List of incoming correspondence subject to registration in the Secret Registry"<sup>4</sup>. At the end of 1926, the order of the evening duty of the registrar of the Secret Registry for outgoing correspondence was also determined, for which an appropriate instruction was drawn up, agreed with the head of the Secret Department, I.P. Tovstukha and Head of the Secret Chancellery Bremann \$. Evening duty at the reception was carried out from 15.30 to 23.00 on working days and 11.00 to 19.00 weekends and holidays.

In 1929, for the purpose of secrecy, instead of the names of the departments, the digital designation of the sectors was introduced, behind which the true purpose of the units of the Secret Department was hidden. This also applied to secret office work. This is how the subdivisions conducting secret office work were encrypted: the Secretariat, leading the office work of the Politburo - Sector P; clerical work of the Organizing Bureau - III sector; accounting, control and return of secret documents - U sector; office (registration, external and internal communications, typing, shorthand) - YIII sector.

In the 1930s, the system of secret office work changed slightly. In 1932, four divisions of the Secret Department were directly involved in secret office work. Of these, two were the office work of the Politburo and the Orgburo, the third ensured the distribution of documents in encrypted form, the fourth took into account the return of documents of the highest bodies of the party, which were sent for execution and information to the localities, as well as to a certain circle of party and state officials. leaders. The Office of the Secret Department provided auxiliary operations: registration, communication, reprinting of documents, shorthand recording of meetings of the Politburo, the Organizing Bureau, the Secretariat. In the future, secret office work is concentrating

1 See RGASPI. L. 21-22.

2 See ibid. F. 17. Op. 85. D. 537. L. 42-44.

3 See ibid. F. 17. Op. 85. D. 538. L. 195-198. 4 See ibid. F. 17. Op. 85. D. 542. L. 336.

5 See ibid. F. 17. Op. 85. D. 539. L. 19-20.

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moose in the Special Sector of the Central Committee organized in 1934. Unfortunately, the author does not have documents covering the process of conducting secret office work by the Special Sector. But

It is known that the Special Sector, according to its functional purpose, continued the work of the Secret Department of the Central Committee.

Thus, the organization of secret office work was the main and most important organizational measure of the RCP (6) - VKP (6) for the protection of information in party bodies, since it was the organizational forms in this historical period that were decisive and prevailed over the technical means of protecting information formations. This was, first of all, due to the low level of development of special equipment, when the human factor and organizational methods of information protection were the main ones.

Another means of protecting information in the party bodies in this period was the organization of closed (secret) meetings of the highest bodies of the party. Despite the secrecy of ordinary meetings, by the decision of the Politburo of February 5, 1927, regular closed meetings of the Politburo are introduced twice a month. In addition to members of the Politburo, only candidates for members of the Politburo and representatives of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission in the Politburo, and in their absence, deputies, could attend the meetings, and from May 5, the Secretaries of the Central Committee were also allowed to attend. From May 12, 1927, instead of closed meetings of the Politburo, a closed part of ordinary meetings was established, which were attended by members and candidate members of the Politburo, as well as members of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission. However, it is known that in a number of cases, as, for example, on June 23, 1927, ordinary members of the Central Committee were also present at the closed part of the Politburo meetings! The call of speakers to closed meetings of the Politburo was established by the Secretariat of the Central Committee. A total of 11 closed meetings were held, at which issues of foreign policy and international relations were considered (possibly in connection with Curzon's ultimatum). But on August 11, 1927, the Politburo abolished the regular holding of closed sessions. It was decided to convene closed meetings on individual issues each time according to a special resolution of the Politburo. But later, by a resolution of the Politburo of December 30, 1930, the practice of regular closed meetings was restored: "Listened: 17/27. - On the meetings of the Politburo (comrade Stalin). Resolved: a) At the meetings of the Politburo on the 10th, 20th and 30th, to hear only questions of the GPU, People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, defense, currency (secret) and some internal party issues, deferring consideration of other issues to the next meetings of the Politburo (5,

ÿ See Zelenov M.V. Apparatus of the Central Committee of the RCP (6) - VKP (b) ... P. 119.

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15th and 25th of every month). c) Entrust the preparation of the agenda of the Politburo to the Secretariat of the Central Committee together with Comrade Molotov.

Schedule the next PB meeting for January 7 (at 12 noon)"!.

Decisions adopted at closed and extraordinary meetings of the Politburo were most often recorded as annexes to the minutes of regular meetings under the heading "decisions of the Politburo" without indicating the lists of those present at the meetings"2. In 1929, for example, three closed meetings were held, which dealt with the defense of the country.

In the process of strengthening the personal influence of I. V. Stalin, when more and more issues were resolved directly by him, members of the Politburo - his associates and supporters, as well as in connection with the aggravation of the international situation, especially important secret issues were considered by a narrow circle of trusted General Secretary of the Party, persons. To resolve such issues, by a resolution of the Politburo of April 14, 1937, special commissions were created under the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6): "Heard: 53. On the preparation of questions for the PB of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (6). Resolved: In order to prepare for the PB, and in case of special urgency - and to resolve issues of a secret nature, including foreign policy issues, to create a permanent commission at the PB of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6) consisting of Comrades. Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, L. Kaganovic



In order to intensify the preparation for the PB of urgent current issues of an economic nature, to create a permanent commission under the PB of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6) consisting of comrades. Molotov, Stalin, Chubar, Mikoyan and Kaganovich L. These commissions existed until the Great Patriotic War.

The Central Committee attached particular importance to the information support of the work of the central organs of the party. In the structure of the Central Committee from the very beginning there was a division that ensured the collection, systematization and distribution of information material to the interested instances of the Central Committee and to the localities. This information, in the form of informational and statistical reports, was both open, within certain limits for party members, and closed. Secret (closed) information was intended for a strictly defined circle of users. Certain specific types and whole complexes of secret documents were formed. The most famous of them, the so-called "closed" or "political" letters

I RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D.9. L. 112.

2 See O.V. Khlevnyuk, A. V. Kvashonkin, L. P. Kosheleva, L. A. Rogovaya. Stalin's Politburo in the 1930s. Collection of documents L. 176.

3 RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 986. L. 16-17.

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and Special folders. The information support system through closed letters developed in the early 1920s. The first mention of them in the minutes of the Organizing Bureau of the secretariat of the Central Committee is found in 1922. Thus, in the clarification of the circular of the Central Committee of the RCP (6) No. 31, sent to all regional committees, national Central Committees and the regional bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (6), it is confirmed that, along with open information and statistical reports: "... one copy of the political letter of the secretaries of organizations sent to the regional committee or regional bureau of the Central Committee or to their national Central Committee, and the other to the Central Committee of the RCP (6). The Central Committee of the RCP (6) invites all regional bureaus of the Central Committee, regional committees and national Central Committees to observe the exact implementation of the said circular to local organizations ... In political letters of the secretaries of regional committees, national Central Committees and regional of the entire region with a brief assessment and description of the state and work of the party organizations included in this association!

Based on the materials of the closed letters of the secretaries, the Organizational Department of the Central Committee compiled monthly written summaries for the Secretariat of the Central Committee. It should also be noted the composition of the information that should have been covered in closed letters. So, for example, in the political report of the Kharkov Gubernia Committee to the Central Committee, for May - August 1922, questions of the economic and political state of the province were covered; the state of the party organization; the growth of the party organization and its composition; work in production; work among non-party people, women, youth, trade unions; work in the police, military cells; work in the village, patronage over the village; propaganda work?. What was it for? So, at a meeting of the Secretariat on September 27, 1922, which considered the issue of closed letters, it was decided: "To instruct the Organizational Department at the end of each month to compile written reports on the state and work of party organizations on the political mood of the population and on the most important phenomena of the economic life, using the materials of the closed letters of the secretaries received during the given month. 2. If it is necessary to take immediate action on this or that closed letter, to propose to the Organizational Department to make practical proposals to the Secretariat»3. In November 1923, the Bureau of the Secretariat compiled a summary for the Secretariat of the Central Committee on closed letters for July-September and the first half of November 1923. The summary noted activities such as practical and general issues put forward by secretaries; suggestions for improvement in a particular area; positive activities;

I RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 112. D. 356. L. 73. 2 See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 84 D. 362. L.9. 3 Ibid. F. 17. Op. 112. D. 374. L. 3.

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TA, PROTECT THE HOMELAND!

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HUNTING OUT YOUR ENEMIES, REPORTING TO ADULTS!

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negative phenomena of an inner-party character; the brightest facts from the life of the RKSM; activities of anti-Soviet parties!.

As can be seen, the information contained in the "closed" letters served not only as a source containing information for information, but also made it possible for the highest bodies of the party to take practical actions to resolve certain issues. But, nevertheless, the information received by the Organizational Department from the secretaries of the Party organizations did not always satisfy the Central Committee. Therefore, the Central Committee sent secret instructions to the localities regarding the preparation of closed letters. Thus, at the end of 1922, a secret letter was sent to all secretaries of the regional bureau of the Central Committee, national Central Committees, regional and provincial committees, and the head of the Organizational Department of the Central Committee explaining in what form and what information to provide to the Central Committee. The letter stated: "In the circular on the reporting of the Central Committee, general instructions were given on the nature of the content of the closed letters of the secretaries of the party committees. In spite of this, the letters received in the majority suffer from a lack of plan and concretization of messages, are pale in their inner content and almost do not illuminate the life of the party and its work among the worker and peasant masses. Therefore, the Central Committee, in addition to the circulars already issued on closed letters, considers it necessary to make the following instructions: Leaving the previous plan for presenting closed letters (Circular No. 31), it is necessary to focus their main attention on the state and work of party organizations: identifying negative and processes in them and on the work of the Party among the non-Party masses. These messages need to be backed up more with figures, facts and illustrations. 2. When elucidating the political and economic situation of a given region or province, it is necessary to avoid repetition in reports, and also to refuse to clutter up letters with administrative and economic questions that can and should be resolved in a Soviet manner. 3. It is necessary to pay more attention to the processes of a social and political nature taking place in the countryside, such as: the growth of the political activity of the kulaks, the facts of the class struggle in the countryside, etc. Along with this, it is necessary to cover in letters the forms and content of the movement among intelligentsia and clergy. 4. When compiling closed letters, it is necessary to be guided by the instructions already made on the size of the latter, to make them as short as possible, but also more specific. Instead of general reasoning and general phrases when evaluating certain events, such as "the mood is satisfactory" or "not satisfactory", "industry is developing", "the clergy is successfully splitting", "pro

ÿ See *ibid.* F. 17. Op. 84 D. 492. L. 139-142.

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the professorship under the guise of science is carrying out a bourgeois ideology," etc., it is necessary to group the available concrete material in such a way and provide it with illustrations, the most striking and characteristic facts and figures, so that the assessment itself follows from the data presented! As can be seen, the Central Committee instructed the party committees in the most detailed way how to prepare closed letters.

In 1923, the apparatus of the Central Committee established a procedure for dealing with "closed" letters from secretaries of regional committees. The development of these letters was entrusted to the Organizational Department and the Bureau of the Secretariat: "1) The development of questions along the party line is concentrated in the Organizational Department. 2) Development of questions on

economic and Soviet lines is concentrated in the Bureau of the Secretariat. 3) The Bureau of the Secretariat and the Organizational Department mutually inform each other by exchanging copies of correspondence in closed letters. 4) Closed letters are processed within a week”?

But the procedure established in this way did not cancel the distribution of materials according to the "closed" letters and protocols of the gubernia and regional committees and the "closed" letters themselves, carried out by the Informer Department to the departments of the Central Committee. It should be noted that the secret information emanating from the information department had to be signed or with the visa of one of the Secretaries of the Central Committee.

The number and categories of officials who had the right to get acquainted with the contents of “closed” letters were strictly limited. So, on March 8, 1923, at a meeting of the Politburo, a list of officials who received and had the right to get acquainted with the content of "closed" letters was approved:

At the same time, it was pointed out that the secretary of the provincial committee had the right to acquaint the secretaries of the ukoms who came to the provincial committee with the contents of the letter and that the secretary of the provincial committee or a member of the Bureau of the provincial committee could, in necessary cases, make an instructive report at the meetings of the party activists, using the material and conclusions of the letter. In May 1923, at a meeting of the Orgburo, apparently at the request of the political departments, it was decided to send closed letters to the political departments of the fronts, districts, armies and navies. This issue was submitted for approval by the Politburo. The composition of the recipients of "closed letters" was constantly changing depending on the political situation and the principle of expediency. As you can see, only the highest party-state apparatus had the right to receive and get acquainted with this information. The transfer of classified information was carried out only through secret office work.

1 RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 112. D. 395. L. 57. 2 Ibid. F. 17. Op. 112. D. 480. L. 15.

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The following comrades receive closed letters and get acquainted with its contents:

Acquainted with: Received by: Members and candidate members of the Central Committee Each personally

Members and candidate members of the Central Control Commission Presidium of the Central Control Commission in the amount of 3-5 letters

Members of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission under the responsibility of the head

Editor: Pravda, Izvestia, Economic | Responsible editor of every life”, “Poor”, “Working newspaper”. Doy from said newspaper

Secretary of the Central Committee, regional committee, Gubkom:

Members and candidates of the Central Committee, nat. Communist Parties, Regional Bureau, Regional Committee, Gubkom, GKK, Gub. Rev. Kom, Responsible instructors of the Gubkom, Head. Departments, Secretary of the Civil Code of the RKSM, Editor, Members of the faction of the Presidium of the SFRC, the Presidium of the CEC and the Presidium of the State Electoral Commission, Chairman and Deputy. Chairman of the GO GPU, commander of the district troops and early. District PU

Members of the district committees of Moscow and St. Petersburg and the Secretary of the district committee "of other industrial points according to the list

Organization Department

I RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3..D. 340. L. 7-8.

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All information material received by the Central Committee was concentrated in the Information Department of the Central Committee. It was necessary to summarize the collected information, develop and provide material to top management for making an appropriate decision. This is especially important

It was during a period of intensification of the internal party struggle associated with the difficulties of economic development, the restoration of the economy after the Civil War, crop failures, unemployment, and the intensification of the class struggle in the countryside. In turn, the Information Department prepared and sent closed letters of the Central Committee to the secretaries of party committees in the field and submitted questions to the Central Committee on issues of improving and improving information work. It was necessary to summarize the information collected, develop and provide material to the top party leadership for adoption solutions. The information department of the Central Committee raised issues related to information support to the highest party authorities. In July 1924, the department prepared a report for the Orgburo, where it touched upon the whole range of issues related to the concentration, collection and development of information, including closed letters.

On July 7, 1924, the Orgburo prepared a draft, and then approved the Resolution on the report of the Information Department of the Central Committee. The resolution drew the attention of the Information Department to collecting information about intra-party life, about the processes taking place in the working class and in the countryside, related to the level of wages, unemployment, crop failures, trade and cooperation. It was proposed to cover the work of the Plenums, the Politburo, the Secretariat, in Pravda and through Rosta, to send out monthly reviews of internal party life and the work of the Central Committee to provincial committees, regional committees and ukomas in the form of letters. The Organizing Bureau instructed the Information Department, together with the Organizing Department, the Agitprop, the Zhenotdel and the Press Department, to develop the issue of concentrating all information in the Information Department, to start reworking the existing reporting scheme for local committees so that the reporting reflects the most important moments in current life. parties.

With regard to closed letters, it was noted that: "In order to more fully inform the gubernia and regional committees about the political situation and more fully cover the activities of the Central Committee, it is necessary to recognize, along with the distribution of the protocols of the Plenums and the Politburo, the distribution of closed letters to the secretaries every 3 months, and the material for them should be prepared by the Information Department.

6. Noting this great importance, which is the regular distribution of sealed letters by gubernia and regional committees for announcement and discussion at meetings of cells, to invite the Information Department to develop the existing experience and prepare a proposal that boils down to ensuring that such letters are sent out in the near future to all GK and OK

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For their cells .... Regularly draw the attention of the GC and OC to issues that require special attention from the secretaries of the GC and OC when compiling closed letters and reports! As can be seen, this resolution outlined the main directions for collecting, concentrating, developing and sending information both to the Central Committee and to the localities. It was planned to acquaint the members of the Party more widely with the materials of the closed letters, bringing their discussion to meetings of cells, i.e., the broad masses of the Party, thereby softening the regime of secrecy. It was especially important that in their letters the leaders of party organizations were obliged to note negative aspects as well. Thus, in the closed letter of the Pskov Provincial Committee for May - June 1924 sent to the Bureau of the Secretariat of the Central Committee, when analyzing the state of the party organization, the political mood of the population, the intelligentsia and the peasantry, in particular, it was noted that along with the growth of the organization at the expense of workers from the ka, there was dissatisfaction with the peasants of the Soviet regime. The peasants were dissatisfied with the large percentage of loans, the slow pace of land management work, and the bribery of foresters. In the letter, the secretary also noted that the big issue is the decision to disband the CHON. The secretary noted in his letter that, despite the fact that the province is a frontier province, the Soviet authorities have few forces, and banditry is high<sup>2</sup>.

It was also important that in the letters the leaders of party organizations had to draw their own conclusions and conclusions, as well as make proposals on the issues raised. For example, in a closed letter for October - November, 1924, the secretary of the Omsk Provincial Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (6) highlighted the general economic situation in the province, the state of agriculture and crop failure,

budget, grain procurement and trade, grain forage balance, agricultural tax, collection of seed loans, cooperation, prices and the beginning of a procurement company, trade union work, raising labor productivity and wages, unemployment, mood and processes in the countryside, re-elections to village councils and district executive committees, Tiansk committees, rural intelligentsia, crime. As regards the state of the party organization, the letter touched on such points as the composition of the party, the social status of the members of the organization, moods, "painful deviations and phenomena", responses to the speeches of L. D. Trotsky, work in the countryside, the Komsomol. In conclusion, the secretary draws conclusions about the intensification of educational work, the fight against drunkenness, the intensification of work in the trade unions and the countryside, the fight against private procurers, the collection of seed loans, the increase in productivity.

1 See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 112. D. 578. L. 7-8. 2 See *ibid.* F. 17. Op. 84. D. 733. L. 39-44.

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of labor, on the staffing and organization of co-operatives without scarce work, on the revision of the cadres of business executives, etc.!

To resolve issues raised in closed letters, the Central Committee promptly forwarded information to certain departments for consideration. So, for example, a letter from the Samara Provincial Committee, sent in November 1925, which notes the facts of excess taxes from private traders, was sent to the Deputy People's Commissar for Finance of the USSR N.P. Bryukhanov, for a specific solution to the issue. In June 1924, the Secretariat instructed the Orgraspred to systematically answer the questions raised by the secretaries of the Civil Code in their closed letters, by means of letters of instruction, raising individual questions at the Secretariat, etc. For the period from May 1923 to May 1924 (from XI to KhP congresses) The Secretariat of the Central Committee sent 150 circular documents to the local party organs, of which 30 were secret, that is, 1/5 part.

In turn, the Information Department also sent to the Secretary of the Central Committee I.V. Stalin daily and monthly information and political reports to raise questions with the Secretariat. Thus, in a summary sent to I.V. Stalin in November 1924, such most important issues for the country as the economic condition, wages, cooperation, banditry, religious movements, the mood of the peasants, the state of party organizations, Leninist call, Soviet construction, agitation and propaganda work, work in the countryside and among women, about national organizations". These reports were classified as "top secret" and "keep as a cipher." Often, this information was transmitted to the Central Committee together with the reports of the OGPU, which were obligatorily received by the Central Committee.

The secretariat of the Central Committee also exercised control and carried out regular surveys of party organizations in the field. The reports of the instructors of the Central Committee on the results of the examination also passed through the Bureau of the Secretariat. At the same time, there was a violation of executive discipline at the Organizing Bureau and the Secretariat, since the secretaries of local party committees did not always send closed letters to the Central Committee. Thus, according to the Decree of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) dated October 16, 25, "On the transfer of the Civil Code, OK, Regional Committees, Bureau of the Central Committee and nat. Communist Parties" stated that: "In connection with the non-delivery of closed letters by a number of party organizations, the Central Committee confirmed the need for regular sending by the provincial committees, regional committees, regional committees, the bureau of the Central Committee, the Central Committee of the national communist parties and the closed letters allocated for information communication to the Central Committee. The Central Committee has established the sending of closed letters | once a month, including in this number of letters and reports from

1 See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 84. D. 730. L. 36-56. 2 See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 84. D. 682. L. 10-16.

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specific urgent matters. The Central Committee pointed out that in closed letters secretaries should cover only the main issues of political life, the internal state of the Party and the work of organizations that require information from the Central Committee, as well as the adoption of practical measures and the issuance of instructions,

moreover, letters should not be cluttered with local material of a general political nature!

In 1927, the Information Department of the Central Committee prepared a number of fundamental documents on the content of information work, such as "The main types of information materials, their compilation and use", "Information work technique (On the procedure for collecting, processing and storing information materials)", "Information materials accounting scheme (according to the decimal classification system)", where all types of information work and information documents were described in detail. Naturally, they also analyzed the personal (closed) letters of the secretaries of the party committees. The sealed letters were classified as materials "for informing the apparatus of the party committee" and "materials for informing higher party organs". As well as original copies of the minutes of meetings of congresses, Plenums, Commissions of the Central Committee, local party committees and their transcripts, closed letters were considered the most important documents of the party and were subject to classification and limited use. It was also noted that: "Particularly important meetings, plenums, conferences, etc. are recorded in shorthand, and the shorthand records of the speeches of the comrades who spoke are given to them for preview. The original original text of the transcripts is kept in a secret archive. Verbatim records on certain issues of the meetings are attached to the minutes of the meeting, which is kept separately. The nature of the transcripts (secret or non-secret) and the circle of bodies and persons to whom they are sent is determined in each specific case separately, depending on the issue under discussion.

There was also a certain procedure for working with closed letters. Closed (personal) letters of the secretaries, as information material for the higher party committee, received from the secretaries of the lower party committees, were processed as follows: "1. a) reproduction of closed letters for the circle of employees determined by the party committee, in whole or in an abbreviated (concise) form; 6) use of the messages given in them for summaries and developments. 2. It is possible to send individual letters to the workers of the apparatus of the party committee in outlined form: not the whole letter is sent out, only its most significant passages; at the beginning, the main points are indicated on which

ÿ See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 112. D. 701. L.3. 2 See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 113. D. 191. L. 98.

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the format apparatus considers it necessary to pay attention; characteristic moments are emphasized!

The nature of the closed letters of the secretaries is determined by the secrecy of their handling and the possibility of their use. Closed (personal) letters from secretaries of party committees to higher party bodies were to set as their task: 1) raising the question before a higher party body, taking into account the requirements put forward by the conditions of practical work; 2) informing the higher party organ of the most topical and important moments and questions that are or arise in the work and state of the organization, about which the secretary of the party committee considers it necessary to inform the higher party organ as soon as possible from the point of view of his personal assessment. It should be noted that the closed letter in no way replaced the informational report and did not have the character of such: only a few were taken from the state and work of the organization - relevant and important points that really require special coverage from ordinary coverage. Outwardly, the maximum brevity in presentation had to be observed<sup>2</sup>. Closed letters from the secretaries of local party organs were "processed" out of turn, outlined or reproduced in full for the leading workers of the party committee. The above resolutions of the Secretariat of the Central Committee and the documents of the Information Department, which quite fully regulated the procedure for compiling, processing and distributing closed letters, were fundamental for working with these documents.

Other most classified documents of the Central Committee were part of the protocols from ordinary meetings of the highest bodies of the party, but decided in secret or directly.

protocols of closed (secret) meetings of party bodies and secret commissions and materials for them, formed in the so-called "special folders". It is not known exactly the time when both the set of documents and the term "Special Folder" appeared. So far, no document has been found in party archival materials that officially introduced this term into circulation and a list of documents included in the "special folder". In any case, one can speak of a "special folder" as a set of documents of a particularly secret nature, deposited on secret issues at regular meetings and at secret (closed) meetings of party bodies. Basically, these are secret protocols and preparatory materials for them: drafts, transcripts, telegrams, etc. Regarding the time when the "special folder" appeared, among archivists and historians there are

1 See *ibid.* L. 101-102. 2 See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 113. D. 191. L. 106.

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different points of view. There is an opinion that the "special folder" existed already in 1919. But, as M. V. Zelenov writes about the "special folder": "Some decisions of the PB were endowed with top-secret content and since 1923 were formalized as a "special folder".... The appearance of "special folders" is natural and one can only be surprised at that that they did not appear before 1923, since Lenin, back in August 1921 proposed that the secret parts of the reports be allocated to a secret meeting of the PB. A little earlier, in July 1921, Lenin insisted on special storage of the minutes of the Orgburo, writing on one of them: "secret, in a special cover"!

According to the studies made by the author of the open minutes of the meetings of the Politburo, the Orgburo, the Secretariat of the Central Committee, it was recorded that for the first time in these documents the term "Special Folder" appears in 1923. The first closed protocol of the "Special Folder", which is stored in the RGAPI, dates back to May 31, 1923. In the open protocols, the first mention of the "special folder" we find in the protocol No. 5 of the meeting of the Politburo, held in January 1924, on the issues of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs - this is how this protocol says: "Decision - "Special folder""; in the protocol of the Politburo No. 40 dated 12/11/24, paragraph 35 - On the League of Nations - "Decision - "Special Folder"". Previously, there was no mention of a "special folder" in the open protocols of the Politburo, the Orgburo, and the Secretariat of the Central Committee. As can be seen, only the issue under discussion was indicated in the open protocols; the content was not disclosed in the resolution, but only briefly noted: "Decision - "Special Folder". Materials for these decisions, drafts, handwritten versions, etc., as well as the text of the decision, were kept separately. They were not included in the minutes, they were sent for storage to the thematic folders of the Politburo with the designation "do not include in the protocol" or "do not attach to the protocol". Apparently, they were kept either directly in the secret archive of the Politburo, or in the archive of the Bureau of the Secretariat (Secret Department). In our opinion, the secret protocols and materials to them constituted the main part of the documents of the "special folder" of the Politburo. Special protocols were drawn up in "several copies and extracts from them were sent only to those officials who were ordered to comply with the relevant decision. Moreover, not the entire decision was sent out, but only that paragraph from it that concerned the given person. Under each decision, an indication was made in a special protocol to whom a copy of it was sent.

1 Zelenov M. V. Apparatus of the Central Committee of the RCP (6) - VKP (b) ... S. 131-132 2 See O. V. Khlevnyuk, A. V. Kvashonkin, L.P. Kosheleva, L. A. Horny. Stalin's Politburo in the 1930s. Collection of documents. S. 21.

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According to the characteristics of the design and content of information, "special folders" were a special set of documents of the highest bodies of the party. It is possible that the materials of the thematic folders of the Politburo were also included in the "special folder". "Special folders" were formed both in the central organs of the party and in the localities. One of the copies of the "Special folder", at a level not lower than the regional committee, after the formation was sent to the Central Committee. So, on January 11, 1930, at a meeting of the Secretariat of the Central Committee

List of Party Committees sending their decisions, including those of the "Special Folder" to the Organizing Department of the Central Committee (Approved by the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on January 6, 1930)

1. Moscow industrial 15. Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Turkmenistan.

regional committee 16. Zakkraykom.

2. Ivanovo industrial OK. 17. Central Committee of Azerbaijan CP(b).

3. Nizhny Novgorod Regional Committee. 18. Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Armenia.

4. Northern Regional Committee. 19. TsKKP(b) of Georgia. 5. Western regional committee. 20. Kazakkraykom.

6. Bashobkom. 21. Sevkavkraikom.

7. Karelobkom. 22. Siberian Regional Committee.

8. Krymobkom. 23. Uralobkom.

9. Tatobkom. 24. Middle Volga regional committee. 10. Lenobkom. 25. Nizhne-Volzhsky regional committee. 11. Dalkraikom. 26. Central Black Earth Regional Committee. 12. Middle-Az. Bureau of the Central Committee. 27. Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine.

13. Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Uzbekistan. 28. Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Belarus!

14. Tajik regional committee.

the issue "On sending the decisions of the "Special folder" of local party bodies to the Central Committee", concerning the sending of the "Special folder" of local party bodies, was considered, at which it was decided: "To oblige the leading party bodies ... to send all their decisions in a timely manner, including , and the decisions of the "Special Folder", addressed to the Organizing Instructor Department of the Central Committee"2. Attached to the resolution was the appendix "List of Party Committees sending their decisions, including the decisions of the "Special Folder" to the Organizing Instructor Department of the Central Committee: Appendix 4 to Project 176, paragraph 121 of 11.1.30

G.

The composition of the information (issues) included in the "special folder", and therefore subject to classification, concerned a variety of parties.

I RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 113. D. 812. L. 30. 2 See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 113. D. 812. L. 23.

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party and government activities. Basically, these are issues of state security and internal affairs, international, defense, national, administrative, personnel policy, recommendations on the use and safety of secret information and documents, control over compliance with the secrecy regime in party and government bodies, anti-state speeches and riots, counter-revolutionary and opposition activities. Also, the "special folder" included decisions on the most important economic issues, revealed compromising evidence on senior employees, etc. But, it should be noted that issues of a military mobilization and international nature prevailed in the late 1930s. The range of information included in the "special folder" of the party bodies also depended on the status, geographical location, and socio-economic potential of the region. So, in the border regions, the "special folder" included questions on the protection and strengthening of borders, in industrial areas - the work of defense enterprises, in national ones - problems of national relations, etc. In principle, the "special folder" could include any question that was considered by the party organ to be especially secret and not requiring disclosure. Certain information in certain periods could be both secret and open, depending on the prevailing situation, the significance and relevance of the issue. Responsible party officials were supposed to monitor the inclusion of issues of "special



folders" to the common protocol. So, in 1941, not long before the war, the Central Committee gave strict instructions to some party committees not to enter secret questions into open protocols (secret mobilization paperwork, conscription and registration of communists liable for military service, the results of verification of compliance with and use of secret documents of the Central Committee, destruction of archival documents on defense mobilization correspondence, neglect of secret documents, the state of storing documents in institutions, issues of closed letters and the use of classified information, the work of defense enterprises, the disclosure of state secrets, the protection and strengthening of state borders, internment and resettlement from the border strip, strengthening the passport regime, etc.) and put things in order in this matter.

Thus, it should be noted that "special folders" were kept in all party committees, starting with local party bodies and ending with the Politburo of the Central Committee. The information contained, and the very existence of the "special folder", was strictly classified. It should be noted that, in essence, characterizing the "special folder", we can talk about it as:

1. a set of documents related to a specific topic; 2. parts of the system for the protection of top secret information;

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3. a term denoting the highest degree of secrecy of documents and information contained in them; 4. restrictive bar.

The specificity of the "special folder" lies not only in the above features, but also in the specific content of the information contained in it, which mainly affected the spheres of foreign policy, the activities of law enforcement agencies, inter-party struggle, and personnel policy. In the activities of party organs, a range of issues and information was determined, which were mandatory to be classified and included in a "special folder". These are information constituting a state secret, included in the "List of information constituting a secret and not subject to dissemination", as well as issues of intra-party struggle and those issues that party bodies classified for political reasons.

In the party documentary array, there are also so-called "off-the-minute decisions", which were discussed at meetings of the highest bodies of the party, but were not included in the minutes. M. V. Zelenov in his work<sup>1</sup> notes that the degree of their secrecy was much higher than that of the "special folder", since the persons receiving the protocol did not know about their existence and acceptance. These documents could consist of resolutions, decisions, telegrams, etc. They were removed from the protocols and entered into the thematic folders of the secret archive of the Politburo.

The "special folders" of the Politburo began to be declassified in 1997. Several files for the 1920s in typewritten copies of the 1920s and 1960s were transferred from the Archive of the President to the RGASPI. Currently, the process of declassifying the "Special Folders" has not yet been completed

<sup>1</sup> Zelenov M. V. Apparatus of the Central Committee of the RCP (6) ~ VKP (6b) ...

### 1.3. SECRET PARTY ARCHIVES

The solution of the issues of documentary support of the administrative activities of the Central Committee and the party as a whole, the solution of not only purely party, but also state issues, led to an increase in the number of documents. All this required the creation of a certain system for organizing the storage and use of documents. It was necessary to create party archives that store documents of both higher and local party organs. The history of the creation of the party archive dates back to the pre-revolutionary period. It was necessary to create archives storing documents on the history of the party and the revolutionary movement. To solve this problem, a commission was created, which received the name "Istpart". Current archives were created in departments of the Central Committee to store and document the operational work of the highest party bodies. So, according to the staffing table approved by the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) on March 22, 1922,

The organizational department had an archive with a staff of 3 people (head of the archive, assistant head of the archive, archive employee); 9 employees worked in the archive of the Accounting and Distribution Department (the head of the archive, the assistant to the head of the archive, 2 clerks [categories, 2 clerks of the II category and 3 clerks]).

There were also archives in the Bureau of the Secretariat. According to the Regulations on the Bureau of the Secretariat and Assistant Secretaries of the Central Committee in 1922, the technical apparatus of the Bureau of the Secretariat, along with the office, secretaries in the Politburo and the Orgburo, and the cipher department, included the archive. In 1924, there were three archives in the Bureau of the Secretariat: in the Technical Secretariat of the Politburo - 6 employees (head of the archive, 2 assistants of the head of the archive, 3 archivists); in the Technical Secretariat of the Orgburo - 1 (head of the archive); directly in the archives of the Bureau of the Secretariat 5 employees (head of archives, 4 archivists). All these archives were secret. At the beginning, the files in the secret archives were formed according to specific folders (protocols, resolutions and extracts from the Politburo, the Orgburo, the Secretariat). Preparatory materials were originally formed separately from the minutes of the meetings. To organize folders was introduced but

1 RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 112. D. 395. L.9.

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case list. Separately for the affairs of the Politburo and separately for the Orgburo and the Secretariat.

The question of creating a unified archive was repeatedly raised in the Central Committee. So at the meeting of the Secretariat on December 7, 1922, the Executive Director of the Central Committee, I. K. Ksenofontov, was heard on this issue. The secretariat decided: "... Offer comrade. Ksenofontov to collect the signatures of the head. departments of the Central Committee on the draft regulation on a single archive and registry of the Central Committee and in the absence of objections, consider the issue resolved! The commission headed by I. K. Ksenofontov was instructed: "... To inspect the building of the former Duma in order to determine the possibility of moving the Secretariat of the Central Committee into it"<sup>2</sup>. In addition, at the same meeting of the Secretariat, on the issue of archives, it was instructed: "... Eastpart, together with Agitprop and the Main Archive, within two weeks, submit to the Central Committee a draft of measures for collecting and protecting materials of the revolution (documents, photographs, films, etc.). d)"<sup>3</sup>. Many documents of the Central Committee have accumulated in institutions and individuals who were sent to them in due time for work. In view of this, by decision of the Central Committee, in 1924, a commission was created to seize the "Tsekist" documents.

By the middle of 1923, a number of measures were taken to unify and centralize office work and archives of the Central Committee apparatus. In addition to the Central Archives of the Central Committee, the archives of the departments of the Central Committee remained, which were organized according to a single system for the Central Committee. From February 1924, a provision was introduced on a unified record keeping in all the archives of the Secretariat, the system "by file folders" was abolished and a Unified Archive was created under the jurisdiction of the Central Committee Affairs Department. In the archives and records management of the Politburo, the system of thematic folders was preserved.

By the middle of 1925, the introduction of a system of unified office work into the Central Committee was completed. The new record keeping system led to a new case acquisition system. Each folder now had to correspond to a meeting of the Orgburo or the Secretariat. In the archives of the Bureau of the Secretariat, work began on the creation of final versions of the minutes of the meetings of the Politburo, the Organizing Bureau, the Secretariat, to which the materials were attached. The acquisition of the archives of the Central Committee also continued. So, in 1928, the Secret Archive of the Secretariat accepted documents for 1925 for safekeeping.

Since 1924, the Central Committee has taken a course towards separating the archives of the Party from the nationwide archival storage system, i.e., a course towards a system of departmental ownership and departmental storage. In connection with

1 RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 112. D. 395. L.9. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. L. 5.

By this, party documents were not subject to transfer for state storage to the Political Section of the Archives of the October Revolution. This had its pros and cons. On the one hand, all this increased the degree of secrecy and limited access to party information, but at the same time, on the other hand, increased the degree of protection against unauthorized access.

from the outside.

A large number of incoming documents required an organizational restructuring of the already existing archive of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (6), its expansion and approximation to the highest party bodies, i.e., to the main user. At a meeting of the Organizing Bureau on February 9, 1925, the issue of the archive of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) was considered, at which it was decided: "a) Expand the existing archive of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) 6) Consider this archive under the Secretariat of the Central Committee. c) Transfer this archive to the Kremlin. d) All questions related to the expansion of the archive of the Central Committee and its transfer to the Kremlin, to entrust the development of Comrade Kaganovich, together with Comrade. Mekhlis with the participation of Comrade Kanatchikov! At the same time, L. Z. Mekhlis prepared a draft of a broader and more specific resolution concerning the archives of the Central Committee. As a result, at a meeting of the Secretariat on March 13, 1925, a more complete and specific resolution was adopted on expanding the archive of the Central Committee, which stated: "To expand the Archive of the Central Committee, transferring to it, in addition to the stored materials, all materials and documents related to the history of the party and stored in: a) Archive of the October Revolution, 6) Kremlin Archive and c) Istparte. Note: Materials on the history of the party collected by the commission of the Central Committee (OB pr. No. 42, item 11) must also be transferred to the archives of the Central Committee. 6) All documents and materials of the Central Committee for the entire period of its existence and activities must be transferred for disassembly, systematization and storage to the Archives of the Central Committee. c) Departments of the Central Committee transfer to the archives of the Central Committee materials that are five years old. d) In the Archives of the Central Committee, allocate an Operationally Secret Section for the storage of secret documents. e) Keep the archive in the Kremlin, and its Operative-secret part in the Secretariat of the Central Committee. e) Appoint Head. archive of the Central Committee comrade. Tovstukh, instructing him to develop the states and regulations on the archive of the Central Committee. g) Instruct the Organizing Committee of the Central Committee within a week to identify an appropriate candidate as a deputy. Head archive, in agreement with TT. Tovstukha and Kanatchikov. h) Submit the question as a whole for approval by the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee. As can be seen, almost all documents of the Central Committee, both historical and operational, including secret, were concentrated in the archives of the Secretariat of the Central Committee. Some historians, for example, M. V. Zelenov, see in the increased attention of the Central Committee to archival work the seizure

1 RGASPI. F.17. Op. 112. D. 636. L. 5. 2 Ibid. F.17. Op. 112. D. 636. L. 4.

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documents of the Central Committee from responsible party workers, for their further use in the political struggle, primarily against L. D. Trotsky, G. E. Zinoviev, L. B. Kamenev, A. I. Rykov, etc. one thing is doubtful, that the storage and use of party documents, primarily secret ones, took place under the control of the General Secretary I. V. Stalin, through the apparatus subordinate to him.

For the storage of secret documents in the archive, the Operational-Secret Unit was allocated. The archive itself was transferred to the Kremlin, and its secret part was transferred directly to the Secretariat of the Central Committee. I. V. Stalin's assistant and head of the Bureau of the Secretariat of I. P. Tovstukha was appointed head of the archive. A little more than a year later, it was necessary to specify and regulate the storage of documents while concentrating that part of the general archive that was in the Secretariat of the Central Committee, that is, the most important and secret documents. To consider the issue of expanding the archives of the Central Committee in May 1925, by a resolution of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee, a commission was created consisting of A. S. Bubnov, L. Z. Mekhlis, S. I. Kanatchikov. The Commission was instructed to submit to the Secretariat a draft resolution on the distribution and storage of archival materials. At a meeting of the Secretariat of the Central Committee on June 12, 1925, it was decided: "... under the Secretariat to have two archives for the next period: the general Eastpart and the Secret Bureau of the Secretariat. Unclassified documents were transferred to the general archive of Eastpart for safekeeping. All secret documents were transferred for safekeeping to the Secret Archive of the Bureau of the Secretariat of the Central Committee. In addition, the threshold for storing documents of current office work directly in the departments of the Central Committee was reduced from 5 to 3 years!

The large volume of incoming documents in the secret archive, the organization of their storage and use required an increase in the staff of the Bureau of the Secretariat. So at the meeting of the Secretariat on November 20, 1925, the request of the Bureau of the Secretariat to increase the staff of the bureau by 8 people was granted, including 5 people for the organized Secret Archive. It must be said that all employees of the secret archives, like all employees of the Bureau of the Secretariat (Secret Department), were secret employees of the Central Committee, and their leaders (heads of the archives and their deputies) were secret employees of the Bureau of the Secretariat of the Central Committee, whose work was equated with a mass party work. So, in the list approved by the Secretariat on January 30, 1925, we find Austrina (deputy head of the archive of the Politburo), Bogoslovskaya (head of the secret archive of the Bureau of the Secretariat), Bykova (head of the archive of the Politburo).

In 1926, already on the state line, the Secret Department of the OGPU developed the "Rules for setting up the archival part of secret office work in state, trade union, cooperative

1 See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 112. D. 670. L. 8.

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institutions and enterprises of the USSR. In this document, in addition to general provisions, the rules for conducting secret files, storing materials from the archive of the secret part until delivery, and the procedure for submitting cases to the bodies of the Central Archive were prescribed. Published by the Central Archive, the rules were sent to institutions and enterprises of the USSR for guidance and organization of work. Work with secret party documents was regulated only by party resolutions. The secret archive was constantly updated with new documents. It was necessary to determine the composition and procedure for the use of documents. In 1925, a procedure was established for the obligatory storage in the Bureau of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the original transcripts (with copyright corrections) of meetings of the Central Committee and its commissions, party congresses and conferences!. On December 11, 1925, Kanatchikov was instructed to submit an exact list of documents from the secret archive of the Central Committee necessary for publishing the protocols of party congresses with an indication of who can personally use the documents and submit them for approval by the Secretariat of the Central Committee?

The most important documents, on individual issues, were issued by decision or agreement directly at meetings of the Secretariat of the Central Committee. For example, at a meeting of the Secretariat on December 26, 1926, the issue of issuing authentic materials on party congresses from the archives of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was considered. Even Istpart, in this case, was given not the originals, but copies of the documents: "... Issue to Istpart from the archive of the Secretariat of the Central Committee under the personal responsibility of Comrade Kanatchikov copies of: election commissions at the same congress, resolutions adopted but not published: initial draft resolutions as amended at the Tenth Congress and notes to the Presidium, including those concerning elections at this congress. 6) Copies of materials on the anonymous platform, on the Rabochaya Pravda group and on the workers' opposition. c) Copies of closed letters to comrade. Stalin to the secretaries of the provincial committees for the period between the XII and XIII congresses, the book "Materials of the Party Discussion" and the book "Protocols of the XIII Conference". d) Propose to Comrade Kanatchikov to coordinate in each individual case with Comrade Tovstukha the issue of obtaining information on the protocols of the Politburo for the relevant period.

As you can see, among other "closed" documents were documents related to the opposition. In addition, issues related to non-party, but important, in the opinion of the Bolsheviks from a political point of view, documents were resolved at meetings of the party bodies. Yes, by order

ÿ See RGASPI F. 17. Op. 112. D. 710. L. 13. 2 See Ibid. F. 17. Op. 112. D. 716. L. 4. 3 RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 113. D. 172. L. 5-6.

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The Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (6) U of April 26, 1926, by the way, recorded in the "special folder" of the PB of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (6) U, concerning the concentration in Kharkov of all the archives of the gendarme departments,

district security departments, search points, gendarmerie police departments of railways, provincial and judicial chambers, submitted for approval and approval by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6) decided: (Prot. 21 p. 11) on the concentration of all the listed archives in the city of Kharkov! Moreover, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine motivated its decision by the fact that "... In view of a number of cases of careless handling of materials, as well as violations of conspiracy rules, as a result of which these materials became known to a wide range of party members and even non-party members, as well as the impossibility in the current situation, eliminate such phenomena, consider it necessary to concentrate the archives in Kharkov, where "a certain mode of storage and use of these materials should be established"<sup>2</sup>. The Central Archive in a letter signed by the Deputy Head of the Central Archive Adoratsky and Head. The Secretariat of the Collegium Dauber considered: "... it is expedient to concentrate in Kharkov all the archives of the gendarme departments, district security departments, search points, police departments and judicial chambers of Ukraine. Undoubtedly, in Kharkov it is easier to find suitable premises and ensure the proper preservation and best use of these important documents.

By order of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, a secret letter signed by the Secretary of the Central Committee A. Bubnov and head. Istpart S. Kanatchikov, which stated: "In connection with the still unfinished work on identifying the employees of the former security departments and gendarmerie departments who pose a danger to the gains of the October Revolution, the archives of these institutions still retain their topicality. Hence, in order to avoid unnecessary publicity, the Directorate of the Central Archives ordered all archival bureaus to close access to the use of these archives; an exception is made for the organs of the GPU, the Supreme Court and the Eastpart. With the consent of the Eastpart of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the condition for obtaining permission for employees of local Eastpartite departments to work on the archives of the Guards (of [branches] and gen [army] Administrations] is to present a visa of the executive secretary of the Party Committee.

<sup>1</sup> See *ibid.* F. 17. Op. 113. D. 200. L. 9. <sup>2</sup> See *Ibid.* L. 216.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* F. 17. Op. 113. D. 200. L. 217. <sup>4</sup> RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 113. D. 200. L. 218.

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In August 1928, Istpart and the Lenin Institute were merged into a single institution - a department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, which was given the name Lenin Institute under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. In 1929, the question of creating a unified party organization based on historical documents of the party was raised again. At a meeting of the Secretariat of the Central Committee on March 25, 1929, the issue "On the organization of a single party archive", at which it was decided: "a) Recognize the need to immediately start creating a single party archive at the Lenin Institute. 6) Work on the organization of the archives should be concentrated at the Lenin Institute and carried out in close contact with the Secret Affairs of the Central Committee. V). Establish special commissions of party comrades who are familiar with archiving and entrust them with the responsibility of streamlining, recording and concentrating local parties. archival funds. d) Research work on the history of the VKP (6), including the scientific development of all arch. materials, leave to the Lenin Institute. e) To instruct the Staff Commission of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to develop a draft of the staffing required for this and an estimate!

Based on the decision taken, a unified party archive (now the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History) is created at the Lenin Institute, and then its 26 local union-republican and regional branches. All party and Komsomol documents from 1917 to 1925. were to be transferred not to the bodies of the Central Archive, but to the archives of the provincial and regional party committees. Thus, the previously adopted course towards the departmental nature of the party archives was structurally confirmed. Secret departments were formed locally to keep secret documents in the party archives. The unified party archive should have concentrated party documents that were deposited in office work until 1921] and individual documents from 1921 that had lost their operational significance and personal funds.

Financing of the unified party archive was supposed to be carried out according to the estimate of the Lenin Institute. On March 22, 1929, the Secretariat of the Central Committee adopted a resolution on cooperation between the Lenin Institute and the Secret Department of the Central Committee. In the Regulations on the Unified Party Archive of the CPSU (6), approved by the Secretariat of the Central Committee on June 28, 1929, it was noted that all the main directives for the management of party archives are given by the Lenin Institute in agreement with the Secret Department of the Central Committee. In a single party archive, a Secret Department was created, in which secret documents were stored. The issue of the secrecy of materials and their declassification was resolved jointly with representatives of the Lenin Institute and the Secret Department of the Central Committee, and in the field - the secretary of the local party organization and the head of the local

ÿ See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 113. D. 714. L. 3.

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Eastpart!. Thus, a single party archive is divided into historical and operational, the latter with subsections: secret and general.

During this period, a lot of work was also carried out in order to determine the terms of storage and destruction of party documents. It should be noted that a representative from the Secret Department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (Bolsheviks) was a member of the verification and sorting commissions for examining the value of documents and determining the terms of their storage, and in the localities, the heads of the secret parts of the party committees. In the Instruction to city committees on the storage of secret documents dated July 10, 1928, documents of the Central Committee (circular, normative, administrative, etc.) were considered secret. The terms of storage of secret documents were not indicated. They were determined by departments of the Central Committee and transferred to storage in a special way. Repositories of party documents were divided into two parts: general and secret. Secret documents were placed and kept separately from unclassified ones.

It should be noted that the Collegium of the Central Archives made an attempt to concentrate the party archives in the state storage system. The collegium motivated by the fact that in the center and in the localities, there was a large percentage of party members working with party documents concentrated in the storage facilities of the Central Archive, with conditions created for separate secret storage and access to them only upon agreement with the party bodies and the GPU. The collegium of the Central Archive in a secret letter ("strictly secret") to the Secretariat of the Central Committee, addressed to the Secretary of the Central Committee T.P. Samsonov, considered it expedient to create a special party archival apparatus in the system of the Central Archive. The collegium considered: "... the materials of party and Komsomol organizations that have lost their practical significance and are of reference and historical interest should be handed over to the Secret Political Departments of the archives of the October Revolution of the Central Archive bodies"". Among other things, the letter proposed a purge of personnel and, if necessary, to replace the employees of the secret party archives "with quite seasoned party members, quite literate and trained." The organization of party archives in the system of the Central Archive, in the proposed version, was considered, in the opinion of the Central Archive, an economically more expedient option (cost savings) than the organization of independent party archives. But, in the Central Committee, another point of view won - the concentration of pairs

1 See *ibid.* F. 17. Op.113. D. 746. L. 15.

2 See RGASPI. F. 17. Op.113. D. 746. L. 40. 3 See *Ibid.* L. 40-43.

4 See RGASPI. F. 17. Op.113. D. 746. L. 49.

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tiy documents in the system of party archives subordinated to the Lenin Institute (since November 1931 - the Institute of Marx-Engels-Lenin under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (6)). Approved by the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6) on June 28, 1929, the "Regulations on the Unified Party Archive" finally formalized the independent (departmental and closed) system of party archives. 10 years later, in

in accordance with the decision of the Orgburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6) of December 2, 1939, all party archives were removed from the subordination of IMEL under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6) and transferred to the jurisdiction of local party bodies, that is, they became part of the party apparatus. So, for example, on the basis of this resolution, the Leningrad branch of the Unified Party Archive was transformed into the Party Archive of the Leningrad Regional Party Committee, and from 1941 to 1945 it functioned as a department of the regional committee and the Leningrad City Committee of the CPSU (b).

Along with the organization and concentration of party documents in a single system of party archives, specialized secret archives were created in the areas of activity of the structural divisions of the Central Committee. Thus, in view of the accumulation of documents, as well as for the purpose of operational use of information material in the work of the apparatus of the Central Committee, at the suggestion of the rationalization commission of the People's Commissariat of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection of the USSR, made at a meeting of the Secretariat of the Central Committee | January 1931, the issue of organizing a single archive of the Central Committee for storing information material under the Organizing Instructor Department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (6) was considered. The organization of the archive was entrusted to the Organizing Instructor Department of the Central Committee, and the Secret Department of the Central Committee was instructed to establish control over compliance with the work of the information archive established by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6) "Rules for conducting secret office work and handling secret materials!" As you can see, this archive was secret, it was subject to the rules for conducting secret office work and observing the secrecy regime.

The increase in the number of party documents in archival storage led to the creation of the Central Party Archive of the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6), with limited access to the archive and access to the use of archival documents. To store the documents of the Central Party Archive in Moscow, a special building with storage facilities was built on Sovetskaya Square, which began to function in 1935. On October 14, 1935, the resolution of the Orgburo "On the storage of the archive of Marx Engels-Lenin and on the procedure for using documents" was approved. Basically, archive documents, including the originals of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and

1 See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 114. D. 205. L. 23. 2 See ibid. F. 17. Op. 114. D. 595. L. 4.

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also their insurance copies were in special storage. Only employees of the archive approved on a special list, the director of the institute and his deputies with passes had access to the premises of the archive. Access directly to the repository of original documents of Marx Engels-Lenin was only available to the director of the institute, the head of the archive and their deputies, always in the presence of the head of security. In the resolution of the Central Committee concerning the organization of the archive, separate chapters regulated the hiring of employees and the protection of the archive. The archive was guarded by the NKVD. Only members of the CPSU (6) could be employees of the archive. According to a special resolution of the Directorate of the Institute, it was ordered to review the staff of the archive staff and to submit candidates for the staff of the Institute and the documents of the archive allowed for use. for approval by the Central Committee of the CPSU (6)!

Later, also by a separate resolution of the Secretariat of the Central Committee "On the storage of the archive of Marx Engels-Lenin and on the procedure for using documents", it was obliged to submit to the Central Committee for approval the Regulations on the protection of the archive, the List of employees of the archive, the List of employees of IMEL allowed to the use of archive documents, as well as the candidacy of the head of the security of the IMEL2 archive,

Party archives were also created on the ground, where documents of both a historical plan on the history of the party organization and operational documents of the current secret storage were stored. Secret documents were kept in the operational-secret parts of the party archives. The regime of secrecy, storage and use was regulated by the general resolutions of the Central Committee, regulatory documents and local decisions of party organizations. Further

a system for storing secret documents of the party until the beginning of the Great Patriotic War

almost did not change.

Thus, it can be stated that the system for storing secret documents of the party took shape and developed along with the system of party archives as a whole. It was necessary to determine their place and methods of storing secret documents. At the beginning, mainly in the large departments of the Central Committee, such as: the Organizational Department, the Accounting and Distribution Department, the Secret (Bureau of the Secretariat), their own archives of operational documents, including secret ones, arose. A certain technical apparatus with archival storage of documents was also created to provide documentary services to the highest bodies of the party. The secret archives were in the Technical Secretariat of the Politburo, the Orgburo, the Secretariat of the Central Committee and directly in the Secret Department - the Bureau of the Secretariat. Documents of secret office work, materials of meetings, protocols of the Politburo, the Orgburo, the Secretariat of the Central Committee, etc. were put aside there.

1 RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 114. D. 595. L. 47-51. 2 See ibid. F. 17. Op. 114. D. 600. L. 19.

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In 1924, the archive of the Central Committee was expanded, an operational-secret section was created in it, which carried out the storage of secret documents directly in the Kremlin. Under the Secretariat of the Central Committee, two archives were created: the general Istparta and the secret Bureau of the Secretariat. In 1929, a unified party archive was created at the Lenin Institute and the regulation on it was approved. The archive consisted of two parts: historical and operational, which in turn were also divided into secret and general. The party archival fund as a whole was divided into unclassified and secret historical documents of Eastpart and unclassified and secret operational documents of the operating bodies of the party. All issues related to the storage and use of documents were regulated by the Regulations on the unified party archive. In parallel, the Central Committee had secret archives of the Politburo, the Orgburo, the Secretariat, as well as the current archives of departments. In 1935, the Central Party Archive of the Marx-Engels Lenin Institute was created, which concentrated historical documents, the former archives of the October Revolution and Eastpart, original documents of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and other leaders of the revolutionary movement. The funds of the CPA (Central Party Archive) also contained documents of closed, secret storage. Since 1929, departmental closed storage of party documents was established, and by the decision of the Orgburo of December 2, 1939, all party archives were transferred to the jurisdiction of local party committees and became part of the party apparatus. The documents of the party archives were closed to non-party people, and only party members were allowed to access secret documents by decision of the relevant party committee. The Kremlin archives of the Central Committee (the Politburo, the Orgburo, the Secretariat) as well as the archives of the Secret Department, departments of the Central Committee always remained closed, access to them was strictly limited even for the employees of the Central Committee. These archives directly served the highest bodies of the party, members of the Politburo and Secretaries of the Central Committee. The current Presidential Archive originates from the Kremlin archives of the Politburo, the Organizing Bureau of the Secretariat of the Central Committee.

Thus, it can be stated that at the turn of 1918-1919. in the party began to be created and then by the second half of the 1920s it took shape and throughout the period under review, the information protection system functioned in the party structures of the RCP (6) - VKP (6) with its own structure, personnel, documentary support. With all the reorganizations and changes, it lasted until the Great Patriotic War and, by and large, until August 1991. Its feasibility, effectiveness, areas of work and functional responsibilities will be described in the next chapter.

## P. FORMATION OF THE MECHANISM AND DIRECTION OF ACTIVITIES FOR THE PROTECTION OF INFORMATION IN THE PARTY BODIES OF THE RKP(B)-VKP(B)

### 2.1. INFORMATION PROTECTION ISSUES

#### AT MEETINGS AND IN DECISIONS OF THE HIGHEST BODIES OF THE PARTY



One of the functions of the state is to ensure the protection of classified information. Under the protection of information is understood a certain set of methods, means and activities. In addition to methods, means and activities, there should be objects of protection, protection authorities and users of protected information. Information protection should be systemic, and information protection activities should not be aimless, but should be Purposeful in nature and look like a continuous process. Thus, information protection is understood as the activity to prevent the loss and leakage of classified information.

The protection of state secrets is one of the main functions of the state as a whole; almost every country has to deal with the issues of ensuring secrecy and protecting information. After October 1917, the revolution marked the beginning of the process of establishing a new form of statehood proclaimed by the Bolsheviks - Soviet power. The outbreak of the Civil War made the issues of secrecy and protection of information a necessity, especially when it came to power in a state at war. Along with the solution of purely state military and economic tasks, the Bolsheviks during the Civil War, and then

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After that, it was necessary to simultaneously solve the issues of party building and protection of party information. It is quite natural that these tasks were solved at the highest party and state levels. Decisions in many cases, as well as documents on the adopted resolutions, were of a conspiratorial character (a term used for a long time, according to the old terminology of illegal work, by the party apparatus, denoting secrecy - G.K.).

The top party leadership more than once drew attention to the issues of maintaining secrecy in the party apparatus as a whole, and also reacted to cases of unauthorized leakage of party and state information outside the Central Committee. Issues of disclosure of secret information were the subject of discussions at meetings of the highest bodies of the party. So, at a meeting of the Politburo on November 8, 1919, which was attended by V. I. Lenin, I. V. Stalin, L. D. Trotsky, L. B. Kamenev, N. N. Krestinsky, the statement of I. V. Stalin was considered that some information about the meetings of the Central Committee, "although in a very distorted form, somehow reached the enemies." Such a statement of the question was relevant at that time. Let us recall, for example, that at that time, on the instructions of the Volunteer Army of I. V. Alekseev - A. I. Denikin, secret agent A. A. Borman was operating in Moscow. So he, using old connections among the "specialists", got a job in the central office of the People's Commissariat of Trade. On duty, he had to take part even in the meetings of the Council of People's Commissars held by V. I. Lenin in the Kremlin! Naturally, the information received by him was forwarded to the opponents of the Bolsheviks. There were also numerous anti-Soviet organizations, in particular, the "Azбука" organized by V.V. It included 26 Political Centers, and most importantly, it had its own informants. So the Kiev "...center, adhering to strict secrecy, was engaged in intelligence activities. His agents occupied responsible positions in various Soviet administrative and military institutions, had access to highly secret documents and skillfully sabotaged the policy of Soviet power.

Counteracting the leakage of information, the Central Committee took mainly organizational measures. So, for example, on November 8, 1919, the Politburo decided: "a) To instruct comrades Krestinsky and Stasova to examine the procedure for reproduction, storage in the Secretariat of the Central Committee and distribution by members of the Central Committee of the minutes of meetings, especially the Politburo, and introduce such a procedure that the protocols were familiar with the minimum number

ÿ See Borman A. A. Moscow - 1918 (From the notes of a secret agent in the Kremlin). // Russian past. 1991. No. 1. S. 115-149.

2 Bortnevsky V. G. "Intelligence and counterintelligence of the White South" (1917 -1920) // "New sentry". C / P. 1995 No. 3. S. 51.

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comrades. Instruct Comrade. Krestinsky to make a report on the measures taken at the next meeting of the Politburo. 6) Propose to all members of the Central Committee to carefully keep the protocols they receive. c) State the protocols of the Politburo as carefully and briefly as possible. d) Decisions on the most serious issues should not be recorded in the official minutes, but Comrade Krestinsky should mark them for himself for memory and personal execution. As can be seen, in this case, preventive measures were taken to limit the number of users and reduce the information contained in the protocols in writing, i.e., measures to protect party and state secrets.

The first organizational steps in creating an information security system took place at the state level. Thus, the organization of counterintelligence work and the introduction of a passport control system to streamline the process of entry and exit into the territory of the Soviet Republic can be called the first measures of a state scale. In November 1917, the "Rules for Entry and Exit from Russia" were approved, on April 24, 1919, a decree of the Council of People's Commissars "On the procedure for issuing foreign passports" was issued, in 1920, according to the resolution of the STO of August 18, 1920, the NKVD was granted exclusive the right to determine the order of entry and exit to certain localities. Since 1921, attempts have been made to streamline the procedure for processing and storing documents containing state secrets, mainly of a military nature. In this regard, the Department of Military Educational Institutions of the Western Front published a textbook "Military Secret". Guided by this manual, the Bolsheviks thus tried to solve the problem of protecting military secrets in the active Red Army. On May 5, 1921, by the Decree of the Small Council of People's Commissars, a Special Department was created under the Cheka, which was headed by a prominent Bolshevik with extensive experience in underground conspiratorial work, G. I. Bokiya. It was this body, in the opinion of its organizers, that was supposed to become a structure coordinating all measures to protect state secrets in the republic. One of the activities of this department was monitoring all state, party and public organizations for the preservation of state secrets, as well as the development of guidelines and regulations governing various aspects of the organization of the protection of state secrets in the whole country. But, despite the measures taken, in the initial period of the functioning of the Soviet state and party apparatus, the information protection system was weak, both in methodological and methodological terms. First of all

I RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 37. L. 1-2.

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it was important to determine both the methods and principles of organizing work to protect information, and to carry out work in organizational and technical terms.

What information was secret in the Soviet state in the early 1920s, what is the criterion for evaluating secrecy? The main criterion in determining the degree of secrecy was the content of state secrets in the information, as well as information of a political nature. Secret correspondence according to the degree of importance of the content and restrictive stamp was divided into: "top secret", "secret" and "not subject to disclosure". "Top secret" documents, for example, of the People's Commissariat of Posts and Telegraphs on the state line, included documents, correspondence containing information constituting state, as well as military, political and departmental secrets. This is information such as: ciphers, codes, manuals, instructions for use or all correspondence on the issue of replacing, maintaining or destroying ciphers and codes, departmental orders and correspondence on mobilization issues: plans for allocated forces and means of communication, the procedure for their transfer, quantitative and graphic information on these issues and all correspondence related to issues

preparation for mobilization. "Top secret" also included orders on political censorship and correspondence with government agencies on the political struggle against counterrevolutionary parties. "Secret" correspondence included documents that, by their content, were indirectly related to issues of a "top secret" nature and, due to their importance, should be known to a very limited circle of people. "Secret" included such information as orders of an investigative and informational nature (before trial, on crimes of officials), notifications on the transportation of large valuables, information on the procedure for their protection, and those documents that, for various reasons, can be known only to those persons involved in solving these issues. Information "not subject to disclosure" included information that, by its content, contains information on projects and preliminary development of those issues that cannot be considered "secret", but in the process of its development until their final permits may be known in detail to a limited circle of persons, i.e. to those institutions and persons who are directly involved in resolving these issues!. In office work, secret documents were kept and stored separately from unclassified ones. In general terms, but based on the specifics of departments, such regulatory documents have been developed in all departments. Dock-like

ÿ See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 113. D. 395. L. 211.

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The cop was also published in the Red Army. RVSR Order No. 2011 determined the procedure for handling top secret correspondence. In general, all information containing state, military and political secrets was considered secret.

But the measures taken to protect state secrets were insufficient. The military command of the Red Army constantly reported about the disclosure of information of a military and diplomatic nature from the fronts. So, for example, the Commander-in-Chief of the Southern Group of Forces of the Red Army M. V. Frunze reported to V. I. Lenin, L. D. Trotsky and G. V. Chicherin on December 19, 1921 about the opening of information by the British. On March 29, 1921, the Politburo listened to Lezhava's statement about the disclosure of secret information. The Cheka was involved in the investigation of some incidents. So, at the aforementioned meeting, it was decided: "To take note of Comrade Lezhava's message, suggesting that he hand over all the material with oral additions to Comrade Dzerzhinsky, who will be instructed to strictly investigate this case. Submit a report to the Politburo."

The first attempt to streamline, unify and organize work in the field of processing and storage of secret documents throughout the republic was made on August 30, 1922. The secretariat of the Central Committee of the RCP (6) adopted a resolution and approved the instruction "On the procedure for the storage and movement of secret documents." It can be stated that this was the first national instruction on secret office work. Note that in this instruction, for the first time, an authority for the protection of classified information was recorded. In order to organize and conduct secret office work, secret departments were created in the institutions. However, many ambiguities remained in the conduct of this work. Thus, at a meeting of the Politburo on December 7, 1922, I. V. Stalin again raised the issue of publishing some information that was not subject to disclosure. It was about information on the State Planning Commission, on negligence and due to the lack of specific regulatory documents published in the press. After discussing the issue, the Politburo decided to develop instructions for observing secrecy, relating not only specifically to the State Planning Commission, but also to all departments in general: "a) Instruct the commission composed of Comrades. Kaktyn, Gorbunov, Pyatakov, Krzhizhanovsky and Kuibyshev to work out instructions on which decisions of the State Planning Commission are not subject to publication. 6) Instruct the commission to develop also the issue of the procedure for publishing particularly sensitive or dubious information concerning any department and methods for implementing this information.

1 Ibid. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 143. L. 1.

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department of control over this kind of press reports - To entrust the convocation of the commission to Comrade Kuibyshev!

In 1923, the Politburo also repeatedly raised the question of developing instructions and measures to maintain secrecy in departments. As a result, a commission was created to develop these measures, which made its proposals at a meeting of the Politburo on August 16, 1923. Particular attention was paid to the foreign policy and foreign economic departments. Thus, the commission considered questions and put forward proposals concerning the NKID and the NKVT. These are questions related to the plenipotentiary representations, about the transportation of secret documents and the diplomatic courier part, secret correspondence to the NKID and the NKVT, the material security of the NKID employees who deal with secret documents, as well as concerning correspondence through the Comintern and the Profintern, the GPU, the Intelligence Department and the races. - a link of ciphers. In the representative offices of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, secret units were created and security of the premises was organized. It was supposed to strengthen control over personnel, the movement of personnel, to review the entire available composition of cipher workers who had to undergo special courses and check for reliability and performance, their suitability for this work. Dismissal and relocation in the cipher units of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs is allowed only with the knowledge of the Special Department. The order of registration of secret correspondence sent by diplomatic mail was also determined. It was also supposed to switch to a coded system of secret correspondence, concentrating it in the secret part, assigning an employee in each department to communicate with the secret part, monitoring and accounting for the correspondence passing through the department. It was forbidden to leave secret documents in the hands of employees at the end of the working day. Among other things, the need was established for better remuneration of employees of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs dealing with secret documents. Through the Comintern and the Profintern, it was also supposed to introduce a code of secret messages, certain measures were determined to maintain secrecy and distribute ciphers<sup>2</sup>. As can be seen, these questions and proposals, although they belonged to the state sphere of activity and concerned government departments, were resolved at the highest party level.

It was also necessary to streamline the work with secret documents in the party apparatus. The issues of maintaining secrecy when working with party information have been raised more than once by individual members of the Central Committee. Thus, on November 22, 1922, the Assistant Secretary of the Central Committee, Nazaretyan, suggested in a letter to the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (6): "In connection with the observed

1 RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 329. L. 8. 2 See RGASPI. F.17. Op. 3. D. 373. L. 7-10.

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cases: a) transfer of extracts from the decisions of the Central Committee by persons receiving extracts to persons who should not have such; institutions, I consider it necessary that the Central Committee issue the following resolution: 1. The circle of persons to whom extracts from the minutes of the Central Committee of the RCP, party committees and individual orders of the secretaries of the Central Committee and party committees should be sent is determined by one of the secretaries of the Central Committee and secretaries of party committees and addressed to them personally. 2. It is absolutely forbidden to transfer extracts and individual orders of the Central Committee of the Central Committee and party committees to persons to whom the extract or order is not addressed. 3. Extracts and separate orders of the Central Committee and party committees should be kept in special personal files and, in no case. they are not allowed to be applied to Soviet and trade union office work. 4. It is unconditionally forbidden to copy extracts and orders of the Central Committee and party committees, as well as a written reference in Soviet and trade union records to party decisions. 5. All cases of violation of these decisions are brought immediately to the attention of the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party by the Central Committee of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party in order to bring the perpetrators to the strictest party responsibility! These proposals were taken into account in the development of instructions and circular directive documents of the Central Committee on work with secret party documents. So, by the decision of the Orgburo of the Central Committee of November 30, 1922, the party structures adopted and

the "Procedure for keeping secret decisions of the Central Committee of the RCP (b)" was put into effect, which, for better memorization, it was decided to print on the back of extracts from the minutes of the meetings of the Orgburo. It should be especially noted that this resolution adopted a cardinally principled decision - the party office work was separated from the Soviet and trade union. This document laid the foundation for a system of separate management of party records, including secret ones.

The secret (secret) documents of the Central Committee were the protocols of the Plenums, the Politburo, the Orgburo, the Secretariat of the Central Committee, the Commissions of the Central Committee, as well as other materials and documents (extracts from resolutions and decisions, etc.) of the Central Committee with secrecy stamps: "secret", "strictly secret", "special folder". Therefore, the Bolsheviks took the minutes of meetings of the highest bodies of the party most seriously. One of the ways in which the party apparatus was used to protect information in the minutes was that the Central Committee tried to leave as few written sources as possible on a particular issue on the agenda for

1 RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 112. D. 393. L. 209.

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sedans. V. I. Lenin, for example, was opposed to fixing all issues in the protocol of the Politburo. In January 1922, he wrote: "In view of the fact that here in Moscow we are surrounded by spies, Mensheviks and half-Mensheviks, this (and similar) proposals should not be included in the minutes of the Politburo, but recorded separately ... nowhere, neither in papers, nor in ciphers, not to mention the directives of the Politburo!

In order to protect information, many meetings of the Politburo, especially in the early 1920s, were not formalized in the form of a protocol at all. There was even a practice of oral solution of questions. Further, basically, secret questions were formalized in a deaf non-common form. In 1923, it was decided that only decisions were recorded in the minutes of the Politburo. Even the usual protocols of the Politburo were marked "top secret". The secret points of the ordinary protocols since 1924 had only a link - "See. special folder. This wording spoke of the particular importance of the issue and the degree of secrecy of the document. Secret minutes of closed meetings were drawn up and kept in a "special file". To avoid political intrigues, V.I. Lenin was also against taking shorthand of Politburo meetings. Unlike him, for example, I. V. Stalin, in the future often used them in political struggle. Beginning in 1923, reports and conclusions were stenographed. Debates on issues were recorded in shorthand only by decision of the Politburo. In the same year, the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee adopted the "Instruction on the procedure for using extracts from the protocols and individual orders of party committees"<sup>2</sup>. In addition to the adopted normative documents, the Central Committee is taking measures to strengthen the security of the premises of the Bureau of the Secretariat.

Instructions for maintaining secrecy and working with secret party documents were developed jointly by the Secret Department of the Central Committee, the Special Department of the OGPU (SPECO) and approved by the Politburo, the Orgburo, and the Secretariat of the Central Committee. In addition to drawing up and putting into effect instructions and rules, the Bolsheviks also made other decisions regarding party documents. Thus, the Decree of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of December 7, 1922 determined the procedure for approving and publishing circulars of the Central Committee proposed by Kuibyshev: "In addition to the previous decisions of the Central Committee, adopt the following procedure for approving and publishing circulars of the Central Committee: 1) Circulars submitted for approval The Central Committee, before submitting them for approval by the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee, are discussed in the circular commission, both in substance and in terms of editorial amendments. 2) In the revised edition, for

1 See Zelenov M.V. Apparatus of the Central Committee of the RCP (6) - VKP (6) ... S. 321. 2 See RGASPI. F.17. Op. 84. D. 697. L. 334. 3 See Ibid. F.17. Op. 84. D. 696. L. 16-17.

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the responsibility of the circular commission, the circular is submitted for discussion in the Organizing Bureau. 3) The Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee, when discussing the circular, determines the method of its distribution (distribution by mail, telegraph, publication in the press, etc.). 4) All amendments and changes to the circular, adopted at the meeting of the Orgburo, are transferred to the circular commission, after which the circular in the corrected form is submitted by the circular commission for the signature of one or another secretary of the Central Committee (as determined by the Orgburo). 5) Before signing by the Secretary of the Central Committee, the circular must be properly registered and numbered by the circular commission! As can be seen, the circular documents of the Central Committee were first to be discussed at a specially created circular commission, and only then submitted to the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee. This was done in order to unload the Orgburo both from the preliminary development of questions in general, and from the solution of secondary questions. According to this resolution, only the Orgburo determined the method of distributing documents, thereby putting a barrier to the unauthorized dissemination of party documents and information, including secret.

The Central Committee also issued decisions restricting the dissemination of documents and materials of the Plenums of the Central Committee and party conferences. For example, the Decree of the Politburo of January 2, 1924 "On Documents Prohibited for Distribution by the Decree of the Joint Plenums of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission" prohibited the issuance of materials of the Central Committee to the participants of the party conference until a final decision was made<sup>2</sup>.

The Central Committee paid special attention to work with secret documents in the field. The Secret Department of the Central Committee repeatedly raised the issue of observing the regime of secrecy and keeping secret documents in party committees. This was important in connection with the cases of information leakage that took place. There is a need for a clear regulation of work with documents of party committees. Thus, at the end of 1925, the Secret Department of the Central Committee determined the procedure for using secret documents of the provincial committees of the RCP (6)<sup>3</sup>. This normative and regulatory secret document was a continuation of the previously adopted resolutions of the Organizing Bureau of November 30, 1922 and the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) of August 19, 1924 on this matter. Thus, persons who have access to and receive secret materials of the provincial committees were personally responsible for the distribution and use of these documents, unless there was a special permission of the provincial committee for this. Here we see the principle of personal responsibility in action, when in the event of disclosure

I RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 112. D. 395. L. 5. 2 See ibid. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 407. L. 1. 3 See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 85. D. 615. L. 136v.

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secret information, responsibility is borne not only by the organization as a whole, but also specifically by the information carrier. Thus, here the principle of personal responsibility also acts as an integral part of the information security system. This normative act also confirmed the inadmissibility of maintaining secret party documents in Soviet and trade union office work.

In 1923 - 1924 The administration of the affairs of the Central Committee, and in particular, the manager of affairs, I. K. Ksenofontov, did a lot to organize and unify the office work of the Central Committee. In 1923, the Administration of Affairs raised the issue of keeping secret documents in departments of the Central Committee. In this regard, the Central Committee also carried out work to organize the protection of information in its apparatus. The Politburo brought this issue to the Plenum of the Central Committee. As a result, on August 19, 1924, the Plenum of the Central Committee approved the Rules for the Treatment of Secret Documents of the Central Committee of the RCP (6)<sup>4</sup>.

At the same time, in order to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of work, the highest party authorities needed information from the field. In this regard, party organs were obliged to send information about the most important facts in the life of local party organizations to the Central Committee. The Central Committee, in turn, provided materials from local party organs and other information to members of the Politburo, the Organizing Bureau, the Secretaries and heads of departments of the Central Committee. By a special decree of July 17, 1925, the departments of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (6) were granted the right

to correspond directly with Soviet, professional, cooperative and other organizations, and from July 24, 1925, directly with party organizations. Correspondence with the organizations of the departments of the Central Committee were to be carried out only with the signatures of the head. departments or their deputies. Correspondence with Soviet and other non-Party bodies was to be conducted through communist factions or communist leaders, and with party organizations only if a copy of the correspondence was sent to higher party organizations. Correspondence of the department of the Central Committee was to be conducted only on issues of its competence in accordance with the regulations on departments. It was conducted on issues of obtaining information material, preparing materials for meetings of the Central Committee and its commissions, transferring correspondence received by the Central Committee for consideration by leaders or party organizations with notification of the Central Committee department about the further development of the issue, monitoring the implementation of decisions of the Central Committee, instructing and giving clarifications, clarifications about the progress of a particular issue. The departments of the Central Committee could not, in their correspondence, propose for execution, prohibit or permit certain measures, give circular instructions

ÿ See *ibid.* F. 17. Op. 85. D. 540. L. 172-174. 2 See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 114. D. 639. L. 8.

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with the exception of cases expressly provided for by the regulation on the department or the corresponding resolution of the Central Committee of the RCP (6). On issues beyond the rights of the departments of the Central Committee, the correspondence had to be signed by one of the Secretaries of the Central Committee or put up for discussion by the Central Committee!.

External ones, such as the aggravation of the international situation in connection with Curzon's note, followed by the events on the CER; as well as internal reasons - the aggravation of intra-party contradictions in connection with disputes in the country's leadership over the timing and methods of industrialization, reports of the interception of secret foreign political information of the USSR by the British secret services, cases of publication of secret information in the press, required a radical strengthening of measures to protect information. The 1926-1927s were especially active in carrying out measures to ensure the regime of secrecy both along state and party lines. So, in April - June 1926, two lists were developed and approved: "The list of information that is in its content a specially protected state secret" and "The list of questions of top secret, secret and not subject to disclosure correspondence." Also in 1926, all-Union instructions were adopted that regulated certain issues of organizing and maintaining secret office work. At the party level, in 1927, the "Rules for the storage, familiarization and return of the protocols of the Politburo and Plenums of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union", as amended in 1923, were revised and supplemented. In the apparatus of the Central Committee, measures were intensified to protect the premises and the entrance to the Secret Department of the Central Committee. Of the employees of the apparatus of the Central Committee, only employees of the Secret Department could enter the department, and even then not in all structural divisions. All divisions of the Secret Department had the right to enter only the head and deputy heads of the Secret Department, the secretary of the Secret Department, assistants to the Secretaries of the Central Committee, the head of the Shifrburo, secretaries of the Technical Secretariat and the Politburo<sup>2</sup>.

In April 1927, I. V. Stalin initiated the issue of developing the most radical measures to ensure maximum secrecy in the work and use of secret materials of the Central Committee. On the basis of an exchange of opinions, on April 7, 1927, a commission was urgently set up in the Politburo to prepare a draft resolution on the use of secret materials. The commission included N. A. Kubiak, M. M. Litvinov, I. P. Tovstukha, I. A. Pyatnitsky, G. G. Yagoda, I. S. Unshlikht, and L. M. Karakhan. As a result, on April 21, 1927, at a closed meeting of the Politburo, the question "On secret materials" was heard. Politburo, having considered the proposals and, apparently,

considering them insufficient

<sup>1</sup> See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 112, D. 680, L. 9-10; D. 681. L. 3-14. <sup>2</sup> See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 85. D. 539. L. 29, 54.

worked out, again decided to create an additional commission, now consisting of N. A. Kubyak, K. E. Voroshilov, G. K. Ordzhonikidze, V. M. Molotov and I. A. Pyatnitsky to rework the project. A week later, N. A. Kubiak was instructed to convene a commission. When discussing issues related to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and the GPU, the commission was asked to call the responsible representatives of these departments! As you can see, this time the composition of the commission was even more impressive. Soon the Politburo considered the final draft resolution submitted by the commission<sup>2</sup>. And, finally, on May 5, 1927, at a closed meeting of the Politburo, the issue of secret materials was considered. As a result, the Politburo approved the resolution "On the Use of Secret Materials".

This resolution, when using the protocols of the Politburo, recommended that only those comrades to whom they were addressed be acquainted with extracts from the protocols, and also regulated the issues of cipher correspondence, distribution, storage, circulation and transmission of secret documents. Particularly noted was the secrecy in organizing foreign archives and diplomatic mail, as well as in relation to closed meetings of the Central Committee and employees conducting secret work. Particular attention was paid to monitoring the implementation of these events. This decree was of national importance and applied to all departments, institutions and bodies, regardless of state, departmental or other subordination. The procedure for using cipher correspondence was especially determined. When transmitting strictly secret messages, they were obliged to use a special secret cipher. All organizations, departments and persons conducting cipher correspondence were asked to use a certain code along with the cipher. Directive documents were subject to numbering of copies, and sent out with the inscription "personally" and opened only by the addressee. For the purpose of the greatest secrecy, all institutions and commissions were ordered to discuss the most secret issues at closed meetings without secretaries and speakers, with minutes being taken by the chairperson himself, and it was also ordered to reduce to a minimum the amount of information material, the distribution of which should be made only to those persons who need it. for work. The secret department of the Central Committee was instructed to regulate the technique of handing over materials. In order to ensure maximum secrecy regarding the use of secret materials, the Central Committee again proceeded from the basic organizational principle of the validity of access - secret files should be

ÿ See *ibid.* F. 17. Op. 3. D. 629. L. 1. 2 See *ibid.* F. 17. Op. 3. D. 633. L. 4.

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known only to those who need to know, i.e. official and political necessity!.

In 1927, the procedure for considering issues at meetings of the highest bodies of the party was changed in the direction of greater classification of information. Fulfilling the decision of the Politburo, all the questions of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, the ECCI, the Military Department and the OGPU, which passed through the Central Committee, were now heard, as a rule, at closed meetings of the Politburo. The Orgburo was instructed to minimize the number of those present at meetings of the Orgburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee. With regard to crimes in connection with the disclosure of secret information, all employees of institutions and organizations conducting secret work were subject to extrajudicial liability. The Central Control Commission was recommended to conduct a resolute struggle against persons disseminating secret information and all kinds of political rumors and gossip. A special department of the OGPU was instructed to monitor the correct use of the ciphers available to institutions and individuals, and was also entrusted with general control over the implementation of the decisions of the Politburo on the protection of information?.

In 1927, the Central Committee decides on the need to strengthen measures to ensure the regime of secrecy in Party committees in the localities. There is a need to strictly regulate the activities of Party committees and secret organs of party committees. On November 21, 1927, the Central Committee instructs the Secret Department to develop and coordinate with the Special Department of the OGPU a document that determines the procedure for organizing work with secret documents in the field. Work continued until March 1928. Moreover, on March 23, 1928, S. V. Kosior



it was instructed to preview the prepared instructions and report to the meeting of the Secretariat of the Central Committee. Thus, in March 1928, the Organizing Bureau and the Secretariat approved the Rules for Conducting Secret Record Keeping and Handling Secret Materials in Party Committees, fundamental for all party committees and in force throughout the chronological framework under consideration. The Secret Department sent these rules for guidance and use in the work of all national Central Committees, regional committees, regional committees, provincial committees and regional committees of the CPSU (6). The rules of 1928 confirmed the main duties of secret departments or parts of party committees to conduct almost all organizational and technical measures for the protection of information, which indicates the functioning of these party divisions as regime-secret bodies like state ones. In addition, the general supervision of the preparation of a secret file

1 See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 4. L. 123. 2 See RGASPI. F.17. Op. 3. D. 633. L. 11-16. 3 See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 113. D. 608. L. 99-113.

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Leadership in party organs was carried out by the Special Department under the OGPU and its special departments in the field. In 1928, a decision was made to separate the secret and encryption business. In 1929, the functions of the OGPU to control compliance with the requirements of secret office work were confirmed. A new "Instruction for local bodies of the OGPU on monitoring the state of secret and mobilization office work of institutions and organizations" was adopted. Thus, in this period, due to the aggravation of the international situation around the USSR, the Bolsheviks, through their state and party structures, took adequate preventive measures to protect information and ensure secrecy both in state bodies and in party committees.

The intensification of the internal political struggle with the supporters of L. D. Trotsky also demanded from the Politburo to strengthen the conspiracy. For example, at the Politburo, and then at the Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, on April 23, 1929, the issue was considered, and then the resolution "On conspiracy" was adopted. Paragraph "g" of the resolution of this resolution directly indicated "On intra-Party affairs." The decision of the Plenum stated: "To establish special measures, up to and including expulsion from the Central Committee and from the Party, that can guarantee the secrecy of the decisions of the Central Committee and the Politburo of the Central Committee and exclude the possibility of informing the Trotskyists about the affairs of the Central Committee and the Politburo." In this regard, the members of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission were asked to "unconditionally comply" with the decision that "secretaries of the members of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission who receive secret documents can only be verified people and necessarily communists." The members of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission were asked to oblige all their secretaries "to strictly observe the rules of secrecy", and JV Stalin was instructed "to carry out a thorough check of the secretaries of the members of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission and other comrades who receive secret materials."

By a resolution of May 9, 1929, the Politburo ordered the Secretariat to take measures for the strictest implementation of the resolution of the Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of April 23, 1929 "On Conspiracy"! The Decree "On Conspiracy" was finally approved on May 16, 1929. In pursuance of this decision, in order to ensure the greatest secrecy of the documents of the Central Committee, a number of organizational and technical measures were taken. In particular, the institute of trustees of the 2nd category was liquidated, that is, those who received secret documents of the Central Committee without the right to open them. The secretariat of the Central Committee recommended that all persons who received documents through trustees receive and keep secret documents in person and return them either personally or through a special

1 Cited. according to O.V. Khlevnyuk, A. V. Kvashonkin, L. P. Kosheleva, L. A. Rogovaya. Stalin's Politburo in the 1930s. S. 77.

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dedicated employee of the Secret Department of the Central Committee. The secret department of the Central Committee, in turn, was asked to simplify the procedure for returning secret documents as much as possible. Trustees with the right to open, store and return documents were left only with members and candidate members of the Politburo, members of the Orgburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee, the Presidium of the Central Control Commission allocated to attend meetings of the Politburo and the Orgburo. Commissions composed of B. A. Roizeinman, V. I. Polonsky, G. I. Bokiya, Ya. S. Agranov, I.P. Tovstukha (replaced by A.N. Poskrebyshch), M.A. Trilisser and I. A. Pyatnitsky were instructed to carefully check the secretaries and trustees, as well as the entire staff of the Secret Department. According to this resolution, a 3-day deadline for the return of the Politburo protocols was confirmed and it was recommended that if the protocol is not returned within the specified period, the next protocol should not be sent. The resolution of the Politburo of May 5, 1927 "On the Use of Secret Materials" was also confirmed for steadfast execution.

At the end of the 1920s, the unification of the composition of secret bodies was carried out and a standard nomenclature of positions in the secret apparatuses of institutions and organizations was established. Secret departments were set up in the central offices of the Supreme Council of National Economy, People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, People's Commissariat of National Economy, and secret units in other people's commissariats; in central offices, directorates and departments, secret units and secret departments, respectively. The nomenclature of positions of secret bodies included: head; instructors; secretaries (assistant secretaries); correspondents; senior typists (typists); archivists. The structure of the secret agencies provided for secret office work, a machine bureau, a drafting bureau, a stenographic bureau, a control group, a group for accounting and distribution work, a pass and information bureau. The specific composition of the secret organs was determined by the people's commissariats in agreement with the Special Department of the OGPU. As noted above, since 1928, the encryption business has been separated from the secret. The information protection services by technical means had different names: encryption departments or bureaus, secret departments, subdivisions of secret office work, etc. All of them were also secret departments.

During the 1920-1930s. in the highest bodies of the party, issues of observance of the secrecy regime on certain issues continued to be raised. So, for example, on June 25, 1929, the Politburo considered the issue of the procedure for publishing Central Committee resolutions on the reports of economic bodies. In this case, the Politburo decided: "To recognize as necessary the publication of resolutions of the Central Committee on the reports of economic bodies and with the withdrawal of certain points of a secret nature and with the application of certain points with

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financial allocations! On January 5, 1939, at a meeting of the Organizing Bureau, the issue of the procedure for returning subpoenas and extracts from the minutes of meetings of the Orgburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee was raised, at which a 7-day deadline was set for the return of extracts from the day they were received by the addressee and subpoenas - immediately after the meeting. The departments of the Central Committee were allowed to leave extracts from the protocols for a longer period under the personal responsibility of the head. department 2.

In the 1930s - early 1941, one of the activities of the highest bodies of the party to ensure secrecy was still the organization of work to create a legal framework to ensure secrecy in the form of preparing administrative, regulatory and instructive documents. In accordance with the resolutions of the Politburo, Orgburo, and the Secretariat of the Central Committee, "Rules for the storage, familiarization and return of the minutes of meetings of the bureaus and Plenums of regional committees, regional committees and the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the Union republics" were developed. Instead of the instructions of 1928, the "Instruction on the establishment of secret office work in regional committees, regional committees and the Central Committee of the republics" was developed and approved on June 28, 1940. From time to time, changes and additions were made to the previously existing instructions and regulations. So, for example, in October-November 1940, B. A. Dvinsky's proposal was submitted to the Secretariat of the Central Committee on some changes in the organization of secret office work in the regional committees, regional committees, and the Central Committee of the communist parties of the union republics. The changes concerned the procedure for signing and processing documents, as well as the deadline for their return.

The issues of publishing Party and Soviet documents were constantly in the field of view of the Central Committee. Decisions to publish certain documents were made at the highest level, depending on the type and significance of the documents. So, for example, documents of the highest party forums, party and Soviet bodies were published according to the decisions of the Politburo. Documents of local party bodies and Soviet authorities in the field - according to the decisions of the relevant party committees. The number and composition of published documents were strictly regulated. In the 1930s, control over publications in the press increased. So, at the meeting of the Secretariat of the Central Committee on October 3, 1933, the issue "On the procedure for printing official materials and reports in regional and political department newspapers" was considered. As a result, the Secretariat made a decision: "To instruct Kulprop of the Central Committee to instruct the district committees and editorial offices of district and political department newspapers on the maximum reduction of official materials placed in newspapers (Resolutions of the Republic of Kazakhstan,

I RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 776. L. 14. 2 See ibid. F.17. Op. 114. D. 653. L. 17. 3 See RGASPI. F.17. Op. 116. D. 60. L. 52.

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RIKov, orders, etc.) "!, and on December 31, 1934, at a meeting of the Orgburo, the issue "On the procedure for publishing and covering in the press the decisions of the Orgburo and the Secretariat" was considered, at which it was decided: "To establish that as the publication, and coverage in newspapers and magazines of decisions of the Central Committee can be made only with the permission in each individual case of one of the Secretaries of the Central Committee. For violation of this resolution, the guilty person should be removed from work"2. In some cases, the initiators of party decisions on the use of secret materials were Soviet authorities. Since the highest party bodies, in fact, were also the highest state structures (the leading role was fixed constitutionally), in certain cases, their decision or agreement was required. So, for example, on September 3, 1927, the Administration of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR sent a secret letter to the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6) signed by the Manager of Affairs of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR N. Gorbunov with a proposal to distribute secret information reports on the activities of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the STO in the Soviet and party apparatuses. This letter was accepted by the Secret Department of the Central Committee and submitted to the next meeting of the Secretariat of the Central Committee. As a result, having considered the issue, the Secretariat of the Central Committee decided: "a) To recognize as expedient the distribution of secret information reports and transcripts about the activities of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the STO to local party bodies in 2 copies (1 copy for executive committees) according to the mailing list confidential materials of the Central Committee to all Presidium of the Central Executive Committees, Council of People's Commissars and ECOSO of the Union Republics from 3 to 5 copies under the personal responsibility of their chairmen. 6) Responsibility for maintaining secrecy when distributing materials and not including those decisions cat. are subject to submission for approval by the decision-making bodies, to assign to comrade. Gorbunova" In March 1928, the Council of People's Commissars and the STO again raised the issue of sending secret information reports. The secret department wrote about this to the Secretariat of the Central Committee: "According to post. PB of the Central Committee dated June 15, 22. Until recently, information summaries of the most important decisions of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and STO were sent out in limited quantities through the apparatus of the Secret Department only to members and candidates of the PB and representatives of the Central Control Commission - to the PB. At present, these reports, printed in the printing house, are sent out by the Managers of the Council of People's Commissars in accordance with the decision of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of 9.1.27) to local party organizations and individual comrades - according to an expanded list. Of the comrades who receive these reports through the apparatus of the Central Committee, 17 now receive them directly from the Council of People's Commissars. So about

1 Ibid. F.17.Op. 114. D. 364. L.2. 2 RGASPI. F.17. Op. 114. D. 575. L.9. 3 Ibid. F.17. Op. 113. D. 327, L. 3.

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at once, the remaining mailings through the apparatus of the Central Committee - only 13 copies. Tov. Gorbunov petitions for the complete transfer of the distribution of these materials directly to the apparatus of the Council of People's Commissars. I fully support this request, applying the same procedure to the reports of the Council of People's Commissars and ECOSO of the RSFSR and ask you to approve the attached draft resolution. Head Secret department of the Central Committee! IN

As a result, the Secretariat of the Central Committee decided: "To entrust the distribution of reports on the most important decisions of the SNK and STO of the USSR, SNK and ECOSO of the RSFSR to the managers of the SNK of the USSR and the RSFSR, making them responsible for timely distribution"<sup>2</sup>. The above example, to some extent, shows the mechanism of interaction between the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, i.e., the highest state and party bodies for making decisions regarding work with secret documents. One of the activities of the Central Committee for the protection of party information was the response to the facts of its disclosure. Despite the organizational and administrative measures taken to maintain the secrecy regime, there were cases of disclosure of secret documents both through the press and party authorities. These incidents immediately became the subject of discussion and decision by the Secretariat of the Central Committee, the Orgburo, and in especially urgent or significant cases, the Politburo of the Central Committee. So at a meeting of the Politburo on February 15, 1930, the issue "On the publication of decisions on dispossession by the North Caucasian and Lower Volga regional committees" was considered. A rather strict, but without organizational conclusions, decision followed. The Politburo decided: "The North Caucasian Regional Executive Committee published in the local press and given to the central press a detailed decision on dispossession in many respects literally repeating the top secret decision of the Central Committee of January 30. disclosure of secret party decisions. The Central Committee considers these facts completely inadmissible and makes it clear to the secretaries of the regional committees, Andreev and Sheboldaev, that the decision of the Central Committee has been violated. The said decision of the Central Committee and the additional instructions given by it are subject to firm implementation with special attention to the cause of rallying really broad masses of the peasantry around the Party, which has nothing to do with the newspaper hype and the disclosure of especially secret decisions of the Party. Send this resolution to the attention of all regional committees and national Central Committees"<sup>3</sup>. In some cases, administrative measures were taken. So, at a meeting of the Organizing Bureau on January 8, 1938, the issue raised by Mekhlis "O

I RGASPI. F.17. Op.113. D. 606. L. 175. 2 Ibid. L. 11. 3 RGASPI F.17. Op.3. D. 776. L. 14.

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article in the magazine "Gribuna". In this case, the Orgburo issued a harsh decision: "Remove S. Dimanshtein from his job as editor of the Tribuna magazine for publishing an anti-Soviet article aimed at sowing voters' distrust of candidates for deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR for propaganda of bourgeois nationalism. The Tribuna magazine, published in Russian, cut off from the readership and duplicating Jewish newspapers, should be closed." Secret party divisions could not help but be aloof from the political struggle. An example of this is one of the episodes. We are talking about the statement of L. D. Trotsky, K. B. Radek, G. L. Pyatakov of December 29, 1923 on Pravda, in which they accuse A. M. Nazaretyan and G. I. falsification of the statements of L. D. Trotsky in Pravda and "asked" to punish A. M. Nazaretyan and G. I. Safarov and change the method of work in Pravda. On this occasion, L. D. Trotsky, K. B. Radek, and G. L. Pyatakov wrote: the dangers that the Party is moving towards under those methods of struggle, one of the expressions of which are the above facts. We believe that this must be put to an end, and precisely today, since every day makes the situation more and more dangerous for the party. In response to this letter, JV Stalin stands up for A. M. Nazaretyan, accuses L. D. Trotsky, K. B. Radek and G. L. Pyatakov of factionalism and squabbles. In the letter, I.V. Stalin also raised the issue of disclosing secret party information. He writes: "... As before, secret documents and statements directed against the Central Committee (for example, the letter of 46 and the letter of Comrade Trotsky, etc.) immediately became the property of wide circles of party members and even non-party members and the Army, received wide circulation, it is obvious that this defiant statement will be put into wide circulation in order to undermine confidence in the Central Committee of our Party and its Central O. The Political Bureau categorically declares that such speeches, which are typical of squabbles, threaten to really create an atmosphere split, fraught with the most serious consequences"? At a meeting on April 4, 1927, the Secretariat considered the certificate of the Head of the Secret Department of the Central Committee I.P. Tovstukha in connection with the statement of L.D. Trotsky

at the February Plenum of the Central Committee about the refusal to give him uncorrected transcripts of speeches at the Plenum. In his reference, I.P. Tovstukha writes: "At the plenum of the Central Committee on February 1-2 this year. tov. Trotsky declared: "I do not enjoy the privilege

1 Ibid. F.17. Op. 114. D. 635. L. 13. 2 RGASPI. F.17. Op. 3. D. 407. L.9. 3 Ibid. L. 4.

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receive other people's uncorrected transcripts ... "and another time" ... By order of comrade. Stalin, they didn't give me a transcript when I asked for it." Further, I.P. Tovstukha notes: "I consider it necessary to state that the prohibition of issuing someone's uncorrected transcript of Comrade. Trotsky or any of the members of the Central Committee on the part of comrade. There never was a Stalin, and I categorically affirm that in the practice of our work there was not a single case when Comrade. Trotsky asked and would have been refused the issuance of someone's uncorrected transcript. By the way, we can here recall the case when Comrade. Trotsky asked to be given an uncorrected transcript of Comrade Manuilsky's speech at the GU nat. meeting and considered it necessary at the same time to declare "... the kind assistance of the secretariat" in this "I. From the above examples it is clear that, like the entire apparatus of the Central Committee, the secret units were to a certain extent involved in the inner-party struggle. By the way, the disclosure of secret information in the future was very often blamed on the oppositionists of I.V. Stalin, which was incriminated in the form of accusations and at trials.

Thus, it follows from the foregoing that, having come to power in 1917, the Bolsheviks faced the problem of protecting information not only in the state as a whole, but also in party structures. From the very beginning of functioning, the issues of protecting party secrets constantly arose in the field of view of the highest bodies of the party. The Soviet Republic had to develop and, under difficult conditions, create a new, efficient system for protecting state secrets. In parallel with this, a system was created to protect party secrets. With the established party-state structure of the country, in general, it was a single party-state system. Party secrets in a broad sense were perceived by the leadership of the party and the party apparatus as a state secret. Many secret questions were first discussed at the highest party level (but it was the other way around), then embodied in joint party-state decisions. But, based on the specifics of the party structure, which differs from the state one, in a narrow sense, one can also talk about an independent party system for protecting information with its secret organs, secret functions, administrative and regulatory framework, and separate, since 1922, general and secret office work. But it cannot be denied that in many ways these systems duplicated each other.

The issues of ensuring secrecy were raised both by individual members of the Central Committee and by divisions of the Secretariat and the Central Committee. The initiators of some issues to ensure secrecy were the state

1 See RGASPI. F.17. Op. 113. D. 270. L. 244.

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military authorities and administration. The general control over the observance and maintenance of the secrecy regime in the country was entrusted to the state security structures, the Special Department of the OGPU, created in 1921. Control over the observance of the secrecy regime in the apparatus of the Secretariat of the Central Committee and work with secret party documents in party committees in the localities was carried out by the secret divisions of the Central Committee - the Secret Department (Bureau of the Secretariat, Special Sector). They were also the initiators or, on behalf of the Central Committee, the responsible executors of measures on the issues of information protection. The main part of the issues on the protection of information by the Secret Department was submitted to the Orgburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee, and the most important, to the Politburo of the Central Committee. Thus, at meetings of the highest bodies of the party, resolutions were discussed and adopted on the organization of ensuring secrecy in party and Soviet

bodies, and approved instructions, rules, regulations, etc. for working with secret not only party, but also state documents. Naturally, the Central Committee paid special attention to ensuring secrecy in the Party organs proper.

Thus, it can be stated that through the highest party bodies of the Central Committee, everything more or less significant was passed and approved, which was associated with the protection of party and state secrets throughout the country. Particular attention was paid to the leakage of secret information from party and state bodies, the disclosure of information of a military, foreign policy and diplomatic nature, and in wartime, reports from the fronts. Organizational and technical measures were taken in party bodies to strengthen the secrecy regime, tighten control and limit the number of persons with access to classified information. To solve this problem, the forces of not only the party apparatus, but also state bodies were used. In many cases, due to their official and functional duties, the state security bodies of the Cheka-GPU-OGPU-NKVD-NKGB were involved for this, which were entrusted with general control over the observance of the secrecy regime and the protection of party and state secrets. . Taking into account the specifics of the functioning of the state as a whole, the leading role of the Bolshevik party, we can also talk about the existence of a kind of party state secret. It seems that this term has the right to exist.

In the Central Committee and party committees in the localities, secret regime functions were performed by the Secret Department of the Central Committee and secret subdivisions (units, departments) in the apparatus of party committees in the localities Work on the organization and functioning of the system for protecting party and state secrets

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was carried out continuously and had a purposeful character. It should also be noted that this activity was especially intensified during periods of aggravation of the international situation and internal political struggle. So it was, for example, in 1926-1927, and then, in the 1930s, and the years immediately preceding the Great Patriotic War. So, it was in 1926-1927 that the Central Committee was most active in organizing the protection of information. Based on the resolutions of the Politburo "On the Use of Secret Materials", and then in 1929 "On Conspiracy", the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6) adopted a number of organizational and regulatory measures that consolidated the basic principles of information protection in party bodies. These resolutions were fundamental and obligatory for execution not only in the work of the party apparatus, but also in state authorities and administration, as well as in all organizations and institutions of the country.

Thus, it can be stated that by the end of the 1920s. a stable system of information protection was formed and subsequently functioned in the party bodies, both in the center and in the localities. It should be noted that this system was formed and worked together with the state information protection system as a whole.

Table 1 below, compiled on the agenda of meetings of the Politburo, Orgburo, Secretariat, gives an idea of the number of issues directly or indirectly related to the protection of information that were raised at meetings of the highest bodies of the party from 1919 to 1941. up to the Great Patriotic War. The author considers indirect questions that are not specifically related to the organization of information protection, but are held to some extent under the heading of secrecy and do not reveal the specific essence of the issue. For example, "See "Special Folder", "Questions of the NKVD", "Questions of the OGPU", or "Questions of the NKID", etc. d.

Due to the complexity of the calculation, the above table does not claim to be 100% reliable, but it does give a general picture of the number and intensity of issues raised by the highest bodies of the party for the protection of information. Basically, the numbers speak for themselves. So, for example, most of the issues related to the protection of information for 1919-1941. was decided not by the Politburo, but by the Orgburo and the Secretariat. The ratio of questions was 67 to 312, i.e., the difference was more than 4 times, and together with indirect ones, 5 times. Most security issues

information security took place in the 1920s, especially at the end of the decade, i.e., during the period of organization and formation and, ultimately, the formation of the information protection system in party bodies. In the 1930s, the already established system continued to evolve in a well-established manner. It should be noted (to the question

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Table 1. The number of issues considered regarding the protection of information in the governing bodies of the Central Committee in 1919 - 1941 (before the Great Patriotic War).

Organizing Bureau Secretariat Total | Shi mevno| arys | kene |

ZHEGEN ERLI BESIIN BELE 91) 5 (14 |

zoy EEEESH YENEG SHGINIGE BEFORE THE WAR

1930-1941) 29 |] 18 |7) 12) 9 |251.

Total: for 1919 - 1941

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about the "top secrecy" of Politburo meetings), which on average per year, for example, in the 1930s, about 3.5 thousand points were entered into the protocols (from 4 thousand in 1931 and 1934 (of which, respectively, only 2 and 3, on issues of information security - G.K.) up to 2.3 thousand in 1938 (of which only 4 on issues of information security - G.K.). In the early 1930s, at many meetings The Politburo considered up to fifty questions. In this regard, on September 1, 1932, at the suggestion of Stalin, a maximum norm was established - no more than 15 questions could be submitted to a meeting!

Issues related to the protection of information were raised at meetings of the highest bodies of the party, depending on the current situation in the country and the world. Of great importance is the fact that many questions of a secret nature were decided at closed meetings and put aside in the "Special Folders" of closed protocols and are not reflected in open protocols.

Thus, it can be stated that the highest bodies of the party directed and controlled through certain state and party structures the work of both the party and the state as a whole to ensure secrecy and protect party-state secrets. Decisions on these issues were made at the highest party-state level, as evidenced by the minutes of open meetings of the Politburo, the Orgburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee. Above, only a number of general measures to maintain secrecy taken at the party-state level were listed. The main material on this topic is concentrated not in open, but in closed protocols of the highest bodies of the party and local party committees. But even the information that is in open protocols gives an idea of the scale and level of decisions taken to maintain secrecy not only in party bodies, but also in the state as a whole.

ÿ See Stalin's Politburo in the 1930s. Compiled by O. V. Khlevnyuk, A. V. Kvashonkin, L.P. Kosheleva, L. A. Horny. S. 15.

## 2.2. ESTABLISHING THE ORDER OF ACCESS TO SECRET INFORMATION AS A DIRECTION OF ACTIVITIES FOR THE PROTECTION OF PARTY AND STATE SECRETS

One of the activities of the RCP (6) - VKP (6) to ensure the protection of information in party bodies by organizational methods was the adoption of measures to limit the circle of persons with access to classified information to the maximum. Access is authorized by an authorized person or body familiarization of specific persons with

information constituting a state (or party) secret. It is carried out by admission, i.e., a certain procedure for registration of the right to access. Admission, in turn, provides for the voluntary acceptance by a person of obligations to non-dissemination of information that leaves a certain secret, consent to partial or temporary restriction of his rights, written consent to conduct certain verification activities in relation to himself, determination of types, sizes and procedures providing the envisaged benefits, familiarization with the norms of legislation and departmental regulations on this issue and the final decision on admission or a decision on refusal. Control over access to secret documents of party congresses, plenums, the Politburo, the Orgburo, the Secretariat, departments of the Central Committee and local party committees, determining the circle of persons and organizations admitted to secret party information, as well as distributing these materials for work, was carried out by secret divisions Central Committee and secret divisions of party committees in the field.

Access to classified information was issued only after a number of organizational and technical measures were taken. It included both the conduct of verification activities to determine the trustworthiness of persons, and the determination of the circle of subjects

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admitted to classified information. Verification activities were carried out by authorized special bodies of state security. Interaction with state security agencies on this issue was the prerogative of the secret divisions of the party. The main task of the secret units was to limit the circle of permitted persons and maintain secrecy. The main principle of work on granting access to secret information in party bodies was the principle of reasonableness and expediency of access. In this case, the rule was that the smaller the circle of persons and organizations admitted to classified information, the greater the guarantee of its safety. Therefore, the circle of persons and organizations admitted to classified information was strictly limited. The secret subdivisions of the Central Committee prepared materials for the meetings of the highest party organs on issues of access and registration of access to secret party information, acting as the initiators of the decisions of the Central Committee in this area. Registration of access to classified information was part of the functional responsibilities of these units, was an integral part of the access, that is, being one of the areas of activity for information protection.

The Central Committee determined the circle and number of users of secret information, limiting or expanding, within certain limits, its dissemination, if necessary. It should be noted that the permissive system of access to secret documents in party bodies influenced the circle of users of this information and, accordingly, the circle of external distribution of secret documents, which was not limited to purely party bodies. It was not purely party or departmental, but nationwide in nature, since secret party documents were sent to organizations of various departmental subordination. Questions of distribution of secret documents of the Central Committee were decided at meetings of the highest party instances. At the same time, the Central Committee strictly distinguished between the use of secret and unclassified information. Already in 1921, references in the work of state and party instances to secret party decisions, as well as copying secret documents of the Central Committee, were strictly prohibited. This was confirmed by the resolution of the Politburo of September 16, 1921 and the resolution of the Orgburo of November 30, 1922.

Decisions to determine the circle of persons and organizations using secret documents of the highest party forums and party bodies, as well as the procedure for their distribution and use, were made by the above party authorities on the proposal of the secret divisions of the Central Committee. The protocols of the Politburo were distributed by secret divisions of the Central Committee according to special lists to persons who had the right to get acquainted with these secret documents.



The lists were updated from time to time by decision of the Politburo or the Secretariat. They constantly changed both in personalities and in status and geographical principle. For example, in the 1920s, these lists tended to expand their composition, but at the same time, the requirements for maintaining secrecy, execution and storage conditions for secret documents became stricter. The main punishment for violating the rules for the use of classified information was the deprivation of the right to receive secret documents. Access was made by familiarization on the spot or distribution of documents. The transfer of documents was carried out by secret divisions of the Central Committee through courier communications.

Judging by the minutes of the Secretariat of the Central Committee, in the main, decisions on these issues were adopted by the Secretariat of the Central Committee, and in special cases - by the Politburo and the Orgburo. So, for example, at a meeting of the Politburo on April 30, 1921, the issue of the right of responsible instructors of the Central Committee to read the minutes of the Orgburo and the Politburo was considered, at which, in particular, it was decided: "Give responsible instructors of the Orgburo of the Central Committee the right to read the protocols and extracts from protocols of the Politburo sent to the regional Bureaus of the Central Committee! For the first time, the list for receiving secret materials of the Central Committee was considered and approved at a meeting of the Secretariat of the Central Committee on October 26, 1922. In 1922-1923 The Central Committee adopts resolutions on the "Procedure for the storage and return to the Central Committee of the Communist Party (6) of the transcripts of the meetings of the Secretariat, the Organizing Bureau, the Politburo and Plenums of the Central Committee" and "On familiarization with secret transcripts of the meetings of the Central Committee that are being distributed"<sup>2</sup>. For example, the mailing list for the materials of the Politburo and the Plenum of the Central Committee to members and candidate members of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission in October 1923 was compiled by the Bureau of the Secretariat at 123 human

To regulate and regulate this issue, the "Instruction on the procedure for mailing, returning and familiarizing with secret documents of the Central Committee of the RCP" was developed and approved in June 1923. This instruction also confirmed the procedure for the return of party documents from state departments to the Central Committee after the issue was resolved in the Soviet order. Separately, the procedure for mailing and the circle of persons received extracts from the decisions of the Orgburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee for places in party committees and commissions, as well as for delegated responsible employees for party, trade union and Soviet work, was regulated separately. Statements to the places were sent only

<sup>1</sup> RGASPI. F.17.Op. 3. D.157. L. 3.

<sup>2</sup> See *ibid.* F. 17. Op. 84. D. 697. L. 331-332.

<sup>3</sup> See *ibid.* F. 17. Op. 84. D. 492. L. 153-154v. <sup>4</sup> See *ibid.* F. 17. Op. 112. D. 453. L. 278.

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those organizations to which these extracts concerned. The Central Committee considered the distribution of secret party documents not only within the country, but also abroad. Was it the prerogative of the highest party authorities to decide on the transfer of secret correspondence to Soviet institutions abroad?

In 1923, the circle of persons and organizations to whom the transcripts of the meetings of the highest bodies of the party were sent was quite wide. Transcripts were sent to members and candidate members of the Central Committee, the Central Control Commission, the Revision Commission of the Central Committee, to some departments of the apparatus of the Central Committee, instructors of the Central Committee, Secretary of the Central Committee of the RLKSM, secretaries of local party committees (not lower than provincial committees), secretaries of district committees of Moscow and Leningrad, city koms of Grozny and Baku, the secretary of the Society of Old Bolsheviks and the Lenin Institute, the ECCI and the Profintern, the chiefs of the main political departments of the army, the Bureau of Cells and the rectors of the Communist Universities, the highest officials of the central Soviet institutions and commissions, as well as the Chairmen of the factions of the Centrosoyuz and Selskosoyuz, editors of central newspapers, some plenipotentiaries, members of the faction of the Presidium of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions and the Chairman of the Central Committee of the Union, personally (with the permission of the Secretariat of the Central Committee) Dem...

In June-August 1924, the Bureau of the Secretariat of the Central Committee sent a circular letter on behalf of the Central Committee to the localities on the distribution and storage of secret materials to members of the Central Control Commission.

TsKI. At a meeting of the Organizing Bureau on September 26, 1924, an additional list of district committees was considered, the secretaries of which should be sent all secret information documents. It was approved by the Secretariat. The list included: "1. In the Urals: 1. Yekaterinburg OK. 2. Perm OK. 3. Chelyabinsk OK. 4. Zlatoust OK. 5. Nizhne Tagil OK. In the South-East: 1. Kuban OK. 2. Armavir OK. 3. Stavropol OK. 4. Tersky OK. 5. Don OK. 6. Dagestan OK "5. In December 1924, the procedure for distributing secret information materials was established. Documents were prepared by the Information Department of the Central Committee, and the distribution and determination of the circle of organizations, receipt and return of documents was entrusted to the Bureau of the Secretariat. Moreover, the storage of the returned materials of the Politburo and Plenums of the Central Committee was carried out in the archives of the Politburo, and the documents of the Orgburo in the archives of the Orgburo.

ÿ See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 84. D. 696. L. 101-102. 2 See ibid. L. 97-98.

3 See ibid. F. 17. Op. 84. D. 696. L. 75-76.

4 See ibid. F. 17. Op. 84. D. 697. L. 4, 8.

5 See RGASPI. F.17. Op. 112. D. 598. L. 81.

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In 1925, access to transcripts of Central Committee meetings was limited! In the same year, the circle of persons and organizations receiving secret party documents changed again, and a new procedure for familiarizing themselves with these documents was adopted. It was regulated by special resolutions of the Secretariat of the Central Committee dated January 30, 1925 "On the circle of persons and organizations to whom the transcripts of the Secretariat, the Organizing Bureau, the Politburo and the Plenums of the Central Committee are subject to distribution". The secretariat approved the submitted draft list, limited and determined the procedure for familiarization with the secret transcripts distributed?. It was forbidden to acquaint the members of the party organization not included in the list with the content of the transcripts. On February 13 of the same year, the circle of persons and organizations to whom secret circulars of the Central Committee were sent was determined. As a change to the previous one, a new list of district committees was approved, to which conspiratorial materials of the Central Committee were sent. So the list included 23 district party organizations in Ukraine, 2 in Belarus, 10 in the Northern Regional Committee, 11 in the Ural Region, 11 in Siberia. The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (6) strengthened measures to ensure secrecy and tightened the requirements for persons admitted to secret correspondence. In March 1925, by a resolution of the Orgburo, it was decided to leave transcripts on the ground, on which there was no inscription "to be returned". The party committees were obliged to return within the established time limits to the Bureau of the Secretariat of the Central Committee all the secret transcripts of the meetings of the Central Committee. In the district committees, only members of the Bureau of district committees and the Presidium of the KKZ were allowed to familiarize themselves with secret materials of the Central Committee. On August 13, 1926, at a meeting of the Secretariat of the Central Committee, a list of leaders of propaganda groups of the Central Committee and their deputies was approved, who have the right to get acquainted with secret materials of the Central Committee in copies sent to their party committees. This list, which included 23 people, was submitted to the Secretariat by the Secret Department of the Central Committee, and on October 22, 1926, this list was supplemented.

Until October 1926, in the party apparatus there were certain categories of proxies of members and candidate members of the Central Committee, the Central Control Commission, the Audit Commission of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6), the highest officials of the state, who received secret documents of the Central Committee for receiving, opening and familiarizing themselves with secret correspondence. Basically, the trustees were assistants or secretaries of the management

ÿ See ibid. F. 17. Op. 84. D. 866. L. 1 rev., 21. 2 See Ibid. F.17. Op. 112. D. 635. L. 8-9. 3 See RGASPI. F.17. Op.112..D. 713. L. 5-6.

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party and government officials. Trustees for the reception and storage of secret correspondence of the Central Committee with party organs were appointed only by special resolutions of the relevant party committees. As a result of the flight abroad of the assistant and secretary of I. V. Stalin B. Bazhanov, since 1926 the Central Committee began to pay special attention to checking proxies. The selection of candidates and screening activities have become stricter. These persons were presented by the Secret Department and approved by the Secretariat of the Central Committee. Thus, at a meeting of the Secretariat of the Central Committee on October 22, 1926, the issue "On those authorized to receive, store and return secret documents of the Central Committee", presented by the deputy head of the Secret Department of the Central Committee Ya. E. Brezanovsky, was considered. In the report of the Secret Department to the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6) it was noted that: "In connection with the recent increase in cases of loss and disclosure of secret documents of the Central Committee, it becomes necessary to narrow, as far as possible, the circle of persons who have access to these documents. The question of the circle of persons to whom secret documents of the Central Committee are sent is closely connected with the existing procedure for receiving, storing and returning these documents. The fact is that a significant part of the comrades who receive secret documents of the Central Committee entrust the receipt, storage, return and keeping records of these documents to a special representative (most often their secretaries), approved by a resolution of the Central Committee. In the event of vacation or temporary absence of these latter, they are entrusted to third parties, thereby the circle of persons in contact with secret documents of the Central Committee is expanding along this line as well. At present, the number of such personally trusted persons reaches 140, not counting "95" trusted persons in party organizations, who are not approved by the decisions of the Central Committee. The specified number of trustees was formed in 1924, 1925 and 1926, while there is a tendency for their further growth, and this will expand the circle of people who have access to secret documents even more. Along with this, it should be noted that a number of trustees have actually already retired, and the rights granted to them by the Central Committee have not been canceled. Quite a significant part of the trustees is defined without a definition - a clear wording, which gives them the opportunity to interpret their rights broadly! As can be seen, the secret division of the Central Committee, performing its functions, in this case, appears as the initiator of organizational actions to protect information. The secretariat of the Central Committee, having considered the issue, agreed with the proposed draft. Thus, instead of the existing list of trustees, a reduced and modified list was approved, while from now on it was allowed to expand it only in the most extreme cases. Only 2 installed

I RGASPI. F.17.Op. 113. D. 238. L. 224.

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categories of authorized persons; with the right to open secret packages and without the right to open them. In the first case, the trustee had to accept, open (respectively, get acquainted with the contents), present to the head, store, keep records and return secret documents to the Central Committee, and in the second, only accept and transfer the package to the addressee without opening it. He could return secret documents only in sealed form. It was established that during the absence (business trip, vacation, etc.) of the trustee, his functions should have been performed by the addressee himself or by a person who has the right to get acquainted with secret materials! As a result, in pursuance of the decision of the Secretariat of the Central Committee, the Secret Department re-registered to the faithful, while the list was significantly reduced. 126 trusted representatives were finally approved. In the end, in March 1928, the head of the Secret Department of the Central Committee, I.P. Only particularly controversial cases were submitted to the Secretariat. Thus, the Secret Department itself, without the sanction of the Secretariat, could determine and regulate the circle of persons admitted to classified information, thereby confirming the status of a special body.

In connection with the aggravation of the international situation, the strengthening of the secrecy regime and the adoption in May 1927 at a meeting of the Politburo of the draft resolution "On use of secret materials of the Politburo", followed by a series of restrictive organizational measures. So, for example, now only the persons to whom they were addressed on the mailing list were supposed to get acquainted with extracts from the Politburo. In all state institutions, secret issues were required to be discussed only at closed meetings without secretaries, minutes of the meeting

was to be conducted by the presiding officer himself. In party committees and state organizations, secret documents of the Central Committee were to be registered in special journals. In November-December 1927, the Organizing Committee of the Central Committee raised the issue of familiarizing the gubernia committees and regional committees of grassroots organizations with top secret documents of the Central Committee. The secret department was instructed to instruct the provincial committees and regional party committees on the procedure for familiarizing themselves with the top secret decisions of the Central Committee, as well as to take measures to improve the storage of top secret (especially mobilization) documents<sup>2</sup>.

The number of secret documents sent to the field is indicated by the information in the certificate of the Secret Department of the Central Committee on the number of transcripts

1 See RGASPI. F.17.Op. 113. D. 238. L. 13. 2 See RGASPI. F.17. Op. 113. D. 345. L.2.

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Gustov and October Plenums of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, sent to party organizations (except Moscow), presented to the Central Committee in December 1927. So, according to the information, the number of transcripts sent was 20540; the number of those returned to the Central Committee by December 20, 1927 - 3615; were considered not returned (for organizations) - 169261. On March 3, 1928, the Secretariat of the Central Committee at one meeting adopted two resolutions at once concerning the distribution of secret documents: "On the distribution of materials for the meetings of the Orgburo" and "On the distribution of materials for the meetings of the Secretariat of the Central Committee »<sup>2</sup>. In May 1928, the Central Committee decided to unite the distribution of the protocols of the Secretariat and the protocols of the Organizing Bureau to the periphery.

Constantly throughout the 1920s-1930s, the Secretariat of the Central Committee considered questions at the request of organizations to include them in the list of those receiving conspiratorial documents of the Central Committee. The secret department, as before, controlled the distribution of secret documents, and if necessary, contacted the Secretariat of the Central Committee with a proposal to reduce or expand the circle of organizations to which secret materials of the Central Committee should be sent. Thus, in August 1928, in view of the appeal to the Secret and Organizing Department of the Central Committee of the regional and newly formed party committees, as well as the party committees of large industrial district committees, to which some materials (for example, about grain procurements, about the sowing campaign, etc.) had already been sent to separate orders of the Secretaries of the Central Committee, with a request to send them materials of the Central Committee on a permanent basis. In a letter to the Central Committee, the secret department considered: "It is completely overdue to raise the question of the need to expand the circle of party committees to which certain materials of the Central Committee should be sent (transcripts of the Orgburo, circular instructions, etc.)"<sup>3</sup>. This proposal was also supported by the Orgspredotdel of the Central Committee. As a result, when considering the issue at the Secretariat of the Central Committee "On expanding the circle of party committees receiving secret materials", it was decided: "Include in the list of persons and organizations receiving secret materials of the Central Committee the following party committees, divided into 2 groups, and the 2nd receives only transcripts of the OB and similar materials. In total, 88 organizations were included in the additional list. On March 19, 1926, the Orgburo considered the request of the Central Asian Bureau of the Central Committee to include the Tashkent and Fergana regional committees; F. E. Dzerzhinsky's request to include a large number of representatives of industrial enterprises

ÿ See *ibid.* F.17. Op. 113. D. 582. L. 154.

2 See RGASPI. F.17. item 113. D. 603. L. 14-15. 3 *Ibid.* F.17. Op. 113. D. 650. L. 199.

4 RGASPI. F.17. Op. 113. D. 650. L. 8.

5 See *ibid.* L. 194-197.

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yatiy in the list. In August 1929, the Secretariat of the Central Committee approved a list of newly zoned regions receiving conspiratorial materials of the Central Committee on the Volgograd Regional Committee, Sevkraikom, Western Regions, and the Moscow Regional Industrial Committee! IN

In February 1930, the list of party committees receiving secret materials of the Central Committee on the first group<sup>2</sup> was expanded.

What was your motivation for being on the list? So on October 15, 1926, at the request of the Information Department of the Central Committee and the Northern Regional Committee, four district committees were included in the list. The deputy head of the Information Department of the Central Committee, in a letter on August 28, 1926, to the Secret Department of the Central Committee to the deputy head Ya. E. Brezanovsky, motivated the inclusion of district committees in the list: Cav. The Regional Committee of August 3, 1926 (Prot. No. 32) asks the Central Committee to supply the Vladikavkaz, Salsk, Donetsk regional committees and the Kabardino-Balkarian regional committee with conspiratorial materials to the Central Committee. The information department of the Central Committee, for its part, considers it expedient to send secret materials: to the Kabardino-Balkarian Regional Committee (the center of Nalchik) as a national organization, significant in number (754 members and 1019 candidate members of the All-Union Communist Party), allocated for communication with the Central Committee, located far from the regional center and the centers of other national regions. Salsk Okrug (the center of the village of Vorontsovo-Nikolaevskaya), as a typical peasant organization, significant in number (1027 members and 765 candidate members of the All-Union Communist Party - as of 1.7.26) and vast in territory. The expulsion of conspiratorial materials to the Vladikavkaz Okrug and Donetsk Okrug should be recognized as expedient for the following reasons: The Vladikavkaz Okrug does not actually have a periphery, since the territory of the former. The mountainous republic currently includes a number of autonomous regions (Sundzha, Ossetia, Ingushetia) and thus serves only the mountains. Vladikavkaz, the organization is small (members 652 cand. 377) and is not typical. The Donetsk regional committee (the center of Millerovo station) represents a small organization on 1.7.26, 533 members, 414 candidates" <sup>3</sup>.

The list included, in addition to the party, and officials of the highest state authorities. On February 17, 1923, senior officials of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR were allowed access to secret materials of the Central Committee. April 27, 1928 to the list received transcripts

ÿ See ibid. F.17. Op. 113. D. 761. L. 31. 2 See Ibid. F.17. Op. 113. D. 823. L. 25. 3 RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 113. D. 235. L. 8.

4 See ibid. F.17. Op. 113. D. 598. L. 11.

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The Central Committee included the rector and bureau of the cells of a number of party communist universities, including: the Academy of Communist Education, the Moscow Political and Educational Institute, the Leningrad Political and Educational Institute, the University. Artem, Belarusian communi- versity, Central Asian communi- versity, Transcaucasian commu- nity , Saratov commu- nity , Ural-Siberian communi- versity , North Caucasian communi- versity, Tatar commu- nity!. On May 18, 1928, a cell of the Industrial Academy was included in the list of persons receiving materials on economic issues; Stalin to include it in the list of organizations receiving secret materials of the Central Committee. On February 27, 1933, the head of the MTS of state farms was granted the right to receive secret documents of the Central Committee. On March 29, 1933, a list of leading workers of the Red Army (254 people) was approved, presented by the PUR, who had the right to receive information materials of the Central Committee (transcripts and other secret documents), and on October 28, 1934, the political departments of the Civil Air Force were included in the list. fleet<sup>2</sup>. According to the decree of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of October 5, 1939, and then confirmed by the Politburo on June 10, 1940, the secretaries of the regional committees, regional committees and the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the Union republics were allowed to acquaint the authorized CPC at the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (6) with the protocols of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (6) 6):.

The Central Committee satisfied most of the requests, but there were also opposite decisions. Thus, the sending of secret materials of the Central Committee to the Tajik Orgburo and the Oirat Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party was stopped, due to the small number of these organizations and the extreme difficulty

secret communication, and the Yakut Regional Committee was allowed to send secret materials to the Central Committee only if the documents were sent only through the OGPU courier corps. S. M. Kirov's request to increase the number of sent transcripts of the Central Committee meetings to 10 was rejected, but members of the provincial committee were allowed to get acquainted by copies sent to the district committees of the Leningrad Committee. On November 18, 1927, the request of the Museum of the Revolution to send information materials "Reports of the White émigré press" and protocols of the Central Committee for the archive of the museum was rejected.

In addition to accessing and distributing secret documents of the Central Committee, the Secret Department also controlled the return of these documents back to the Central Committee. Kon

ÿ There. F. 17. Op. 113. D. 617. L. 18.

2 See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 114. D. 572. L. 15.

3 See O.V. Khlevnyuk, A. V. Kvashonkin, L. P. Kosheleva, L. A. Rogovaya. Stalin's Politburo in the 1930s. S. 82.

4 See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 113. D. 176. L. 172-173.

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control over the return of documents was one of the functions of the Secret Department. On May 23, 1929, the Secret Department submitted to the Politburo the issue of returning the protocols of the Politburo and the Plenums of the Central Committee, at which it was decided: "a) By changing the Resolution of the PB of 16.5. this year (pr. 80 p. 17 appendix "e") set the deadline for the return of the IB protocols at 5 days. 6) To oblige all members and candidates of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission who receive the protocols of the PB to strictly comply with the decision of the PB on their return on time. c) Restore the previous procedure for distributing extracts from the protocols of the PB! The issue of distribution and return of secret documents was also raised by the General Secretary of the Central Committee. Thus, at a meeting of the Politburo on May 25, 1928, I. V. Stalin raised the question of distributing secret documents of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. The Politburo ordered the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to strictly comply with the Politburo's resolutions on the procedure for distributing secret documents<sup>2</sup>. At the same time, it was necessary to take into account the specifics of foreign policy and foreign economic structures located abroad. So, head of the Secret Department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (6) I.P. Tovstukha, in a letter to the Secretariat of the Central Committee dated June 11, 1926, noted: "The procedure for the mandatory return of secret documents of the Central Committee, established for individuals and organizations within the USSR, the Secret Department considers it not advisable to extend to representatives of the USSR abroad. The well-known risk in terms of disclosure of these materials (possibility of robbing the diplomatic mail), which exists when sending such materials, does not disappear when they are returned. In view of this, the Secret Department considers that the mandatory return of confidential materials of the Central Committee for representatives of the USSR abroad who receive such materials should be canceled and obligated to burn them on the spot and send acts with detailed descriptions of the burned documents to the Central Committee. As a result, on June 11, 1926, a resolution of the Secretariat of the Central Committee "On the procedure for the return of secret documents of the Central Committee by representatives of the USSR abroad" was issued, which stated: "To oblige the plenipotentiaries to burn secret materials of the Central Committee for use on the spot within the time limits set for return, about what to draw up acts with detailed descriptions of documents, which ones to send to the Central Committee"<sup>4</sup>. As you can see, in this case, the Secret Department of the Central Committee took part in the development of measures to protect party informa

In the late 1930s and before the war, there were significant changes in the practice of mailing the minutes of Politburo meetings. The number of copies of protocols and their distribution were drastically reduced. So, on protocol No. 65-65a (Politburo meeting of November 22, 1938, decisions

1 RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 741. L. 3.

2 See *ibid.* F. 17. Op. 3. D. 688. L. 1. 3 RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 113. D. 205. L. 198. 4 *Ibid.* F. 17. Op. 113. D. 205. L. 8

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for October 27 - November 25, 1938) there is an inscription: "The protocol was not sent out and was made in three copies. E. Sukhova. Members of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (6) were sent only extracts from the protocols on several issues. These items in the protocol of the Politburo were marked with a special note. Of the 162 issues recorded in this protocol, decisions were sent to the members of the Central Committee only on four issues: on the national economic plan of 1939 (decision of November 22); the joint resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of November 15 "On the People's Commissariat of State Farms of the USSR", which removed Yurkin from the post of People's Commissar of State Farms; a statement by N. I. Yezhov addressed to I. V. Stalin with a request to be dismissed from the post of People's Commissar of Internal Affairs (decree of November 124); Decree of November 25 on the appointment of L.P. Beria as People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR. These rules were maintained for several years before the war. Minutes No. 67 (January 29 meeting, decisions for January 4-February 1, 1939), for example, were issued in four copies. On other protocols, marks on the number of issued copies were not preserved, however, in all protocols, points were noted that were selectively sent to members of the Central Committee!

The Politburo Decree "On the distribution of the minutes of the meetings of the Politburo of the Central Committee" dated October 16, 1938 confirmed the circle of persons to whom the minutes of the Orgburo were to be sent: "The minutes of the meetings of the Politburo of the Central Committee should be sent to the members of the Central Committee, candidate members of the Central Committee, members of the Bureau of the CPC and the KSK, first secretaries regional committees (district committees) of the VKP(b) of the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR, the first secretaries of the Central Committee of the National Communist Parties and the first secretaries of the Bashkir and Tatar regional committees of the VKP(b)"<sup>2</sup>. It should be noted that the number of persons and organizations to which secret party documents were sent at the end of the 1930s, compared to the 1920s, significantly decreased, which indicates a narrowing of the circle of persons privy to the highest party secrets and an increasing secrecy of the issues under consideration. Central Committee.

Carrying out measures to organize access to secret documents, the Secretariat of the Central Committee and the Secret Department controlled and monitored the appointment and admission of employees to work with secret documents, both in the apparatus of the Central Committee and in the field. These appointments were to take place after certain verification activities were carried out by the state security agencies and with the knowledge of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. So, at one of the meetings of the Secretariat of the Central Committee in 1926, the issue "On preventing the secretariat of the Novgorod

<sup>1</sup> See O. V. Khlevnyuk, A. V. Kvashonkin, L. P. Kosheleva, L. A. Rogovaya. Stalinskoye Po

Litburo in the 1930s. S. 21. <sup>2</sup> See ibid. P.82.

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Provincial Committee to the cipher work and storage of secret materials of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of a new employee without appropriate verification and without the knowledge of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (6). In this case, the Secretariat of the Central Committee reacted rather mildly: "Instruct the secretary of the Novgorod Provincial Committee on non-compliance with the rules for appointing secret workers!" But in certain cases, the reaction of the Central Committee to non-observance of the secrecy regime was quite decisive. So, on October 12, 1928, the Secret Department submitted to the Secretariat of the Central Committee for consideration the issue of stopping the sending of secret materials of the Central Committee to the Khorezm, Kerkinsky and Tashauz district committees "due to the impossibility of ensuring the conditions of conspiracy." In this case, the Secretariat of the Central Committee decided: "Exclude from the list of organizations receiving secret materials of the Central Committee, Khorezm, Kerkinsky and Tashauz regional committees"<sup>2</sup>.

Thus, the Central Committee, through the Secret Department, provided access for individuals and organizations to secret party documents and information in general. Particular attention was paid to working with secret documents of party congresses, plenums and commissions of the Central Committee, party conferences, documents of the Politburo, the Orgburo, and the Secretariat. The list of persons and organizations admitted to secret documents (information) was constantly changing as needed, depending on the structure of party bodies and the current political moment. The first mention in the documents of open meetings of the highest bodies of the party about the existence of these lists dates back to 1922.

year, but there is reason to believe that this system of admission to the lists existed earlier. The secret department of the Central Committee controlled access to classified information: it processed the admission and admission of new employees to the subdivisions of the Central Committee apparatus and party bodies in the field, whose work was connected with secret information and secret documents. Admission was issued, for example, to such positions as assistants to the Secretaries of the Central Committee, secret employees of the Central Committee and party committees in the field, cipher workers of the Central Committee and party committees, entrusted with receiving secret documents, archivists and clerks of secret divisions. The Secret Department was also entrusted with the distribution and control over the return to the Central Committee of the documents sent by the Central Committee to party organs, departments, institutions and individual officials. In particular, in 1933, after the reorganization of the Secret Department of the Central Committee, the creation of sectors, accounting and control over the return of secret documents was in charge of the U sector. The forwarding and return of secret documents of the Central Committee was carried out through the courier communication of the OGPU. About a significant number of sent documents and shortcomings in this

1 RGASPI. F.17. Op. 113. D. 235. L. 11. 2 Ibid. F.17. Op. 113. D. 667. L. 12.

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work can be judged by a certificate of work in the sector of the Secret Department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (6) on the distribution and accounting of classified materials, sent by the head of the Secret Department A. N. Poskrebyshv to the Secretariat of the Central Committee on August 8, 1933'. The secret department not only carried out work on the implementation of the above measures, but also prepared material and submitted proposals for decision-making to the Secretariat, the Organizing Bureau, and, in special cases, to the Politburo. Thus, these issues were resolved at the highest party level. The execution and control over the implementation of these decisions was entrusted to the secret divisions of the Central Committee (Secret Department, Bureau of the Secretariat, Special Sector). The secret department, in turn, conducted work on accounting and verification of trusted people. In October 1926, according to the decision of the Secretariat of the Central Committee, two categories of entrusted persons remained: the 1st with the right to open secret envelopes and the 2nd with the right to receive, but without opening.

Since the organization of this work was a very complex and time-consuming matter, the Central Committee constantly faced certain difficulties, so there were cases of confusion and disorder. This was due, first of all, both to the large amount of work and, despite the fact that most of the employees in the secret divisions had no lower than secondary education, to the lack of a certain culture of working with documents, especially in the 1920s. Judging by the absence in the open protocols of the Secretariat, the Orgburo and the Politburo of decisions on the admission and distribution of secret documents after October 1934, it can be judged that these issues were no longer submitted to open meetings of these party bodies. Most likely, since 1934 they were considered only at closed meetings of the highest bodies of the party and the decisions were entered in the "Special Folder".

Thus, it can be stated that many issues of access to secret party and state documents were resolved in close cooperation between party and state bodies, with the ruling party playing the leading role. The formation of this system was influenced by the features of both the state structure of the USSR, which consisted in a one-party political system, and external and domestic political factors. It should be noted that the author of the work in this chapter does not reduce the distribution of secret correspondence to a purely technical clerical moment, but interprets and understands it in a broad sense. This is important for answering the question - who was the main user of secret party information? Establishing the procedure for distributing secret documents of the Central Committee

| See O. V. Khlevnyuk, A. V. Kvashonkin, L. P. Kosheleva, L. A. Rogovaya. Stalin's Politburo in the 1930s. pp. 78-81.

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is considered as an integral part of the access and further use of classified information. It can be stated that the composition of addressees - users of classified information when mailing was limited to the party-state nomenclature, which was natural for this historical period in the life of the country. In the 1930s, in comparison with the 1920s, there is an expansion of restrictive tendencies, an indirect sign of which is the lack of open documentary information on information security issues in general. It should be noted that, based on the circle of persons and organizations admitted to secret party information, in the 1920s it was much wider and more democratic. In the 1930s, especially in the second half, there was a process of a significant narrowing of the circle of subjects possessing this party information, which indicates an increase in both the external factor of threats to protected information, and the gradual curtailment of intra-party democracy and the formation of a narrow the circle of persons admitted to party secrets. In this case, we observe a contradiction. It, in our opinion, lies in the fact that the internal party struggle in the 1920s was more acute than in the 1930s, but in the 1920s. access to party secret information was wider than in the 1930s. This speaks of greater democracy in the life of the party and society in the 1920s. But, at the same time, one should not forget about the ever-increasing external threat since the first half of the 1930s. in connection with events in Europe and the Far East.

### 2.3. ORGANIZATION OF INFORMATION PROTECTION BY TECHNICAL MEANS

Ensuring the secrecy of the party and state exchange of information required its protection from unauthorized access from the outside. This led to the implementation of measures to create systems for the technical transmission and protection of information, the creation of special equipment, ciphers and codes, the organization of cipher work in general, both in state and party bodies. This work was associated with many organizational, technical and personnel difficulties. In the first years of its existence, the Soviet state had at its disposal only the arsenal of technical means and professional personnel that remained from tsarist times. And there are very few left. In the conditions of the Civil War, to pay due attention to the creation of encryption and decryption services, although it was a necessary, but very difficult task. A particular problem was that after the revolution, several experienced cryptographers emigrated to England, where they were recruited to work on breaking Soviet ciphers. But still the Bolsheviks took measures to protect information by technical means. The first step of the new government in this direction was the rejection of pre-revolutionary and the creation of new ciphers. "The government of Soviet Russia refused to use most of the "old-mode" ciphers due to their complexity and cumbersomeness. Maybe for the better, because Fetterlein (the head of the Russian service of the Government School of Codes and Ciphers of English Intelligence, a Russian émigré - G.K.), presumably, was the author of some of them. But, as for the replacement of cipher systems inherited from the "damned" tsarist regime, instead of them, new ciphers of weak resistance began to be introduced by the Soviet state to conduct secret diplomatic correspondence. They were opened by Fetterlein without much difficulty! So, for example, the British

I B. Anin, A. Petrovich. Radio espionage. S. 186.

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an operation to intercept the diplomatic correspondence of the Soviet delegation, which from December 1917 to March 1918 negotiated peace with the Germans in Brest-Litovsk. Thus, the British government continued to receive deciphered Soviet diplomatic dispatches on a permanent basis. In August 1920, the British government, through the newspaper The Times, actually officially acknowledged the interception and reading of Soviet correspondence. Although, in response, Soviet Russia changed its cipher system, but after a few months it was again opened.

Responsible party and government officials have repeatedly raised questions about the leakage of information through encrypted correspondence and radio communications. So, for example, the People's Commissar

Foreign Affairs G. V. Chicherin wrote memos to V. I. Lenin stating that the Soviet cipher correspondence was read by the British. "Lenin was attentive to such reports. On November 25, 1920, he wrote: "Comrade. Chicherin: The question of stricter control over ciphers (both external and internal) must not be allowed to fall asleep. Be sure to drop me a line when all arrangements are made. One more thing is necessary: with each important ambassador, a particularly strict cipher for personal decryption should be established, i.e. here a particularly reliable comrade, a communist (perhaps better under the Central Committee) will encrypt, and there the ambassador (or agent) himself should encrypt without having the right to give to secretaries or cryptographers! As can be seen, V. I. Lenin here requires strengthening personal responsibility, restricting access to classified information and tightening requirements for information protection. Alarming reports also came from the fronts. "The first who fully realized the scale of the declassification of Soviet cipher systems was Mikhail Vasilyevich Frunze, commander-in-chief of the Southern Group of Forces of the Red Army. On December 19, 1921, M. V. Frunze reported to Moscow: "From the report presented to me today by the former head of the Wrangel radio station, Yamchenko, it is established that absolutely all our ciphers, due to their simplicity, are opened by our enemies. All our radio communications are the most excellent means of orienting the enemy. Thanks to close ties with the cipher department of the Wrangel Navy, Yamchenko had the opportunity to personally read a number of our ciphers of the most secret military-operational and diplomatic nature; In particular, the most secret correspondence between the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs with its representative office in Europe and in Tashkent is known word for word to the British, who specially organized a whole network of stations for special purposes to eavesdrop on our radios. To ciphers that did not yield

| Cit. by the same place. S. 188.

WATCH YOUR BACK. IN SUCH DEAN WALLS eavesdrop. NEARBY 27 CHAT AND GOSSIP

BEFORE CHANGE.

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opening, the keys were immediately sent from London, where the Russian citizen Fetterlein, who had previously been in charge of this business in Russia, was put in charge of the encryption department by the British. The general conclusion is that all our enemies, in particular England, were constantly aware of all our military-operational and diplomatic work!

In this regard, it was necessary to take measures to create certain structures for coordinating and conducting work to protect information throughout the country. Thus, by a decree of the Small Council of People's Commissars on May 5, 1921, a special (along with other functions) cryptographic service was created - the Special Department of the Cheka. This unit, although it was part of the structure of the Cheka, was actually autonomous and was not subordinate to the leadership of state security, but was under the jurisdiction of the Central Committee of the party. G. I. Boky, who enjoys great prestige and influence both in the Cheka-OGPU and in the Central Committee of the party, was appointed head of the Special Department. Earlier in 1919, F. E. Dzerzhinsky invited him to work at the head of the St. Petersburg Cheka, then on October 20, 1920, by a decision of the Central Committee, he was appointed head of the Secret Operations Department of the Central Committee. A special department compiled ciphers for state and party structures inside and outside the country. The work of the Special Department began with a detailed study of the archives of the encryption and decryption services of Tsarist Russia and the study of teaching aids. Particular attention was also paid to the selection and training of new cadres of cipher workers. So, on the basis of the old remaining specialists, new employees were trained, courses for cryptographers were created, where they recruited people capable of this business and generally educated people. The cipher officers of the Central Committee and local party organs were also trained at these courses. Although the department organized training courses, still a big problem was the relatively low level of literacy and general training of employees and, in connection with this, the small number of personnel suitable for this work. A particular problem was the low level of machinery and equipment used. The ciphers of all institutions and departments reported directly to the Special Department. in the apparatus of the Central Committee and

local committees also created cipher bodies. All cryptographic services of the party were secret divisions. Most likely, the first such unit was the Secret Operational Department, headed by G. I. Boki in 1920.

Based on the order of the Executive Director of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the RCP (6) No. 2 dated August 2, 1920, the Cipher Bureau of the Secretariat is created

1 See B. Anin, A. Petrovich. Radio espionage. pp. 188-189.

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Central Committee of the RCP. The cipher bureau was created to conduct encrypted secret correspondence with bodies and individual responsible officials of the RCP (6), the Central Committee of the communist foreign parties, the Executive Committee of the Comintern, and government departments that had encrypted communications. The Cipher Bureau produced, stored, distributed and kept records of ciphers and instructions for using them for party organizations, conducted methodological and instructor work, encrypted and decrypted correspondence received by the Secretariat of the Central Committee, issued certificates on the content of information to strictly defined persons and bodies. The Shifrburo, headed by the head, at first was part of the Secret Department of the Administration of the Secretariat of the Central Committee. The bureau, along with the head, included: a deputy, a clerk of the 1st category, a registrar, a typist, two cryptographers, that is, a total of 7 people and a courier-messenger. M. M. Chugunov was appointed the first head of the Shifrburo. To work in the Shifrburo, members of the party with at least three years of experience, if possible familiar with cryptography, were accepted only on the recommendation of the party. Work in the Shifrburo was carried out around the clock with shift duty!

In the Secret Department of the Central Committee, until 1921, which was part of the Office of Affairs, there was a Shifrburo, which, in connection with the transformation of the Secret Department, according to the decision of the Orgburo [September 7, 1921, was transferred to the general Bureau of the Secretariat. By order of the Administration of Affairs No. 85 on September 19, 1921, the offices of the Politburo, Orgburo and Shifrburo are separated from the Secretariat. According to the regulations on the Bureau of the Secretariat, the structure of the technical apparatus, the reception room of the Secretariat, included the Cipher Department. Two years later, according to the staffing table approved by the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the RCP (6) on November 22, 1922, into the structure of the Bureau of the Secretariat. included a cipher bureau with a staff of 6 people (head, deputy, clerk, typist and two cipher clerks). In the states of the Secretariat of the Central Committee, approved on August 29, 1924, the Cipher Bureau consisted of five people: the head, the deputy head, the compiler of ciphers, and two ciphers. It should be noted that the head of the Cipher Bureau and the cipher clerks were secret employees of the Bureau of the Secretariat, whose work in terms of workload was equated to mass party work. In 1925, for example, the list of responsible employees of the Central Committee of this category from the Cipher Bureau included two people: the head M. M. Chugunov and the cipher compiler S. F. Chistyakov. In 1929, for the purpose of secrecy, instead of the names of the parts of the Secret Department, at the suggestion of the head of the Secret Department, I.P. Tovstukha, sectors were introduced. Total was

1 See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 84. D. 696. L. 2-4v.

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seven sectors have been created. He was engaged in cipher paperwork [U sector. In the likeness of the Central Committee, sectors were also created in local Party committees. The party committees also assumed the presence of cipher workers who were part of the staff of special (secret) sectors of the regional committees, but who were exclusively engaged in cipher work.

The Central Committee created an information network for the transmission of secret messages between party organs both vertically and horizontally. This work was carried out under the direction and control of the secret divisions of the party committees, and on the part of the competent authorities - by the Special Department in the center and the state security departments in the field. Yes, to

For example, the head of the Special Department under the OGPU G.I. Boki, in a secret circular letter dated November 27, 1922, sent to all the chiefs and heads of the central cipher agencies, as well as the head of the Cipher Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (6), wrote after the annexation of the Far Eastern Republic: "In view of the Sovietization of the Far Eastern Republic and its unification with the RSFSR, the Special Department under the GPU suggests you take urgent measures and establish cipher work in institutions under your department located on the territory of the former Far Eastern Republic!" As a result, encrypted communication with the Dalburo was established, but in a report on November 29, 1922, the head of the Cipher Bureau S.F. Chechulin to the head of the Bureau of the Secretariat of the Central Committee A.M. Nazaretyan noted that: "In the received encryptions from the Dalburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (6) deciphering reveals significant and non-existent rules for the use of ciphers, due to which there is a large delay in deciphering their dispatches, wasting time and cluttering the telegraph with requests for repetition. On the basis of the foregoing, and also in accordance with the circular of the Special Department under the GPU, No. 92531, attached hereto, I consider it necessary to go myself or send comrade. Ronis to examine the setting up of cipher business in Dalbyuro and the establishment of cipher communications between the Bureau and its regional committees"<sup>2</sup>. As a result, at a meeting of the Secretariat on December 7, 1922, it was decided: "To propose to the Special Department of the GPU to send its representative to the Far Eastern Military District to examine and set up cipher production in Soviet and party bodies, including the Dalburo of the Central Committee of the RKIP"<sup>3</sup>.

The secret department of the Central Committee also initiated other organizational and administrative measures. So, for example, as a result of a survey of cipher processing in the representative office

I RGASPI.F.17. Op. 112. D. 395. L. 404. 2 Ibid. L. 402. 3 Ibid. F.17. Op. 112. D. 395. L. 10.

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The Yakut SSR under the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, produced by the Special Department of the GPU and the Secret Department of the Central Committee and submitted to the Secretariat of the Central Committee on August 13, 1926, decided: "a) To propose to the Special Department and the Yakut Regional Committee to liquidate party records management in the representation of the YASSR. 6) Correspondence of the party character, if necessary, to be done in cipher and forwarded through the Cipher Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6). c) Instruct the Secret Department of the Central Committee to check the cipher workflow in other representative offices under the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and to carry out the above decision in relation to all representative offices!

From the foregoing it is clear that the work of the Special Department of the GPU was carried out in close cooperation with the Central Committee and its secret divisions. This example clearly shows the mechanism of interaction in the implementation of inspections, the level of decision-making and the corresponding organizational conclusions on these issues. At first, encrypted communication between party committees did not exist everywhere. The question of its organization was decided directly in the Secretariat of the Central Committee at the request of the party committees and proposals of the cipher agencies of the Central Committee. So, in July 1922, at the request of the Arkhangelsk Gubernia Committee, the Cipher Bureau of the Central Committee came up with a proposal to the Orgburo of the Central Committee to establish a connection between the Arkhangelsk Gubernia Committee and the ukomas of the region. The Cipher Bureau of the Central Committee in a note to the Assistant Secretary of the Central Committee A. M. Nazaretyan reported: "Attachments are attached to the correspondence of the Arkhangelsk Gubernia Committee on the need for encrypted communication within the province. The cipher bureau believes that the proximity of the Finnish border and a significant port center create favorable conditions for the influx of white agents inside the province, and therefore the motives for the need for an internal cipher are quite acceptable. Please, satisfy the petition of the Arkhangelsk Gubernia Committee"<sup>2</sup>. As a result, taking into account the above arguments, the Orgburo of the Central Committee allowed the Arkhangelsk Provincial Committee to establish a cipher connection with the ukoms of the region.

The Decree of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of August 11, 1922 "On the order of cipher communications between provincial committees and ukoms" regulated the procedure for communication and use of ciphers between provincial committees and ukoms. Provincial committees were categorically forbidden to use the cipher of the Central Committee when communicating with their subordinate ukoms, but they were allowed to communicate with their own special cipher with their subordinate ukoms at their discretion, while advising caution. For intercourse in the cipher of the provincial committees with

The Ukoms established a special cipher, samples of which were to be sent exclusively from the Cipher Bureau, while the Central Committee forbade the use of other ciphers.

I RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 113. D. 219. L. 8-9. 2 Ibid. F. 17. Op. 112. D. 356. L. 146. 3 See Ibid. L. 145.

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The Cipher Bureau was entrusted with the development of a special cipher and instructions for using them for intercourse between provincial committees and ukoms!.

At the end of 1923, in connection with Curzon's note, in which intercepted Soviet messages were quoted, the Soviet Union again changed the cipher systems, which lasted until the spring of 1927. The Central Committee also took measures for additional protection of encrypted correspondence. In December 1923, under the signature of I. V. Stalin, a top secret circular letter of the Central Committee was sent to all departments of the Central Committee, to the Presidium of the Central Control Commission, the Secretary of the Central Committee of the RKSM and other recipients and senders of the ciphers of the Central Committee. In pursuance of this circular, in order to ensure the secrecy of ciphers and cipher correspondence, a strictly defined circle of persons was established through which cipher telegrams sent through the Cipher Bureau of the Central Committee could pass, as well as measures to protect information were tightened and the procedure for compiling, printing and storing encrypted telegrams was determined.

During this period, the Central Committee took measures to control the messages received by the Central Committee in cipher from state bodies. Encipherments of political significance were to be sent only to the Central Committee by the foreign ministries. So, the Politburo, at a meeting on October 22, 1925, ordered the NKID to send all encryptions of political significance coming from embassies after decryption to send to the Politburo of the Central Control Commission. On November 5, 1925, at a closed meeting of the Politburo, the issue of the NKID on encryption was considered. At this meeting, it was proposed to reduce cipher correspondence to a minimum, develop a stable code in agreement with the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, establish and submit for approval by the Secretariat of the Central Committee a minimum list of persons with the right to send and receive cipher telegrams, and also check the secrecy of receiving, storing and return of ciphers, as well as those persons who have access to ciphers."

In general, the Shifrburo had a significant work load. Every day it received, decrypted, encrypted and sent dozens of cipher telegrams. So, from January 1 to January 31, 1925, the Cipher Bureau received and deciphered 163 telegrams, 175 were encrypted; 145 numbers were received from the localities and various institutions on the issues of the cipher file, 73 numbers were sent to the localities<sup>5</sup>. From April 1 to April 30, 1925, 88 telegrams were received and decoded, 77 were encrypted; 54 numbers were received from local authorities and various institutions on cipher matters,

I RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 112. D. 360. L. 3.

2 See *ibid.* F. 17. Op. 84. D. 696. L. 1.

3 See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 524. L. 1.

4 See *ibid.* F. 17. Op. 162. D. 2. L. 191-193. 5 See *ibid.* F. 17. Op. 84. D. 944. L. 38.

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sent to places 43 numbers!. C | to August 31, 1925, 72 telegrams were received and decoded, 702 were encrypted. C | By September 30, 1925, the Cipher Bureau received and deciphered 89 telegrams, 57 were encrypted; 115 numbers were received from the localities and various institutions on the issues of the cipher file, 7 numbers were sent to the localities. And all this except for the constant work on compiling ciphers and methodological support for cipher work.

In the future, the highest authorities of the party more than once made decisions regarding cipher correspondence and cipher telegrams. So, for example, in pursuance of the Politburo resolution of November 5, 1925, the Secretariat of the Central Committee at a meeting on November 22, 1925 considered the issue "On ciphers"; On August 13, 1926, on the proposal of the Secret Department - "On cipher telegrams", the decisions on which were placed in a "special folder". In 1926, the all-Union "Instruction on the conduct of secret and encryption office work" was adopted. But, despite the measures taken, the secret services of foreign states intercepted secret information. So, for example, for the British, the intercepted and decrypted correspondence of the Bolshevik government and diplomats with the Middle East and Soviet organizations in London was of great interest. This was also facilitated by the aggravation of relations with England, especially after the raid on the export-import Soviet association in the UK "Arkos". The interception and reading of the correspondence of employees of the Soviet diplomatic service in London continued until the end of May 1927. "...Moreover, in the middle of May 1927, ignoring the protests of the head of the PShKSH (Government School of Codes and Ciphers of Great Britain - G.K.), the British government cabinet decided to publish selected passages from secret Soviet correspondence in order to justify rupture of diplomatic relations with the USSR. ... As a result, at the end of May 1927, the Kremlin ordered the introduction of a time-consuming, but if used correctly, absolutely reliable cipher." Encryption and decryption now took place through the use of one-time cipher pads. "Therefore, from May 1927 until the mid-1940s, British cryptanalysts, confident in the absolute strength of Soviet cipher systems, did not read a single word from the encrypted diplomatic correspondence of Soviet Russia." And it was a significant success, saying that the crisis associated

1 See RGASPI. F.17. Op. 84. D. 792. L. 109.

2 See *ibid.* L. 201.

3 See *ibid.* L. 202.

4 B. Anin, A. Petrovich. Radio espionage. P.192.

5 Leo Liner. "Venona" The most secret operation of the American special services. S. 262.

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with personnel, intellectual, organizational and technical lag in the field of cryptography, passed. A new system and school of cryptographers of the already Soviet state was formed.

The Central Committee constantly controlled and carried out inspections of the ciphering agencies and the conduct of cipher work in party committees. So, by decision of the Central Committee, at the beginning of 1927, the Special Department of the OGPU, along with checking the conduct of the usual secret office work in a number of provincial committees, examined the cipher office work in the Tambov, Saratov, Samara provincial committees of the CPSU (6)!. After verification, the Special Department of the OGPU drew up the relevant acts in three copies, one of which was then sent to the Secret Department of the Central Committee for further decision-making. The acts indicated the identified shortcomings and recommended measures to eliminate them. The deficiencies were mainly related to record keeping, logs and space requirements. The observed shortcomings of the provincial committees were obliged to eliminate them in the shortest possible time and notify the Central Committee about this. Thus, the Tambov Provincial Committee reported to the Secret Department of the Central Committee: "At your request under No. department of the OGPU, the following work has been done: 1. According to the code. Paperwork. 1) Cabinet with cipher. transferred to a room isolated from outside access by correspondence and sealed daily at the end of classes. 2) A book of accounting for ciphers has been opened. 3) Cipher. Correspondence, upon final execution, is immediately filed in the appropriate file with inclusion in the inventory of papers available in the file, and cipher telegrams are filed separately from other ciphers. ne-

correspondence. 4) In cases with cipher. correspondence over the past years, starting from 1924, inventories of papers were entered according to the established form. Cases before 1924 are numbered, stitched, sealed, and inventories of papers are entered into them"<sup>2</sup>. The Samara Provincial Committee reported: "2. In the case of storing the cipher of business: a) All parts of the cipher are entered in the book of accounting for ciphers. 6) Inventories in cases are kept in a timely manner. c) The vault is sealed daily, both the room and the fireproof closet.

The Central Committee strengthened overall control over the cipher business, as well as the admission of new employees and the transfer of employees of the cipher departments in party organizations. Based on the facts of violation of the established procedure for conducting cipher record keeping, the Central Committee made the appropriate organizational conclusions of an administrative nature. So, for example, on October 1, 1927, the Secretariat of the Central Committee considered the issue "On violation of the rules for cipher correspondence

1 See RGASPI. F.17. Op. 113. D. 259. L. 179-182. 2 Ibid. L. 195. 3 Ibid. L. 197.

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Secretary of the Komi Regional Committee Kozlov", at which it was decided: "To announce a reprimand to Comrade Kozlov for negligent attitude to cipher correspondence". In this case, we are talking about a cipher telegram for the implementation of an industrialization loan! At the same meeting, the question "On the violation of the rules on cipher correspondence by the secretaries of the Vladimir Civil Code, Comrade Rummyantsev and the Vologda Civil Code, Comrade Matveev," was heard, regarding which it was decided: "Indicate com. Rummyantsev and Matveev for inattentive attitude to cipher correspondence"<sup>2</sup>. On November 18, 1927, the issue "On the results of a survey of cipher production in the Fergana district committee of the CP (b) Uz" was considered, at which it was decided: "a) To announce a severe reprimand to the secretary of the Fergana district committee, comrade Ulmasabaev, for negligent handling of cipher correspondence (not decoding within 38 days directive encryption of the Central Committee, lack of registration and accounting in the cipher business, unsatisfactory storage, etc.). 6) Propose to Ulmasov within 2 weeks to eliminate the shortcomings indicated in the inspection report of the Special Department" h. On December 30, 1927, the Secretariat of the Central Committee considered the issue "On cipher record keeping in party organizations", which pointed out to the secretaries of the Murmansk, Nikolaev, Chelyabinsk, Vladikavkaz, Mogilev, Maikop district committees, the Voronezh provincial committee and the Kalmyk regional committee on the violation of the circulars of the Central Committee on the procedure for conducting cipher production". On March 23, 1928, the Secretariat of the Central Committee considered the issue "On the results of the verification of the conduct of secret cipher paperwork and the handling of secret materials of the Central Committee in the Kara-Kalpak Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks." As a result, the Secretariat of the Central Committee decided: "a) Instruct the secretary of the Kara-Kalpak regional committee on the unacceptable handling of secret materials of the Central Committee and the conduct of secret encryption paperwork (disorderly state of secret and encryption files, lack of registration and accounting of documents, non-return of secret materials, storing them in desk drawers, etc., etc.). 6) Propose, within two weeks from the date of receipt of this decision, to organize the maintenance of secret-ciphering office work and the handling of secret documents of the Central Committee in accordance with the rules and instructions noted in the act of the Special Department of the OGPU"<sup>5</sup>. As can be seen, the penalties for violations of the rules for conducting cipher work in the 1920s. were rather mild, limited to administrative measures of influence. The Central Committee paid special attention to the cadres providing encryption work. So, on July 2, 1927, the deputy head

1 See RGASPI. F.17. Op. 113. D. 337. L. 8. 2 See Ibid. L. 9.

3 Ibid. D. 344. L. 8.

4 See Ibid. F.17. Op. 113. D. 583. L. 7.

5 Ibid. D. 608. L. 17.

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The Secret Department of the Central Committee, Ya. E. Brezanovsky, in a secret letter to the Secretariat of the Central Committee, pointed out the violation of the rules for checking and appointing secret cipher workers in 8 party organizations. As a result, on October 24, 1927, the Secret Department, together with the Shifrburo

sent out to all party organizations that have encrypted communication with the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6) a secret letter signed by the head of the Secret Department of the Central Committee I.P. Tovtukha and the head of the Cipher Bureau of the Central Committee S.F. Central Committee and sending documents of candidates for registration. In pursuance of the decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6) dated May 30, 1927, a circular letter signed by the Secretary of the Central Committee S.V. The letter stated that a number of party organizations with cipher communication violate the rules for the movement of cipher workers, which deprives the Secret Department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6) of the possibility of timely verification and registration of persons admitted to cipher business and creates unfavorable conditions when working in party organizations and violations of the rules conspiracies. In this case, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6) proposed to the party organizations to take a number of demands to the leadership. Conducting cipher paperwork should have been assigned to party members with at least 3 years of experience; each appointment and transfer of cipher workers of party organizations had to be carried out without fail with the prior consent of the Secret Department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6) with the sending of all required documents. The transfer of cipher office work (even if it was temporary) had to be formalized in the same manner as in the case of a new appointment, the removal and appointment of cipher workers. A newly appointed cipher worker was allowed to use ciphers and cipher correspondence only upon receipt by the party organ of a corresponding notice from the Secret Department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6). The Central Committee also pointed out the inadmissibility of frequent changes of cipher workers in party organs. The transfer of cipher business without prior consent from the Secret Department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6) was allowed only in exceptional cases (illness, urgent transfer, immediate dismissal). The situation caused by the flight in 1926 of I. V. Stalin's assistant B. Bazhanov abroad demanded to strengthen control over the personnel of the Shifrburo. Thus, the issue of the Cipher Bureau was submitted to the Secretariat of the Central Committee by the Secret Department, at which, in particular, it was decided: "Instruct comrade. Tovstue, together with comrade. Fedorov (Secretary of the Party Collective of the Secret Department) to review the composition of the staff of the Cipher B

In 1928, separate nationwide "Instructions on secret office work" and "Instructions on ciphering" were adopted.

1 RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 113. D. 866. L. 136.

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gross office work". And in June 1929, by a circular letter of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6), signed by the Secretary of the Central Committee L.M. Kaganovich and the head of the Secret Department of the Central Committee I.P. committees of the CPSU (6). The changes concerned the procedure for coordinating the submitted documents for candidates who are being tested and are employed in secret divisions or admitted to classified information. Trustees and ciphers were to be appointed by the party committees only after prior approval of the candidacies from the local bodies of the GPU. The previously existing procedure for coordinating secret and cipher workers with the Secret Department of the Central Committee was canceled! In our opinion, this was due both to the general strengthening of the role of the OGPU in this matter, and to the transfer of these functions by the Central Committee to a more competent body.

After the 17th Congress of the CPSU (6), the structure of the Central Committee underwent changes. Instead of the Secret Department, a Special Sector is created. In the localities, special sectors were retained in the party committees, where the heads of the Special Sectors simultaneously became the heads of the Shifrburo. By decree of the Secretariat of the Central Committee, the regional committees, regional committees and the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the Union Republics were forbidden to remove or transfer to another job the heads of special sectors and cipher workers without the consent of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6), and also to allow employees to cipher work without the approval of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6). In this form, the Shifrburo remained structurally and in subordination unchanged until the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. There are no decisions and documents on the organization and conduct of the cipher record keeping for the 1930s - early 1940s in the open protocols of the Politburo, the Orgburo, and the Secretariat of the Central Committee. There is only a mention of a meeting of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6) on August 24, 1941, already in wartime, at which the question "O



cipher communications with district committees and city committees. Apparently, we can find documents on the protection of information by technical means for the 1930s in the materials of closed meetings, the "special folder" of the above-mentioned higher bodies of the party, or in the documents of the Special Sector of the Central Committee, which are stored in the Presidential Archive.

Thus, it can be stated that when the Bolshevik party and government came to power, the issue of protecting secret messages, both political and diplomatic and military, was acute. The organization of a cryptographic service is a very expensive business and requires a certain level of development.

1 See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 113. D. 608. L. 114.

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technology, special knowledge and training. Radio reconnaissance and ciphering became ever more widespread. Technique improved especially rapidly. The developed countries of Europe, the United States, Tsarist Russia before the revolution of 1917 had special services involved in the encryption and decryption of messages. The Bolsheviks abandoned most of the ciphers that were "inherited" from the tsarist and Provisional governments due to the simplicity of the ciphers and their readability, and in some cases, on the contrary, due to the difficulty in using them. In addition, the majority of cryptographers turned out to be "on the other side of the barricades." The organization of work to protect messages transmitted by technical means was entrusted to the Cheka. At the beginning of the activity, since the ciphers were weak or known to the enemy, most encrypted radio messages and cipher correspondence were easily intercepted and read by both Western intelligence services and the White Guards, which was repeatedly reported to the country's leadership. In the initial period of the Civil War, it was an impossible task for the Bolsheviks to organize work on the entire complex of information protection by technical means. Emphasis was placed mainly on organizational and administrative measures. Only in May 1921 was a secret division officially created - the Special Department under the Cheka, then the GPU, which was supposed to deal with cryptography. Over time, the functions of the department will be significantly expanded. The first head of the department was a prominent Bolshevik with experience in secret work - G. I. Boki. The special department existed until the order of the NKVD of the USSR dated August 9, 1938, when the 9th (encryption) Special Department of the 1st Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR was formed on its basis, which was headed by the captain of state security A. D. Balamutov. By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of February 3, 1941, when the NKVD was divided and an independent NKGB was formed, the 5th (encryption) department was formed in its structure. The encryption unit (5th department) was also formed in Smersh, created on April 14, 1941. The author of the work did not set the task of highlighting the history of the creation and development of this unit and cryptography in general, and therefore, within the framework of the topic, he limited himself to the relationship of the Special Department with the party bodies for the work and development of encryption business in party committees, from the Central Committee to the party committees. in places. The protection of party and state secrets passing through party committees was the subject of close attention of the highest party authorities. Naturally, the Communist Party, being the ruling party, directed and controlled all aspects of the activities of the state and the party apparatus, including the work to protect

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information by technical means. In the structures of party committees, from top to bottom, special services are being created to encrypt and decrypt messages. In 1920 - 1930, right up to the Great Patriotic War and later, they were part of secret divisions or were independent secret structures of party committees. In the structure of the Central Committee in different years there were: the Cipher Bureau, the Cipher Department, the GU sector of the Secret Department, etc.; on the ground - special cipher units with a staff of cipher workers. Since 1934, for example, it has been the Cipher Bureau of the Special Sectors of Party Committees.

After the KhUP Congress of the CPSU (6), the head of the Special Sector of the Central Committee became at the same time the head of the Shifrburo. It can be stated that from that moment on, the entire management of the secret work of the Central Committee for the protection of information was concentrated in one hand. It should be noted that the head of the Special Sector of the Central Committee reported directly to I. V. Stalin. Employees of the encryption divisions had a special status in the structure of the Central Committee. All cryptographers (from the Central Committee to local party committees) were secret employees of the party. The presence of cipher units and cipher workers in party committees was a party secret. Employees of these units were checked by the state security agencies and the Secret Department of the Central Committee, were accepted and assigned to work only after their consent. All restrictions related to working with classified information also applied to employees of the cipher divisions. As noted above, for the 1930s, there is practically no information about the activities of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party on the protection of information by technical means in the open protocols of the Politburo, the Orgburo, the Secretariat of the Central Committee, but from the documents available at the moment it can be seen that the issues of protection state and party secrets by technical means, not only in the party, but also in state departments and institutions, more than once became the subject of discussion of the Central Committee. The Politburo and other supreme bodies of the party approved all decisions of the party and the government on this issue, which were binding not only for the party apparatus, but also for state authorities and administration. For example, we can note the resolutions of the Politburo "On the use of secret mater

It should also be noted that since the mid-1920s. issues of cipher work were discussed only at closed meetings of the highest party bodies and commissions of the Central Committee. It is from 1925 that in open protocols on this issue we meet a short one: "The decision is a special folder". Taking into account the specifics of these issues, which are directly related to ensuring secrecy not only in Party bodies, but also in state structures, one can understand the secrecy of this information. WITH

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the development of special technical means, the accumulation of experience, the solution of the issue of staffing, the effectiveness of technical and organizational measures for this work increased. In open materials of the highest bodies of the party and other open sources, the author of this work did not come across documents about cases of disclosure and leakage of information through the technical channels of the party after 1927 and up to the Great Patriotic War inclusive, although it is known that Western intelligence services, in particular Great Britain, before mid-1927 deciphered the foreign policy correspondence of the USSR. There is evidence that party organs used their own (specially developed for them by the Special Department of the Cheka - OGPU) system of information protection by technical means in general and, in particular, their ciphers and codes. For example, in party documents of the late 1920s. the ciphers of the party committees under the name "Uranus" and "Dawn" are mentioned. But later, starting from 1940, the party bodies switched to the state system of ciphers and codes.

During the period under review, the main method for protecting information was taking organizational and preventive measures and responding to the facts of leakage of secret information and mitigating the consequences of unauthorized access. The author of this work did not set the task of considering the issue from the point of view of the technical equipping of party bodies with special equipment and technology (as well as in terms of its improvement and efficiency) used in 1920-1930. on information protection. From the beginning of the 1920s. The work of the party and the state was focused on organizational activities, including: 1. Rejection of the old and creation of new ciphers. 2. Strengthening the exactingness, control and personal responsibility for employees related to encryption and decryption work. 3. Selection and training of personnel. 4. Creation of the Special Department of the Cheka, but subordinate to the Central Committee of the party - a special body that carried out centralized functions for the protection of information. 5. Carrying out work on the organization and examination of subdivisions conducting cipher paperwork in party bodies.

The Central Committee and the Special Department collected basic information about the state of affairs in protecting information by technical means by conducting scheduled and unscheduled inspections of the cipher divisions of party committees, as a result of which negative aspects were identified and preventive measures were taken to prevent information leakage. Moreover, it should be noted that the organizational conclusions to violators in the 1920s were rather mild and were mainly of an administrative nature.

From the end of the 1920s, after the flight in 1926 of Secretary I.V. Stalin, B. Bazhanov abroad and the aggravation of tension, almost led

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On the eve of the war with Great Britain in 1927, not only the system of using ciphers on a national scale was changed, expressed in the transition to one-time cipher notebooks and the separation of secret and cipher records, but also in work with personnel. In the party bodies, this was expressed first in the strengthening of inspection and prohibition functions and control over the party bodies in the localities and staffing by the Special Department of the Central Committee, and then with the complete transfer of these functions to the jurisdiction of the OGPU.

Further development of the system of cryptography and protection of information by technical means, as well as its use by the Comintern as a specific party body, is not within the scope of this work. It is important that the use of information, in particular, cipher correspondence, even separated by years, must be extremely careful. Thus, A. Sudoplatov writes in his book: "Veterans of the CIA, who were working on the archives of the Central Committee of the CPSU in the spring of 1992, came across materials from the Comintern about Openheimer's connections with members of a conspiratorial cell of the US Communist Party. They also found a request from our intelligence to Dimitrov, the chairman of the Comintern, in June 1943 with a request to provide data for the use of these contacts! He further notes: "Now the Americans have managed to decipher the correspondence of our residencies in Washington, San Francisco, New York with Moscow, to a large extent, I believe, because in 1992 we ourselves handed over to the American side a number of materials of the Comintern, including the full text of cipher telegrams in Russian received through NKVD intelligence channels. In view of the constant surveillance by American intelligence services of our radio air since 1940, they managed to establish, as our press reported, more than two hundred Soviet intelligence agents who participated in the extraction of materials on the atomic bomb and secret documents of American government agencies, including special services. But a number of key codenames remain undisclosed."

Ÿ 4. Sudoplatov. The secret life of General Sudoplatov. Truth and fiction about my father. T. 2. S. 151. 2 Ibid. S. 189.

## 2.4. CREATING A REGULATORY BASE FOR PROVIDING SECRETITY AND SECRET PROCESSING

One of the methods of combating the unauthorized release of secret information outside the Central Committee, as well as the right to ensure the protection of information, was the development of special regulatory documents - rules, instructions, regulations, regulations, memos, etc., both on general issues of secrecy, and specifically on working with secret documents. In practice, in the early 1920s. in the distribution, use, and especially, the return of the secret documents of the Central Committee, there was a lot of confusion and confusion. In state and party instances, there was a lack of both a general culture of working with documents in general, and a lack of observance of the elementary rules of secrecy. Therefore, taking only administrative measures was not enough. A clear regulation of work with secret documents was necessary. It was necessary to create a regulatory framework and train employees of the state and party apparatus.

After the end of the Civil War, this issue was repeatedly put on the agenda of meetings of the highest party instances. As a result, at the end of 1922, the "Instruction on the order

storage and movement of secret documents. It should be noted that the OGPU was entrusted with control and supervision over the execution of this instruction. The Central Committee also obliged the OGPU to develop, in agreement with the departments, the relevant departmental instructions within a month. This document concerned not only state, but also party structures and had a nationwide regulatory significance. For the first time, it was recorded that secret divisions were created to organize and conduct secret office work. All secret clerical work of central and local state institutions and party organizations was to be concentrated in the Secret Sections allocated for this purpose. Data employees under

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divisions were to be exclusively party members. The procedure, working conditions, as well as registration and reception of employees of the Secret Department were determined the same as for employees of the Shifrburo. (shortly before that, in 1921, the Central Committee approved the regulation on the Shifrburo). The instruction also determined the forwarding of secret correspondence from other cities only through the courier corps of the OGPU. The military department had to use its couriers. This instruction was accompanied by the "Procedure for preparation, registration, forwarding and storage of secret correspondence", which was also approved. The document regulated: who and how produces and prepares secret documentation for shipment; procedure for production, registration, storage of secret documents and their copies; maintaining a registration log or compiling registration cards for classified documents; the order of registration, production and acceptance of secret packages was determined. At the end of the working day, the documents had to be checked against the inventories. Employees were forbidden to take secret documents home. Responsibility for the integrity and safety of secret correspondence, as well as for maintaining the secrecy of the information contained in it, fell on both the executor and the head of the organization. Each higher state or party organization had to establish for its subordinate structures the terms, procedure, conditions for the return of secret materials for destruction or determine the procedure for their destruction on the spot! On October 19, 1922, at a joint meeting of the Organizing Bureau and the Secretariat of the Central Committee, the "List of institutions in which the procedure for storing and sending secret documents is introduced" was also approved.

Thus, until 1922 there was no centralized approach and a general regulatory document for working with secret documents, the departments independently carried out secret work, and also determined the degree of secrecy of information. In connection with the release in 1922 of instructions regulating the work with secret documents in state institutions, party committees also raised questions before the Central Committee of the party on the development of a regulatory document on the use of secret party documents. By the decision of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee for the development of a party normative document, a commission was created, headed by A. M. Nazaretyan. It also included G. Kanner, Kantorovich, Tsibizov (from the Special Department of the OGPU). As a result, on August 30, 1922, the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee, having considered the issue "On the procedure for storing secret documents", made a decision: "1) Accept the proposals of the commission on the procedure for storing secret documents

ÿ See RGASPI. F.17. Op. 112. D. 365. L. 324-325.

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comrade...To instruct this commission to precisely determine the institutions to which this decision as a whole or its individual parts relates. 2) Instruct Comrade Nazaretyan to convene a meeting of representatives of the departments of the Central Committee to resolve the issue of the technique of keeping secret documents inside the apparatus of the Central Committee! Also in 1922, the Orgburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee adopted a resolution "On the procedure for the storage and movement of secret documents within the departments of the Central Committee" and adopted instructions for the storage of secret documents of the Politburo, the Orgburo, and the Secretariat of the Central Committee. At a meeting of the Orgburo on November 30, 1922, the question of the procedure for storing extracts from the protocols of the Politburo and the Orgburo was heard. In the end, the decision was made:

circular proposed by Comrade Nazaretyan "On the procedure for keeping secret decisions of the Central Committee." Recognize it necessary to print the rules for keeping secret documents on the back of extracts from the protocols of the Politburo and the Orgburo"2. Since this instruction was the first, we will give the text of this instruction in full: "Procedure for keeping secret resolutions of the Central Committee of the RCP (B ov). a) 1. The circle of persons to whom extracts from the minutes of the Central Committee of the RCP, party committees and individual orders of the secretaries of the Central Committee and party committees should be sent are determined by one of the secretaries of the Central Committee and secretaries of party committees and addressed to them personally. It is absolutely forbidden to transfer extracts and individual orders of the Central Committee and party committees to persons to whom the extract or instructions are not addressed. 2. Extracts and individual orders of the Central Committee and party committees must be kept in special personal files and in no case are they allowed to be attached to Soviet and trade union records. 3. It is absolutely forbidden to copy extracts and orders of the Central Committee and party committees, as well as a written reference in Soviet and trade union office work to party decisions. 6) 1. All cases of violation of these decisions are reported by the Central Committee immediately to the attention of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party or Party committees in order to bring the perpetrators to the strictest Party responsibility. Reason: Decree of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of November 30, 1922, protocol No. 77, paragraph 58"3.

Local party organizations were not forgotten either. Late December 1922 ~ early 1923 The Central Committee adopted the "Instruction on the procedure for using extracts from the protocols and individual orders of party committees"4. A similar document was published in the Red Army. RVSR Order No. 2011 determined the procedure for handling top secret correspondence.

1 RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 112. D. 365. L. 310.

2 RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 112. D. 393. L. 207-208.

3 Ibid. F. 17. Op. 112. D. 412. L. Title, rev. 4 See ibid. F. 17. Op. 84. D. 697. L. 334.

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Based on the adopted resolution of the Orgburo of August 30, 1922, institutions and departments, in agreement with the Special Department of the GPU, developed their own departmental instructions. The main issue that arose during the development of the instructions was the lack of a precise definition and distinction between "secret" and "top secret" information and correspondence. So, for example, the People's Commissar of Posts and Telegraphs issued a secret order for the department "On the delimitation of correspondence into" top secret "and" secret "and on the procedure for maintaining them," . secret" and secret". On November 10, 1922, the People's Commissar approved the departmental "Instructions for maintaining, storing, forwarding and delivering secret correspondence", in which, in the general part, a distinction was also made between three types of correspondence: "owls. secret, secret" and "not subject to disclosure". The second part of the instruction - "Procedure for the preparation, registration, forwarding and storage of secret correspondence", in general, repeated with a certain specification, adopted and approved by the Central Committee "Instruction on the procedure for storage and movement of secret documents".

In 1923, the problem of creating instructions for local party committees was raised again. At a meeting of the Orgburo of the Central Committee on January 13, 1923, the question "On the draft circular on the procedure for the storage and movement of secret documents" was considered. The Organizing Bureau decided: "Not to issue a special instruction, but to indicate to the provincial committees the need to be guided by the instructions corresponding to the Soviet authorities on the procedure for storing and moving secret documents"! Three days later, i.e., on January 16, 1923, a secret circular letter signed by the Secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP (6) V.V. It proposed that all party organs, in case of secret correspondence, be guided by the instructions established for Soviet institutions with the appendix "Procedure for the preparation, registration, forwarding and storage of secret correspondence." Thus, these were the first instructions that determined and regulated the procedure, circle of persons and organizations for working with classified information,

the prohibition of the joint conduct of party, state, Soviet and trade union office work was confirmed, as well as copying and reference in documents to party decisions. Violators were threatened with severe party punishment<sup>2</sup>.

1 See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 112. D. 403. L. 60. 2 See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 112. D. 412. L. title vol.

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But, in May of the same year, the Central Committee nevertheless decided to develop an instruction, originally intended for working with secret documents of the Central Committee. So, at a meeting of the Secretariat of the Central Committee on May 11, 1923, the issue "On the development of instructions on the return, familiarization and distribution of secret documents of the Central Committee" was considered, at which it was decided: "Create a commission consisting of Comrades. Nazaretyan, Bokiy and Tovstukha. Convening a commission for comrade Nazaretyan! The composition of the commission spoke for itself: assistant to the Secretary of the Central Committee, head of the Special Department of the OGPU, head of the Bureau of the Secretariat of the Central Committee. Already in June 1923, at a meeting of the Secretariat of the Central Committee, a report was heard by the head of the Bureau of the Secretariat of the Central Committee, IP Tovstukha, on the work of the commission. As a result, the instruction "On the procedure for distribution and familiarization with secret documents of the Central Committee of the RCP (6)" was presented and adopted. The issue as a whole was submitted for approval by the Politburo of the Central Committee, and ultimately this instruction was approved by the Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6) on August 19, 1924. By a secret circular letter dated September 5, 1924, signed by I. V. Stalin and sent to all members and candidates of the Central Committee, members of the Central Control Commission, members of the Central Audit Commission, national Central Committees, regional committees, provincial committees and regional committees of the RCP, the instruction was brought to the attention and execution. The letter also noted: "The Secretariat of the Central Committee has facts at its disposal indicating that a number of secret decisions and resolutions of the Central Committee and its bodies became known to persons who in no case should have been privy to this. Most often, the reason for this is the failure to observe the most elementary rules of secrecy, including when handling documents of the Central Committee in terms of familiarization with them, storage and return. At the moment, in connection with the expansion of the composition of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, the question of the condition for observing absolute secrecy in relation to the documents of the Central Committee becomes especially important, in view of the need to increase the number of prepared documents, complicate both the distribution itself and the monitoring of the receipt their addressees and returning them to the Secretariat of the Central Committee. Therefore, in order to ensure the strictest secrecy, the Central Committee proposes that the following rules be strictly guided, so that all cases where secret data go beyond the limits of the Central Committee, as well as cases of violation of these rules, will be subjected to a thorough investigation in order to bring the perpetrators to the strictest responsibility, with the transfer of the case to the Central Control Comm

1 RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 112. D. 448. L. 3. 2. Ibid. F. 17. Op. 112. D. 578. L. 90.

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In 1924, for the first time, the composition of the secret documents of the Central Committee was regulated. The text of the rules for handling secret documents determines the type and composition of secret documents of the Central Committee. Secret (conspiratorial) were considered all the protocol and administrative documents of the highest bodies of the party. The protocols of the Plenum, the Politburo, the Orgburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee, as well as all other materials and documents (extracts from resolutions, etc.) emanating from the Central Committee with the inscription: "Strictly secret" were considered secret documents of the Central Committee. The document also regulated the production, quantity, procedure for receiving, familiarizing, using, storing and returning secret documents of the Central Committee. This resolution limited the number of persons who had the right to get acquainted with and work with secret materials. It was especially noted that: "The resolution of the Politburo, the Orgburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee, which have a directive character of all-party significance, which should be implemented not by an individual or a separate department in a strictly secret manner (for example, by the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, the People's Commissariat of Military Affairs, the GPU, etc. .p.), but by the entire party as a whole or by the party press, may be announced by members of the Central Committee at closed meetings in the bureaus of the national Central Committees, regional and provincial committees or at meetings of senior officials in the same

order, as the minutes of the plenums of the Central Committee and the closed letters of the Central Committee are announced!. In turn, not only the Central Committee, but also the highest control body of the party adopted the corresponding secret organizational documents. So the Central Control Commission, by a resolution of the Secretariat of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission of October 31, 1923, approved the "Procedure for keeping secret decisions of the Central Control Commission of the RCP (b)"<sup>2</sup>.

Regulatory documents were adopted regulating the work with secret documents of party committees and in the field. In 1923, the "Instruction on the procedure for distributing extracts from the resolutions of the Orgburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the RCP (b)" was adopted, which determined the procedure for distributing extracts to party committees in the localities, and by a resolution of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) dated August 19 In 1924, the "Procedure for the use of secret documents of the Provincial Committee of the RCP (b)" was adopted. A separate resolution of the Central Committee, approved by the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee on March 6, 1925, regulated the "Procedure for the storage and return to the Central Committee of the protocols of the Secretariat, the Orgburo, the Politburo and the Plenum of the Central Committee", which confirmed the storage of these documents personally by those persons to whom they are addressed. After use, the protocols were subject to

1 See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 112. D. 578. L. 90. 2 See Ibid. F. 17. Op. 84. D. 697. L. 4. 3 See Ibid. F. 17. Op. 84. D. 696. L. 101-102.

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returned to the Bureau of the Secretariat. For those living in Moscow, a 2-week period was set for the return of documents, in the provinces - 1 month, on the outskirts of the USSR - 1.5 months. The return of documents was carried out through trusted employees approved by the OGPU, and from the provinces through the OGPU courier service. In case of non-return of more than three protocols within the established period, their further sending (until return) was temporarily stopped. Thus, the personal responsibility of users of classified information was increased and the principle of personal responsibility was put into practice.

In 1926, a number of all-Union instructions were adopted that regulate certain issues of organizing and conducting secret office work in the state as a whole: "Instruction for maintaining secret and encryption office work", "Instruction for local bodies of the OGPU on monitoring the organization of secret and mobilization office work", "Instructions for maintaining archival records management and handing over cases to the bodies of the Central Archive", "Rules for setting up the archival part of secret records management in state, trade union, cooperative institutions, enterprises of the USSR and the Union Republics", "Instruction on the procedure for preparing and converting correspondence pondentia sent by diplomatic mail", "Instruction on the procedure for shorthand at secret meetings and meetings", "Instruction on the procedure for maintaining and storing secret correspondence". The years 1926-1927 were the most fruitful in the preparation of internal party normative and legal documents, both in terms of the structure of the secret divisions of the Central Committee and work with secret documents. So, at that time, the "Instructions for the Secret Expedition of the Bureau of the Secretariat"<sup>1</sup>, "Instructions for the current office work of the Secret Department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (b)"<sup>2</sup> were developed. "Rules for Entrance to the Part of the Apparatus of the Secret Department of the Central Committee"<sup>3</sup>, "On the Procedure for Registering and Sending Outgoing Secret Papers"<sup>4</sup>, "Instructions for Working in the Secret Archive of the Bureau of the Secretariat"<sup>5</sup>, "Instructions for the Secret Section of the Typewriting Bureau under the Affairs of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (b)" and the Central Committee of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League"<sup>6</sup>, "Instructions for registering secret incoming documents of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (b)"<sup>7</sup>. In our opinion, this was primarily due to the aggravation of the international situation, as well as information received about the opening of secret correspondence and

1 See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 85. D. 539. L. 62-70. 2 See ibid. L. 1-7.

3 See ibid. L. 54.

4 See ibid. L. 21-22.

5 See ibid. L. 40-42.

6 See ibid. F. 17. Op. 85. D. 537. L. 42-44.

7 See *ibid.* F. 17. Op. 85. D. 538. L. 195-198.

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radio encryption by the British secret services and the unauthorized release of documents outside the party committees. In this regard, the Central Committee has taken a number of organizational measures to protect information. In particular, the regulatory framework was updated and revised. As a result, on May 5, 1927, the Politburo approved the resolution "On the Use of Secret Materials", which regulated the work with cipher correspondence, as well as the storage, circulation, distribution of secret documents. In addition, the resolution concerned the organization of the work of foreign archives and diplomatic mail, closed meetings of the Central Committee and employees conducting secret work. Particular attention was paid to monitoring the implementation of the measures outlined by this resolution. On the basis of the same resolution of the Central Committee, the "Rules for the storage, familiarization and return of the protocols of the Politburo and the Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (6)" were adopted!. The rules determined the work with the minutes of the meetings of the Politburo and the Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, which were then re-approved on June 10, 1927 and May 16, 1929. They completely repeat the "Rules for the Treatment of Secret Documents of the Central Committee of the RCP", approved by the Plenum of the Central Committee on August 19, 1924.

On June 10, 1927, at a meeting of the Secretariat of the Central Committee, the "Rules for the storage, familiarization and return of minutes of meetings of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (6)"<sup>2</sup>, prepared by the Secret Department of the Central Committee, were submitted for discussion, concerning the minutes of the Orgburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee. These rules basically also repeated the "Rules for the storage, familiarization and return of the protocols of the Politburo and the Plenum." The differences were in the timing of the return of protocols and extracts from the protocols of the Organizing Bureau and the Secretariat, as well as the documents of the "Special Folder". The return of the protocols of the Politburo was to be carried out within 5 days, the Orgburo and the Secretariat - 7 days, the documents of the "Special Folder" - 3 days.

For non-compliance with the rules for working with secret documents and violation of secret instructions, measures of party and administrative influence were applied. The perpetrators were threatened with the most severe punishment. To investigate the facts of information leakage, the Central Control Commission was involved, and in special cases, the OGPU. But, despite the measures taken by the Central Committee, in the party committees, especially in the field, the rules of conspiracy to conduct secret records management and handling secret documents were constantly violated. There was no general normative document for local party committees. It was necessary to put things in order and regulate the conduct of secret office work in local Party organizations. November 21

I RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 373. Title page rev. 2 See O.V. Khlevnyuk, A. V. Kvashonkin, L. P. Kosheleva, L. A. Rogovaya. Stalin's Politburo in the 1930s. Collection of documents. pp. 73-74.

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1927, the Secret Department submitted for approval to the Secretariat of the Central Committee, agreed with the Special Department of the OGPU, the rules for conducting secret office work and handling secret materials of the Central Committee in local party committees. Secretary of the Central Committee SV Kosior was instructed to preview the proposed instruction and report his views at the next meeting of the Secretariat. As a result, after several studies of the issue, on March 23, 1928, the Secretariat of the Central Committee decided: "a) Proposed by the Secret Department of the Central Committee, agreed with the Special Department under the OGPU, the rules for conducting secret office work and handling secret materials of the Central Committee in party organizations - to approve. 6) Propose to the Secret Department of the Central Committee to distribute these rules for guidance to all Nat. Central Committee, regional committees, regional committees, provincial committees and regional committees of the CPSU (6). c) General monitoring of the organization of secret office work in party bodies is carried out through special departments at the PGPU of the OGPU and the GPU of the National Republic!



Since 1928, this has been the main document regulating the work with secret documents in local party committees. The "Rules for Conducting Secret Record Keeping and Handling Secret Materials in Party Committees" came out under the heading "Top Secret". The rule consisted of eight chapters: 1. General provisions; 2. Personnel; 3. Record keeping of incoming papers; 4. Record keeping of outgoing papers; 5. Expedition. 6. Storage of materials and conduct of affairs; 7. The procedure for familiarization with secret materials of the Central Committee and on mobile issues; 8. Premises, order of storage, protection.

For completeness of understanding, let's take a closer look at the contents of this manual. The General Chapter stated the basic principle: "The fewer people have access (in one form or another) to classified materials, the greater the guarantee of secrecy." Then it was indicated who conducts this work of the party committees and the duties of the secret part, as well as responsibility for violating secrecy.

In the chapter "Personnel", the characteristics and criteria for employees of secret bodies were given, the procedure for appointing and dismissing secret employees and those authorized to receive documents was determined, as well as the "legend" when mentioning positions and places of work in personal documents.

In the third chapter, the procedure for receiving secret correspondence, registration, accounting and movement of documents within the party committee was determined. All work with secret documents was to be carried out only in the secret part of the party committee and registered in the corresponding secret documentation.

1 RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 113. D. 608. L. 97.

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In the fourth chapter, the procedure for the production of outgoing secret documents until the moment of distribution was determined. The degree of secrecy ("s", "ss") and urgency ("urgent", "very urgent", "especially urgent") should have been affixed to the document by the executor; documents were to be printed only in the secret part and by specially authorized typists, in compliance with secrecy measures. For shorthand recording of secret reports and meetings, special notebooks were to be kept in the secret part; all executed secret documents had to contain the designation of the copy number and the artist; drafts and extra copies are destroyed; Reproduction of secret documents was to be carried out only in the secret part by printing method - in secret printing houses or sites. When registering outgoing documents of magazines and cards, it was recommended not to start, but to make an extra copy, which is filed in folders in the order of receipt and thus should replace the magazine. All copies, journals and other documents were to be kept on an equal footing with all secret documents, in exceptional cases it was allowed to destroy documents by the addressee or leave them in secret files.

In the fifth chapter - "Expedition", it was noted that all outgoing secret correspondence of party committees is sent through the secret part; obligatory requisites, techniques for making and converting packages were given. The following letters were installed on the packages: "K series" - "owls. secret, secret (urgent and non-urgent) - for delivery only to the addressee's own hands; letter "A" - "owl. secret", "secret" urgent; letter "B" - the rest of the "owl. secret" and "secret" correspondence. Arbitrary lettering was not allowed. This chapter regulated the procedure for the delivery and acceptance of secret correspondence. It was forbidden to send unclassified correspondence under the guise of secret. Party committees were charged with the duty to draw up a list of questions that should be held in their "secret", "Sov. secret" and "not subject to disclosure" order.

The procedure for transporting secret correspondence was specially stipulated. Couriers carrying classified documents were advised to avoid traffic jams or crowds. Along the way, it was forbidden to call in places not related to the route, stop and

enter into conversations. The packages had to be handed over personally. Couriers delivering secret documents were usually armed with revolvers. The original receipts for the receipt of packages had to be kept for a year, after which they were checked by a commission with the participation of a representative of the local OGPU and destroyed according to the act.

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In the sixth chapter "Storage of materials and record keeping", it was noted that all secret documents should be filed in the appropriate files, filed according to the correspondent and thematic features, in chronological order.

It was forbidden to attach secret documents to unclassified ones. For duplicates (if any) of secret documents, an inventory was compiled, which was approved by the secretary of the party committee. When the need passed, the duplicates were destroyed according to the act by burning. The current classified material was to be kept for 3 convocations. Secret files were introduced from the congress until the next congress of the party and were kept in secret parts. It was strictly forbidden to transfer the secret archives of party committees to state institutions. Each case had to have an internal inventory of documents. Giving inquiries about the content of correspondence by telephone was strictly prohibited. References could be given orally by the head. secret part only to members of the bureau of the party committee, and written ones - only signed by the secretary of the party committee. The issuance of extracts or copies of secret documents was prohibited. In extreme cases, it was allowed only by order of the secretary of the party committee.

The seventh chapter regulated the procedure for familiarization with secret materials of the Central Committee and on mobilization issues. In this chapter, it was noted that all members and candidate members of the party committee and control commissions get acquainted with secret documents of the Central Committee. The content of the secret documents of the Central Committee was to be read in a specially designated room in the party committee. It was forbidden to issue documents for familiarization and storage in apartments. Acquaintance with documents of additional persons was allowed only with the permission of the Central Committee. Familiarization of grass-roots party organizations was carried out by familiarizing only the secretaries of these organizations. It was noted that familiarization with the secret documents of the Central Committee of "the broader sections of the party members" should be carried out only after a special instruction from the Central Committee.

In the last, eighth chapter "Premises, storage procedure, security" it was noted that the secret part should be located in a room isolated from other parts of the apparatus, with limited access. All repositories of secret documents should be concentrated in the secret part. The storage of secret documents should be in fireproof iron cabinets or in chests upholstered in iron and screwed to the floor. The use of padlocks was prohibited. Cleaning of the premises should be carried out only in the presence of employees of the secret part. The keys to the cabinets were to be kept by the secretary of the party committee or the head. secret part (trusted). Correspondence not completed by departments of the party committee was handed over for the night to a secret

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Part. Party committee employees were also not allowed to leave secret correspondence in their desk or closet at night, carry secret materials to their apartment or take them with them on a business trip, and leave secret documents on the table when leaving the room. Upon dismissal from service, going on vacation, going on a business trip, etc. etc., the documents were transferred to another appointed person under the act.

The room of the secret part and cabinets were sealed and sealed. The keys to the secret part, seal or ice cream were to be kept by the manager. secret part (trusted). To protect the secret part in the party committees, an armed guard was to be posted at night. It was recommended to set up a police post near the buildings of the party committees. At night, only the secretary of the party committee or the head of the secret unit were allowed to enter the premises of the secret unit. Before opening the premises of the secret part had to be checked for

safety of seals and seals. When traces of damage were found, an act was drawn up signed by the head of the guard and the head of the secret department, and then sent to the local department of the OGPU for investigation. In addition, the secretary of the party committee was responsible for taking additional measures in each individual case, ensuring, depending on the circumstances, the maximum secrecy of conducting secret office work and handling secret documents!

Approved by the Politburo on May 5, 1927, and having national significance, the resolution "On the Use of Secret Materials" after two years, required that this document be brought into line with the new conditions. In the development of the aforementioned resolution, in order to ensure the greatest secrecy, a new resolution "On Conspiracy" is being developed and approved at a meeting of the Politburo on May 16, 1929. In pursuance of this resolution, a commission was created to check the composition of the employees of the Secret Department of the Central Committee, entrusted to receive secret correspondence and secretaries, and a 3-day deadline for the return of the Politburo protocols was also confirmed. But, it should be noted that in the future, according to the resolution of the Politburo of May 23, 1929 "On the return of the protocols of the Politburo and Plenums of the Central Committee", the 5-day deadline for the return of the Politburo protocols was restored, the previous procedure for distributing extracts from the protocols of the meetings of the Politburo and Plenums of the Central Committee. The aforementioned decree of May 5, 1927 "On the Use of Secret Materials" was also attached to the decree "On conspiracy". The effect of the decree "On secrecy",

1 See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 113. D. 608. L. 99-113.

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as before, it extended to both state and party bodies.

The Central Committee of the Bolsheviks, of course, could not ignore the issues of secrecy regarding the use of other types of secret documents of the party. Thus, on February 21, 1930, the Secretariat of the Central Committee approved the rules for using the reports "On Foreign Press" and "On Sections of the Comintern" prepared by the Secret Department of the Central Committee. For example, the requirements for the storage and use of reports "On foreign press" were the same as for other secret documents of the Central Committee.

In the 1930s - 1940s, the process of developing and putting into effect documents regulating the work with secret information and documents at the state and departmental levels was actively going on. Especially if it concerned the military department. Thus, by order of the People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs of the USSR dated September 25, 1930 No. 70, the "Manual on mobilization work in military units, departments, institutions and establishments of the Red Army" was put into effect. In 1937, the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR issued an order No. 0043 "On the basics and organization of covert command and control of troops", No. 0105 "On measures to encrypt the names of military units and keep dislocation information secret". Order No. 150 of the NPO of the USSR dated September 4, 1939 put into effect the "Manual on Secret Paperwork in the Red Army", Order No. 0130 dated June 20, 1940 "Manual on the mobilization work of military units, departments and just before the war, by the order of the People's Commissar of Defense of March 5, 1941 No. 095 "Instruction on the mobilization work of local military authorities of the NPO of the USSR."

Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated June 17, 1939 No. 884-145 with "On the reorganization of the courier communications of the NKVD of the USSR" fixed the already existing procedure for transporting secret and top secret correspondence of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, NGOs, NKVMF and NKVD from Moscow to republican, regional, regional centers and back through the NKVD courier communications, as well as transportation of all departments (except for those listed) secret, top secret correspondence and precious metals from the center to the regions and back through Special communications of the People's Commissariat of Com

An important step in the development of the regulatory framework was the approval on January 2, 1940 of the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR "Instructions for conducting secret and mobilization work and office work in institutions and enterprises." This national document regulated almost the entire range of work to comply with the regime

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secrecy and work with secret documents in institutions and enterprises. The instructions specified:

— The procedure for developing a list of information to be classified and the procedure for establishing and changing the secrecy classification, classifying information according to the degree of secrecy;

- functions of the 7th department of the UGB;

- functions and responsibility of the heads of institutions for the state of the secrecy regime;

- names of secret bodies, the procedure for their creation and liquidation;

- the main tasks of the secret organs;

- requirements for employees admitted to classified information;

- the procedure for issuing permits to secret work and documents;

- requirements for restricting access to classified information;

- the procedure for conducting secret office work and working with documents in secret libraries and archives;

- the procedure for handling cipher telegrams in institutions that do not have encryption authorities;

- the procedure for storing secret and mobilization documents;

~ the procedure for accounting, storage of special products and handling them;

- requirements for the production of film and photography;

~ the procedure for holding secret meetings.

No regulatory documents on working with secret party documents for the 1930s were found in the materials of the open protocols of the highest bodies of the party, and in other material studied by the author of the work. Two options are possible: either the instructions on these issues, approved in the second half of the 1920s, were in force and did not undergo significant changes until the Great Patriotic War, or these issues were discussed only at closed meetings from the beginning of the 1930s. the highest party bodies and therefore these documents may be in the materials of closed protocols, the "special folder" and the Special Sector of the CPSU (b).

Shortly before the Great Patriotic War, on June 28, 1940, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (6) approved an instruction on setting up secret office work in regional committees, regional committees and the Central Committee of the republics. This instruction dealt mainly with secret mobilization work. In local party committees, on the basis of decisions and recommendations received from the Central Committee, rules and instructions were adopted for the storage, familiarization and return of secret secret documents. So, for example, in the documents of the Kyzyl-Orda Regional Committee of Kazakhstan, we find the "Rules for the storage, familiarization and return of the minutes of the meetings of the Bureau and Plenums of the Regional Committee of KP (6) K". These documents were similar to the instructions of the Central Committee and for the most part they were repeated.

Thus, in the party committees of the RCP (6) - VKP (6) for 1918 ~ 1940s (before the start of the war), more than twenty documents were developed and put into effect on observing and ensuring the secrecy regime in general and regulating work with secret party documents in particular. It should be noted that the special attention of the party during 1920 ~ 1930. was given to secret documents of the highest party instances and forums - resolutions, protocols and other materials of Congresses, Plenums, meetings of the Politburo, Orgburo, Secretariat of the Central Committee. The earliest instruction discovered by the author - "Instruction on the procedure for storage and movement of secret documents", was adopted at a meeting of the Secretariat of the Central Committee, and is dated August 30, 1922. Perhaps there were earlier normative and regulatory documents, but not found in the materials of the open protocols of the Politburo, the Orgburo, the Secretariat of the Central Committee. In 1922, by a resolution of the Politburo, a decision was made to separate the party from the state and trade union affairs. Another most important event in the life of the country was the preparation for the political and legal formation of the Soviet Union. These circumstances contributed to the creation of normative, regulatory acts on the observance of secrecy and work with secret, both with party and state documents. So, at the end of 1922 - beginning of 1923, the "Instruction on the procedure for the storage and movement of secret documents" and "List of documents not subject to disclosure" were developed and approved. A list of institutions was also approved, in which the above instruction was put into effect throughout the country. In 1922, the first party normative documents were also adopted, regulating the movement of secret documents within the Central Committee. Further, throughout the 1920s, new ones were developed, supplemented or revised old regulatory documents on the observance of secrecy. So, for example, on August 19, 1924, the Plenum of the Central Committee approved the "Rules for handling secret documents of the Central Committee of the RCP", on March 6, 1925, "The procedure for storing and returning to the Central Committee the protocols of the Secretariat, the Orgburo, the Politburo and the Plenum of the Central Committee". In 1927 - 1928. The Politburo approved nationwide resolutions "On the use of secret materials", and in the party committees - "Rules for conducting secret records management and handling secret materials in party committees". On May 16, 1929, by the resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee "On conspiracy", the resolution of May 5, 1927 "On the use of secret materials" was fixed and extended, the effect of which extended to all party and state structures. Regulations

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The governing documents of the party were not only approved at the highest party level, but were also taken as the basis for the development and implementation of instructions and rules for setting and ensuring secrecy when working with the minutes of the meetings of the Central Committee of the Komsomol, as well as when using the reports of the white- émigré press (Approved by the Secretariat of the Central Committee on 03/04/27), reports "On foreign press", "On sections of the Comintern" (Approved on 02/21/30), etc.

Of particular note is the mechanism for developing, reviewing and approving secret regulatory documents. To solve this problem, special commissions were created, mainly under the chairmanship of one of the members of the Central Committee or the Secretary of the Central Committee with the participation of representatives of the Secret Divisions of the Central Committee, the Special Department of the OGPU, departments and specialists in relevant areas. Part of the decisions and documents were instructed to prepare directly the Bureau of the Secretariat (Secret Department) of the Central Committee, which submitted the documents developed by it or the commission for approval by the Politburo, the Organizing Bureau, the Secretariat of the Central Committee. Assistance in developing, coordinating, conducting inspections (together with the secret divisions of the party), general management and control over compliance with the secrecy regime and rules for working with secret documents was carried out by the Special Department of the OGPU and its successors in the state security bodies. All final decisions on the creation of secret regulatory documents and their approval took place at the highest party state level. It was a real legal basis for working with classified information. Along with regulatory functions, these normative-regulatory acts also provided legitimate, within the framework of the functioning party-state system, legal support, including sanctions for violation of their requirements.

It should be noted that the secret party instructions adopted in the late 1920s remained in effect until the Great Patriotic War. On secret party record keeping in regional committees, regional committees and the Central Committee of the republics, the instruction of 1928 was replaced by the corresponding party instruction approved by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (6) on June 28, 1940, and the state instruction until the adoption of the decision of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of January 2, 1940.

## 2.5. PARTY AND STATE CONTROL OVER COMPLIANCE WITH SECRET, STORAGE CONDITIONS AND USE OF SECRET DOCUMENTS AND INFORMATION

One of the most difficult problems in the functioning of the mechanism of political power in the country in the 1920s - 1930s. there was control over the implementation of the decisions taken, including the observance of the secrecy regime and the use of secret documents in party committees. Ensuring control in this area was one of the activities of the secret divisions of the Central Committee and state security agencies. To accomplish this task, the Central Committee organized inspections of compliance with the secrecy regime during the storage and use of secret documents in the apparatus of the Central Committee and party committees in the field. This work was carried out in order to identify "weak spots" and "vulnerable areas of leakage" of information and further preventive preventive and administrative work to ensure secrecy.

To solve this problem, it was necessary, first of all, to concentrate the secret documents held by the "responsible comrades" from the party apparatus and organizations, which had been handed over to them by the Central Committee for work, in a single center in the Secretariat of the Central Committee. By 1922, the Politburo had information that many documents, including secret ones, such as the minutes of meetings of the Politburo, the Organizing Bureau and the Secretariat, were in the hands of members of the Central Committee. This issue was considered at a meeting of the Secretariat of the Central Committee on April 21, 1922 and then submitted for approval by the Politburo. By the Decree of May 18, 1922 "On the procedure for keeping Politburo protocols by members of the Central Committee", the Politburo approved the decision of the Secretariat: "a) Recognize

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necessary to return the old protocols of the Politburo to the Secretariat of the Central Committee. 6) Set the return period as a general rule, 1.2 years. The secretariat of the Central Committee grants the right to change this period, if it is required by the conditions. c) Instruct the Secretariat to check whether secrecy is sufficiently observed in the personal secretariats of the members of the Central Committee when storing protocols! Secretary of the Central Committee VV Kuibyshev was entrusted with the implementation of this resolution. On October 22, he sent a letter to all members of the Central Committee, in which he asked: "1. Urgently tell me the procedure for keeping the minutes of the Central Committee in your personal archives, what measures have been taken to ensure sufficient secrecy for their storage, and so on. 2. Take note of the leadership that the protocols of the Central Committee are subject to mandatory return to the Central Committee. (Protocols of the Politburo to the Secretariat of the Politburo, and protocols of the Orgburo and the Secretariat to the Secretariat of the Orgburo) after the expiration of a 6-month period; at the moment, the minutes of the Central Committee of the convening of the Tenth Congress until December 1921 inclusive must be returned; the remaining minutes of the Central Committee of the previous convocation are to be returned to the Central Committee in September of the current year. With regard to the minutes of the Central Committee of the convening of the XI Congress, do the same, i.e., send them after the expiration of a 6-month period by six months to the Central Committee "2. In pursuance of the decision of the Politburo and the Orgburo, letters from members of the Central Committee were sent to the Secretariat of the Central Committee and V.V. V. V. Kuibyshev himself, in turn, also informed the Central Committee: "I keep the minutes of the Secretariat, the Orgburo, the Politburo and the Plenum in a closed desk drawer in my office at the Central Committee, and the office is locked during the hours when there are no classes. ".

From the reports of the members of the Central Committee, it became obvious that, in general, at first glance, they complied with the requirements when storing secret documents. But at the disposal of the Central Committee, there were also facts that spoke of a violation of the rules for keeping secret documents, which led to

disclosure of secret information. Violated, among other things, and the rules of storage of archival documents of the party, concentrated in the state archives. So, in 1923, the Special Department of the OGPU checked the Archive of the October Revolution (AOR), in which there was no Secret Part at all, and secret documents of the Central Committee of the RCP (decrees and materials to them, grounds for government and party acts, treaties, concessions, documents, highlighting illegal work, etc.) lay openly on the shelves without proper refrigeration.

1 RGASPI. F.17. Op. 3. D. 293. L. 5.

2 Ibid. F. 17. Op. 112. D. 333. L. 57-58.

3 Ibid. F. 17. Op. 112. D. 393. L. 212-218. 4 Ibid. F. 17. Op. 112. D. 393. L. 211.

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wounds!. In addition to the secret divisions of the Central Committee, the Central Control Commission of the Central Committee was also involved in monitoring compliance with the rules of secrecy when working with secret documents, their storage and use. Thus, at a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission on March 4, 1924, the issue of distributing secret documents was considered: Party members who are not involved in factional struggle and are not interested in spreading are also involved in entering the Central Committee of the Party with a request that local organizations be asked to instruct Party members to hand over all secret documents to Party organizations so that in case of discovery secret documents in the hands of party members, severe measures of party punishment will henceforth be taken. As a result, this proposal was submitted for consideration by the Secretariat of the Central Committee, which decided: "a) Accept the proposal of the Central Control Commission on the storage and surrender of secret documents. 6) Instruct comrade. Korotkov, within a week, draw up a circular for distribution to the localities on the storage and surrender of secret documents.

In 1925, on behalf of the Secretariat of the Central Committee, the Bureau of the Secretariat undertook measures to collect information on the state of secret work in local Party bodies. On October 20, 1925, a letter was sent from the Central Committee to 33 district committees, signed by the head of the Bureau of the Secretariat L. Z. Mekhlis, in which it was proposed to urgently answer a number of questions. Including: which of the employees of the apparatus of the district committee is in charge of secret office work (brief information about them) and who approved him, are there fireproof cabinets in the party committees and is the building of the district committee guarded? Apparently, not satisfied with the answers of the committees and having operational information from the field, as well as the ongoing cases of loss and theft of secret party documents, forced the Central Committee to take measures to ensure the secrecy regime and check compliance with secrecy when working with secret documents more seriously. Thus, at the beginning of December 1925, the Bureau of the Secretariat asked the Secretariat of the Central Committee to raise the issue of checking compliance with the rules for storing, returning and familiarizing with secret documents of the Central Committee of the RCP (6) at the next meeting. The draft resolution proposed to establish a procedure for periodic scheduled inspections of compliance with the rules of secrecy in party bodies, in Soviet institutions, trade unions, cooperative and other organizations.

1 See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 84. D. 587. L. 21-21v. 2 Ibid. F. 17. Op. 112. D. 526. L. 110-110v. 3 RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 112. D. 526. L. 7.

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also in the departments of the Central Committee, in the Secretariats of the members of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission and to determine the persons and bodies that carry out such checks. The secret department of the Central Committee proposed that inspections in the Party bodies should be carried out by local Party audit commissions, responsible instructors of the Central Committee and persons specially sent by the Central Committee to carry out these activities. In the Secretariats of members of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, checks were carried out in each individual case by decision of the Secretariat of the Central Committee in agreement with the heads of departments and members of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission. The Bureau of the Secretariat, in turn, took on the responsibility of supplying the inspectors

relevant guidance material and preparation of a letter to the local audit commissions with a request to carry out periodic inspections!. As a result, on January 29, 1926, the Secret Department of the Central Committee submitted to the Secretariat of the Central Committee the question "On checking compliance with the rules for storing, returning and familiarizing with the secret documents of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6)". Having considered it, the Secretariat of the Central Committee decided: "Establish a procedure for periodic scheduled inspections of compliance with the rules of storage, return and familiarization with secret documents of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6)<sup>2</sup>. The secretariat of the Central Committee also confirmed the procedure proposed by the Secret Department and the circle of persons conducting the check. From that moment on, all the results of checks on the procedure for storing, returning and familiarizing with the secret documents of the Central Committee were subject to submission to the Secret Department of the Central Committee. As can be seen, this resolution legitimized the scheduled and periodic nature of inspections. This work was carried out with the direct participation of the Central Committee of the VKI (6), the Secret Department of the Central Committee and the Special Department of the OGPU.

In pursuance of this decision, already in the spring of 1926, the Secret Department raised the issue of conducting checks on compliance with the rules for handling and storing secret materials of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6) in the local regional committees. On May 7, 1926, the Secretariat considered the request of the Secret Department of the Central Committee and allowed to check compliance with the rules for storing, returning and familiarizing with the secret documents of the Central Committee. It should be noted that this issue was considered in the closed part of the meeting, and decisions on it were made in a "special file".

Adoption by 1926 of normative documents regulating the work with secret documents of the party, such as "Instructions on the procedure for storing and moving secret documents", "Instructions for maintaining, storing, forwarding and delivering secret correspondence", "Rules for handling secret documents", "Rules for the storage, familiarization and return of the protocols of the Politburo and the Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6)", the resolution of the Central Committee "On the procedure for storage and return to

1 See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 84. D. 944. L. 294-296. 2 Ibid. F. 17. Op. 113. D. 163. L. 24.

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The Central Committee of the RCP of the protocols of the Secretariat, the Organizing Bureau, the Politburo and the Plenum of the Central Committee, also demanded that the Central Committee check their execution. Not only party, but also state departments and institutions that receive secret party documents were examined. Thus, in January-May 1926, the Secret Department of the Central Committee and the Special Department of the OGPU checked the People's Commissariat for Education, the State Planning Committee of the USSR, the People's Commissariat of Labor, the People's Commissariat for Health, the State Institute of the West, the Communist University of the Working People of the East, and some members of the Central Control Commission. According to the results of the checks, on January 29, 1926, the head of the Secret Department of the Central Committee, A.P. Tovstukha, and on May 14, 1926, his deputy, Ya.E. Brezanovsky, made reports at meetings of the Secretariat of the Central Committee. As it turned out during the checks, there were cases of negligent handling of classified documents. Measures of party and administrative influence were applied to violators! In this case, the conduct of secret office work and the setting of encryption work were checked. In some cases, when it was not possible to ensure secrecy or the norms and rules for conducting cipher work were not observed, the cipher parts were simply eliminated. In general, it should be noted that according to the results of the checks, the "organizational conclusions" were rather mild: "put in sight", "oblige", "indicate", etc., that is, the attitude towards violators was surprisingly more than loyal. It should be noted that it was by this time that the regulatory framework for ensuring the secrecy regime and secret office work was mainly developed and put into effect, which provided a legitimate legal basis for monitoring compliance with the requirements and rules. on working with classified documents and on taking measures to protect information in general.

The check mechanism was as follows:

1. The Organizing Bureau or the Secretariat of the Central Committee, on the proposal of the Secret Department of the Central Committee, made decisions on conducting inspections of compliance with the rules for storing, returning, familiarizing, maintaining secret and



encryption business.

2. In pursuance of these decisions and in agreement with the Secret Department of the Central Committee, the verification was carried out by the Special Department of the OGPU.

3. Based on the results of the check, the Special Department of the OGPU drew up an act in which both positive and negative moments and shortcomings were recorded. Moreover, one copy of the act (in the mid-1920s, the acts were signed by the head of the Special Department of the OGPU G.I. Boki, the deputy head of the department A. Gusev, the head of the 5th department of the Special Department Tsibizov), in which a general (with an assessment) conclusion was made and indicated measures to eliminate shortcomings, was sent to the Secret Department of the Central Committee;

1 See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 113. D. 163. L. 24-25.

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4. The secret department of the Central Committee analyzed the acts, grouped them, made their conclusions in the form of summaries based on the data of the checks and sent the summary with the attached acts for consideration to the Organizing Bureau or the Secretariat and submitted for approval the draft resolution of the Central Committee on this issue.

5. The Organizing Bureau or the Secretariat issued resolutions of the Central Committee with appropriate organizational conclusions.

6. As a result, the verified organizations and party committees were required to report to the Secret Department of the Central Committee about the correction of the discovered shortcomings.

So, for example, in August 1926, the procedure for handling secret documents in the Kaluga Provincial Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6) was checked!. As a result, the Secretariat of the Central Committee at a meeting on August 20, 1926, adopted a resolution: "... b) To expose the secretary of the Kaluga Provincial Committee for the unacceptable handling of conspiratorial materials of the Central Committee (registration and storage of documents of the Central Committee is not in the proper order, transferring them to the bodies of the Central Archive), "... To streamline the handling of secret materials in accordance with the relevant rules of the Central Committee, as well as the instructions of the Special Department of the OGPU listed in the inspection reports. Report the measures taken in this direction to the Central Committee within two weeks. As a result, in a letter from the Kaluga Provincial Committee, in pursuance of this decision, the reasons were explained to the Orgburo and it was reported that measures were being taken to eliminate the shortcomings<sup>3</sup>.

In September 1926, the Secret Department sent to the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6) a "Summary of violations of the established rules for handling secret documents of the Central Committee, discovered by a survey of the Special Department of the OGPU" made by a number of officials. As a result, a resolution of the Secretariat of the Central Committee is issued: "... To oblige the comrades listed above to streamline the handling of secret documents of the Central Committee in accordance with existing rules, as well as the instructions of the Special Department of the OGPU listed in the inspection reports. Report the measures taken in this regard to the Central Committee within two weeks"<sup>4</sup>. As a result, within two weeks the Central Committee was informed of the reasons for the situation and the measures taken.

In January 1926, the Special Department of the OGPU checked the procedure for using and storing secret documents of the Central Committee in the Samara, Tambov, Ryazan, Voronezh and Saratov provincial committees, with a candidate member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (6) Vareikis, members of the Central Control Commission K. M. Kudryashov, J. K. Abel,

ÿ See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 113. D. 222. L. 128-139, 141-147. 2 See Ibid L. 7.

3 See ibid. L. 145-147.

4 See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 113. D. 242. L. 8.

5 See ibid. L. 203-204.

M. O. Razumova. The survey showed that of all the organizations and individuals checked, only M. O. Razumov was doing well. All the rest had a number of omissions and shortcomings that were a violation of the rules of secrecy (issuance of documents at home and when traveling on business trips, lack of proper accounting, admission to documents of persons not approved by the Central Committee, failure to comply with the deadlines for returning and storing documents etc.). Along with checking the conduct of secret records management, in this case, the conduct of cipher work was also checked in the Tambov, Saratov, Samara provincial committees!. In June 1926, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and the Bureau of Foreign Cells of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (6) were checked. As a result of the check in the Bureau, the state of the case was noted as unsatisfactory. In September-October of the same year, the highest state bodies of the country were checked - the Administration of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the STO, the apparatus of the Central Executive Committee, as well as the Karelian Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6)<sup>2</sup>. As a result, virtually the same cases of negligent attitude to work with secret documents of the Central Committee were revealed (storage in the apartment, not returned on time, lack of access, registration and accounting). In November 1926, at a meeting of the Secretariat of the Central Committee, the results of the next check of compliance with the rules for handling secret documents of the Central Committee were considered. It should be noted that the decision on this issue was not entered in the open part of the protocol, but already in a "special folder". Not only party committees and officials were subjected to verification, but also secret subdivisions of departments. In the most significant cases, cases were referred to the Central Control Commission of the AUCP (6). The meetings of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission on these issues were always attended by representatives of state security agencies. So from the OGPU, the meetings were attended by the head of the Special Department of the OGPU G. I. Boki, the head of the Department of the same department Tsibizov and A. Gusev. In special cases, the Central Committee did not confine itself to taking only administrative measures, and when the guilty were found, the OGPU was instructed to transfer cases to the prosecutor's office, i.e., to bring them to criminal responsibility.

The inspections carried out also revealed shortcomings in this work on the part of the Central Committee itself. Thus, based on the results of inspections, in 1926 the Special Department of the OGPU came to the conclusion that it was necessary to bring the normative documents of the Central Committee in line with the new conditions. Thus, in a letter from the Special Department of the OGPU sent to the Secret Department of the CPSU (6): "... considers it necessary to draw your attention to the urgent need to develop and provide

1 See *ibid.* F. 17. Op. 113. D. 259. L. 170-189. 2 See *ibid.* F. 17. Op. 113. D. 308. L. 9-10, 194-208. 3 See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 113. D. 246. L. 20-21.

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the relevant firm instruction on the procedure for using and storing secret materials of the Central Committee, the Politburo and the Central Control Commission, since the practice of the survey showed us that the current rules for the storage and use of these materials have partially outlived their time of instructions on how to store, take into account and use these materials. Further, in the decision of the Secretariat of the Central Committee on this issue, it was pointed out that violations of the rules for handling secret documents were inadmissible and it was proposed to bring them into line with the existing rules and instructions of the Special Department of the OGPU given in the inspection reports within two weeks, which, judging by the documents sent to the Secretariat later Central Committee to the reports of the secretaries of the provincial committees, and was it done?. As a result, taking into account the concerns and recommendations of the Secret Department of the CPSU (6) and the Special Department of the OGPU regarding the results of the checks, the Central Committee decided to develop a new instruction. Soon, the instruction "On the Use of Secret Materials" was developed and on May 5, 1927, the Politburo of the Central Committee finally approved. As can be seen, here we observe feedback and interaction between the state security agencies and the Central Committee on this issue.

After the instructions were accepted, checks by the Special Department of the OGPU resumed. In May 1927, examinations were carried out with the Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR Lezhava, Chairman of the Preparatory Commission of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR Antonov-Saratovsky, Chairman of the Committee

the munist faction of the Board of the Shefler Central Agricultural Bank, members of the Central Committee Boguslavsky, Leplevsky. As a result, in fact, cases of negligent attitude to work with secret documents of the Central Committee (storage in the apartment, not returned on time, lack of access, registration and accounting) were again revealed. In the decisions of the Secretariat of the Central Committee on these checks, there are again such mild formulations as "indicate and eliminate." Again, the Central Committee is reporting on the elimination of the identified shortcomings. At the end of 1927 - beginning of 1928. The special department of the OGPU checked the Central Asian Bureau of the Central Committee, Sibkraikom, Kazakhkraikom, the Central Committee of the Communist Party (6) of Uzbekistan, the Central Committee of the Communist Party (6) of Turkmenistan, the Kirghiz regional committee, the Kokand district committee, the Buryat Mongolian regional committee. As a result, an unsatisfactory state of affairs in working with secret documents was revealed (unauthorized issuance of documents in hand, careless storage, violation of the rules of registration, accounting and forwarding, non-compliance with the return deadlines, etc.). In the resolution of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of February 10, 1928, we again see the former

I RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 113. D. 246. L. 178. 2 See Ibid. L. 195-197. 3 See ibid. F. 17. Op. 113. D. 308. L. 9-10, 194-208.

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sanctions "point out to the secretaries", "correct shortcomings", the most severe - "reprimand"! In December 1927, the well-known Bolshevik N. I. Podvoisky and a member of the Orekhovo-Zuevsky Ukom Kashtanov were reprimanded and deprived of expulsion for six months for negligent treatment of secret materials (loss of documents). As a warning to others, were these decisions communicated to all persons receiving secret materials?. A noteworthy case was when a very serious investigation was revealed during a check with a candidate member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (6) of Uzbekistan, Kadyr-Aliyev. The fact is that, having served on a business trip to the Central Committee of Uzbekistan, he left party documents at home. His wife, having discovered them, and being illiterate, sold these documents to a private shop as a material for packing goods. This case was investigated by the Special Department of the OGPU. First, an arrest warrant was obtained for a crime under Art. 153 of the Criminal Code of Uzbekistan for disclosure of secret information not subject to disclosure. But then, in a letter signed by G. I. Boki and Tsibizov to the Secret Department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6), the deputy head of Ya. However, there are no documents. And, as a result, the violator was subjected to milder sanctions compared to arrest - a party reprimand was issued and removed from work 3.

This case spoke, firstly, on the one hand, of the existence in the late 1920s. and more stringent penalties under the criminal code for disclosure of classified information. Secondly, on the other hand, about the insufficiently serious understanding of the issue by the subjects - carriers of secret information and the low cultural and legal level when working with documents in general, which was still available in the country as a whole, and especially on the periphery. So, in February 1928, it was pointed out to the secretaries of the Ural, Aktobe, Syrdarya, Akmola provincial committees, Tashkent, Zeya, Samarkand, Kustanai and Chita district committees for unsatisfactory handling of secret documents and a 2-week period was given to correct the situation.

On October 14, 1927, at a meeting of the Secretariat of the Central Committee, the issue of the disappearance in the Arkhangelsk Civil Code of 11 secret documents at once and the cipher "Zarya" by Rogachev Ukom, revealed during a lip check, was considered

ÿ See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 113. D. 595. L. 4. 2 See Ibid. F. 17. Op. 113. D. 582. L. 6.

3 See RGASPI. F. 17. He. 113. D. 582. L. 6. 4 See Ibid. F. 17. Op. 113. D. 598. L. 11.

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department and the Special Department of the OGPU. This case took on the character of a whole investigation, as evidenced by the correspondence of the Secret Department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6), the Special Department of the OGPU, the Arkhangelsk Gubernia Department of the OGPU. As a result of the check, it was found that the following documents were lost,

considered secret: Transcript of the Organizing Bureau on the survey of the Vladimir and Smolensk provinces; about holding an anti-religious campaign in connection with the upcoming Muslim fast; the attitude of the Orgraspred of the Central Committee, signed by Comrade Kosior on the decision of the Central Committee on the dispatch of 150 comrades from industrial regions to non-industrial ones in order to strengthen their personnel; a statement signed by Kosior about the interference of the Arkhangelsk State Corporation in the work of the department of the State Bank; information overview on work among the poor; a request from the Central Committee of wood finishers to recall M. A. Lobanov from Arkhangelsk to work in the Central Committee of the Union; about sending reporters on the Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission to their places; about the provincial prosecutor's office in Arkhangelsk; on the release of communist organizers of the party census and registrars for the period of the party census from party work; about the work of Comrade Koltunov L. G.; the request of the Central Committee of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League to send comrade Kuchеров as a representative of the Central Committee of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League at the Plenum of the Arkhangelsk State Committee on December 26, 1927. Moreover, at first 21 documents were found missing, then ten of them were found. The head of the Special Department of the OGPU, G. I. Boky, and the head of the U department, Tsibizov, asked the head of the Arkhangelsk provincial department of the OGPU to indicate the reasons and the perpetrators. In Arkhangelsk, an investigation was carried out into the fact of the incident, including the production of interrogations. G. I. Boki and Tsibizov suggested: "in view of the importance of the issue, it is proposed that you urgently conduct a comprehensive inquiry on the merits of the missing documents, identify the personal responsible persons who lost the documents, not limited to interviewing only the technical workers of the provincial committee and all the material with Send your conclusion to us immediately. The special department of the OGPU proposed to bring the former secretaries of the Arkhangelsk Civil Code Kudzhiev and Beik (at the time of the disappearance they were the secretaries of the provincial committee) to extrajudicial liability in the party order. As a result, the case that began so severely ended in a rather mild, for this case, resolution of the Secretariat of the Central Committee on December 14, 1927, according to which Kudzhiev and Beiko were severely reprimanded

From his office, from the deputy head of the Organizational Department of the Shakhty-Donetsk regional committee, Begeulov, a secret report of the White émigré press was stolen along with a briefcase. This case also

ÿ See RGASPI. F.17. Op. 114. D. 337. L. 14, 273-297.

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became the subject of investigation by the Secret Department of the CPSU (b), the OGPU, the Shakhty-Donetsk Regional Committee of the North Caucasus Territory and, ultimately, the Secretariat of the Central Committee. Begeulov was reprimanded for neglect of secret documents! In 1933, for the loss of the protocol of the Politburo (left it in the hotel room "National"), the secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (6) of Uzbekistan Ikramov<sup>2</sup> was deprived of the right to receive protocols for 3 months. At a meeting of the Secretariat of the Central Committee on March 22, 1933, a commission composed of A.I. Stetsky (Chairman), N.A. Voznesensky, V.V. Osinsky were instructed to additionally clarify and submit for consideration by the Organizing Bureau the question of the disclosure of data on the loss of livestock by the journal Socialist Reconstruction of Agriculture<sup>3</sup>. It should be noted here that the circumstance at what level was decided, it would seem, is a private issue and the fact that the data on the loss of livestock in a famine year were secret.

Since the 1930s, the Central Committee has become stricter about the facts of disclosure of classified information. There were both internal and external reasons for this. On the one hand, this was a consequence of the strengthening of the personal influence and power of I.V. Stalin and his theory of the intensification of the class struggle as socialism was built, on the other hand, the aggravation of the international situation in Europe, in connection with the coming to power of the Nazis in Germany and the actions Japanese militarists in Asia. All this taken together contributed to the tightening of measures to maintain secrecy and penalties for non-compliance. In 1927, a decree was issued on measures of responsibility in secret cases, providing for an out-of-court procedure for considering these cases. Also, an article of the Criminal Code was adopted and put into effect: "Disclosure of secret and not subject to disclosure information." If earlier those guilty of non-compliance with secrecy received fairly mild administrative penalties, now more and more often it came to court. So, at a meeting of the Politburo on February 1, 1930, the issue "On the disclosure of secret information about the extraction of gold and non-ferrous metals" was considered. The Organizing Bureau on this issue made the following decision in

regarding the perpetrators: "a) Transfer the case for investigation by the OGPU. 6) Propose to the OGPU not to slowly arrest Shippek. c) The question of Simonov and Alyoshin should be referred to the Central Control Commission. On August 31, 1935, the Politburo considered the issue "On bringing to justice the military censor Galgut." The decision was again strict: "To bring to trial the military censor Galgut for

ÿ See RGASPI. F.17. Op. 113. D. 611. L. 9, 206-208.

2 See O.V. Khlevnyuk, A. V. Kvashonkin, L. P. Kosheleva, L. A. Rogovaya. Stalin's Politburo in the 1930s. S. 78.

3 See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 114. D. 340. L. 6.

4 RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 914. L. 5.

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loss of a secret document, which thus became known to foreigners!

In 1940 - early 1941. efforts were intensified to verify the observance of secrecy and investigate the facts of disclosure of secret information, primarily in military and military mobilization cases. So, on February 23, 1940, the Secretariat of the Central Committee considered the issue "On the loss of top secret documents in the People's Commissariat of the Navy"<sup>2</sup>. And in this case, the case now did not end with organizational conclusions. The military prosecutor's office accepted it for production and execution. Despite the fact that before the Great Patriotic War, in general, the strategic and political plans of the Nazis were not a secret to the leadership of the USSR, nevertheless, in some departments there were facts of a careless attitude to secret information, which sometimes leaked through the media and departmental channels. . The Central Committee naturally reacted sharply to these cases. This can be illustrated by the question "On the facts of the disclosure of secret information by the Moscow radio station of the People's Commissariat of Fishery of the USSR" considered by the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee in December 1940-February 1941<sup>3</sup>. In this case, on the part of the People's Commissariat of Fishery, a gross violation of the rules of secrecy was revealed. The Organizing Bureau reacts promptly and obliges to correct the shortcomings in a short time (before | March). The importance of the issue was such that its consideration was submitted to a meeting of the Politburo.

There were facts of violations in the secret divisions of the party themselves. Thus, on July 13, 1940, the Orgburo of the Central Committee considered the unsatisfactory conduct of affairs in the Special Sector of the Kamchatka Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (6). During the inspection, no protocols of the Plenums of the regional committee were found at the site, there was no registration of secret documents, etc. The Organizing Bureau ordered to put things in order in the protocol and secret office work within a month. It was entrusted to exercise control over the implementation of a higher body - the Khabarovsk Territory Committee. As you can see, the problem of disclosing secret information was relevant until the Great Patriotic War.

Thus, verification of compliance with the secrecy regime was one of the activities for the protection of classified information. This work has a dual meaning. Firstly, it was a check of the true state of affairs regarding the observance of the secrecy regime, the presence of bottlenecks, and clarification of the reasons for the vulnerability of information. Secondly,

ÿ See *ibid.* F. 17. Op. 3. D. 970. L. 28.

2 *Ibid.* F. 17. Op. 116. D. 64. L. 66.

3 RGASPI. F.17. Op. 116. D. 67. L. 70-71. 4 *Ibid.* F. 17. Op. 116. D. 43. L. 11.

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it was a verification of the execution of decisions of the Central Committee on issues of information security. The facts of the unfavorable state of affairs in various party committees and state institutions for the observance of the regime constantly appeared at the disposal of the highest bodies of the party.

secrecy, both in the center and in the field. There were cases of disclosure of secret information, loss and theft of secret documents, unsatisfactory state of secret office work. These questions have been discussed more than once at meetings of the highest organs of the Party. Control and verification of compliance with conspiracy was entrusted to the Special Department, local branches of the OGPU - NKVD and the secret organs of the party (Secret Department of the Central Committee - Special Sector of the Central Committee). Until 1926, this work was of an episodic nature, but after the adoption of the resolution of the Secretariat of the Central Committee on January 29, 1926, it became planned. A special department of the OGPU checked the party committees, as well as departments and individual officials. Disadvantages, as a rule, were everywhere of the same type. Among the most common were: acquaintance and work with secret documents of unauthorized persons, delay or non-return of documents, loss, theft, storage of documents at home, lack of conditions and non-observance of storage rules, disorder in registration and accounting. Secret subdivisions prepared material and submitted draft resolutions based on the results of inspections to the Secretariat and the Orgburo, and sometimes to the Politburo. As can be seen from the documents of the Central Committee, noted in the acts of the Special Department and local bodies of the OGPU, the shortcomings were corrected after the relevant organizational conclusions. For minor violations in the 1920s, the perpetrators were given rather mild sanctions, limited to organizational and administrative measures: staging; the cessation, for a specified period, of the expulsion of secret documents; rebuke; severe reprimand. Rarely did it come to more stringent measures. But since the early 1930s there has been a tightening of sanctions; - removal from his post, dismissal from work, up to the transfer of cases to the prosecutor's office and the OGPU for investigation and prosecution. Conducting organizational and administrative measures gave positive results. With strict party discipline and centralization, the party and the country as a whole, being either in a military, or after or pre-war state, on the one hand, pursued a certain political and state line to implement regime-secret measures such as in party and state instances, but on the other hand, nevertheless, in our opinion, this was not always and everywhere given due importance. In some cases, there was a lack of organization, and where there was a negligent attitude towards maintaining secrecy. This is evidenced by cases of loss and theft.

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documents, disclosure of confidential information. These cases were the subject of close investigation in the highest party bodies with the involvement of the Central Control Commission and the OGPU.

Without special analytical information from the state security agencies, it is difficult to fully judge the degree of effectiveness of the work of the party and the country as a whole in ensuring secrecy, maintaining state and party secrets and monitoring the observance of secrecy in party and state bodies and institutions in the period between the two world wars, and especially before the Great Patriotic War. Although it was not possible to completely block the activities of foreign intelligence services on its territory, it was necessary to reduce real threats to a minimum. Despite certain shortcomings in this work, in general it can be noted that, for example, before the war: "German generals recognized the particularly difficult conditions for the activities of Western intelligence and counterintelligence in the USSR. According to Leverk n, [German General - G.K.] Soviet Russia, even before the start of the war, presented a particularly difficult problem with regard to intelligence"! In this, I see the main positive aspects in the activities of the RCP (b) - VKP (b) in organizing work and monitoring the maintenance of the secrecy regime both in the party apparatus and on a state scale.

in general.

I V. A. Volkov. The secret becomes clear. Activities of diplomacy and intelligence of the Western powers during the Second World War. L. 120.

#### 2.6. RESTRICTION OF THE DISTRIBUTION AND CENSORSHIP OF INFORMATION AS AN ACTIVITY OF THE RKP(B)-VKP(B) TO PROTECT PARTY AND STATE SECRETS

One of the areas of activity for the protection of information in the party bodies in 1918-1941. was to control the possible leakage of secret information from party organs through

mass media and printed publications, and this information could be both military-economic and political in nature. On the part of the Bolsheviks, the introduction of a secrecy regime for this or that information was determined by political expediency, the protection of state and political secrets. In principle, in the conceptual sense, the Bolsheviks did not separate party and state secrets and understood them together as a whole. In order to stop the cases of publication in the press and disclosure of secret information in other media, which occurred from time to time, the RKP (6) - VKP (6) pursued a certain restrictive and censorship policy.

The censorship policy in this work is understood not as an element of control by the party and the state over the media, creativity or science, but as a function and activity of the Bolsheviks, i.e. a set of means and methods to limit the unauthorized distribution of party state secret information. In this case, the censorship policy of the party was a type of activity of the political system as a recognized need to preserve the existing system. At the same time, the Bolsheviks also understood the importance of openness of information in the political struggle, and therefore, after coming to power, they faced a twofold task in this regard. On the one hand, this is the publication of documents (including previously secret ones) that expose the anti-people nature of the tsarist

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and the Provisional Government, which are of political importance, and on the other hand, protecting their own secret operational information and limiting the distribution of counter-revolutionary, in the opinion of the Bolsheviks, publications of other parties and organizations.

At the beginning, there were no special party bodies and state acts regulating political censorship. But in order to counteract the spread of counter-revolutionary information in the press, already in December 1917, the Revolutionary Press Tribunal was created under the People's Commissariat of Justice, and on December 23, 1918, military censorship was organized under the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, which dealt not only with military, but also with political civil censorship. . Censorship of foreign information entering Soviet Russia was carried out by the Russian Telegraph Agency (ROSTA) under the leadership of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. Moreover, since 1920, the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs had to carry out the caesura of information concerning foreign policy. In August 1921, military censorship was transferred to the department of military censorship of the Cheka, which also carried out political censorship. Thus, this activity becomes the prerogative of a special body of state security. Censorship functions were also carried out by the People's Commissar Pros. In late 1920 - early 1921, a political department appeared in the GIZ, which reviewed manuscripts, recommended them for publication or banned them. Another structure, the People's Commissariat of Education, carrying out censorship activities was the Glavpolitprosvet headed by N.K. V. I. Lenin perceived the Glavpolitprosvet not as a state, but as a party body! As can be seen in this period, censorship in the Soviet state had a decentralized system, but, formally subordinate to different departments, it was politically and personnel dependent on the party.

The issues of leakage of information not subject to publication through printed publications aroused concern of the Central Committee and was raised more than once at the highest party and state levels. So, in July 1919, the procedure for publishing in ROSTA information that was sent to the agency was determined. In August 1919 the claims of the People's Commissariat of Food for the disclosure of state secrets were examined, and in October of the same year - issues of military censorship. In December 1919, V. I. Lenin and the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs G. V. Chicherin prepared a resolution of the Central Committee on censorship of reports and protocols on speeches by responsible officials on issues of international politics?.

ÿ See Zelenov M.V. Apparatus of the Central Committee of the RCP (6) - VKP (b) ... P. 82. 2 See Ibid. S. 76.

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This paper has already mentioned the statement of A. M. Lezhava to the Politburo on March 29, 1921 about the disclosure of secret information, according to which F. E. Dzerzhinsky, i.e., the Cheka, was instructed to investigate the case. The current situation required more attention to be paid to censorship policy. To eliminate amateurism and confusion in the field of information protection in the media, publishing houses and the mass media had to have appropriate regulatory documents, and the state had to have censorship bodies from top to bottom. One of the first well-known documents developed (most likely there were earlier ones) in this direction was the "List of information constituting a secret and not subject to distribution" approved by decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR on October 13, 1921. In this list, secret information was divided into two groups: military and economic. At the same time, on October 13, 1921, by a decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR, the "Regulations on military censorship of the Cheka" were approved, according to which "to limit the political, economic and military interests of the RSFSR" introduced "censorship of printed works, postal and telegraph correspondence and control over radiotelegraph connections." As can be seen, two fundamental documents in the field of censorship policy were developed and approved simultaneously. In December 1921, the Politburo, concerned about the state of affairs with political censorship, at a meeting attended by L. B. Kamenev, I. V. Stalin, L. D. Trotsky, V. M. Molotov and M. I. Kalinin, considered the question "On political censorship" raised by L. B. Kamenev, at which it was decided: "Instruct Comrade Radek to examine the state of affairs with censorship, both military and civil, and report his conclusions to the Politburo!" The author of this work has no information about how the examination took place and what conclusions were made by K. B. Radek, as well as when the Politburo was reported on the implementation of this resolution and what measures were taken. But, I think this was the beginning of further actions of the Bolshevik Party and the Soviet government in this direction. Soon, in June 1922, the main censorship body of the country was created - the Main Directorate for Literature and Publishing (Glavlit) under the People's Commissariat of Education of the RSFSR with local structural units. "But at the same time, he was subordinate to the People's Commissariat of Education quite formally, constantly emphasizing his independence and dependence exclusively on party bodies"<sup>2</sup>.

The criteria by which certain manuscripts and publications could be banned were determined even earlier. Glavlit forbade publishing

I RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 244. L. 4. 2 Zelenov M. V. Apparatus of the Central Committee of the RCP (6) - VKP (b) ... S. 19.

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materials: 1. Containing agitation and propaganda against the Soviet regime. 2. Disclosing military secrets. 3. Exciting public opinion through false reports. 4. Exciting national and religious strife, 5. Bearing a pornographic nature. As you can see, the set of prohibitions is more than traditional in many countries to this day.

Along the party line, the censorship policy was carried out by the Agitation and Propaganda Department of the Central Committee. In the same year, 1922, a very important and principled decision was made at the highest party level. So, on October 6, 1922, under the auspices of the Central Committee, a meeting of representatives of the censorship was held, chaired by A.S. Bubnov. At this meeting, among others, the issue of censorship was considered. Having considered the current state of affairs, it was decided: "To recognize as necessary the transition from a preliminary to a punitive form of censorship. To develop the exact text of the resolution and detail this issue, create a commission consisting of: vols. Meshcheryakov, Etingof, Lebedev-Polyansky. Complete the commission's work within a week!

In some, the most important cases, the Central Committee of the RCP (6) reacted to the facts of disclosure of secret information by creating representative commissions to analyze what happened and take appropriate organizational and administrative measures, as was the case, for example, after the publication of information not subject to disclosure on the State Planning Commission at the end of 1922. In this case, the commission consisting of V.V. Kuibyshev, G.M. Krzhizhanovsky, G.L. Pyatakov, N.P. develop the issue of the procedure for publishing "particularly sensitive and



"questionable" information relating to an agency and how that agency exercises control over such press releases. The convocation of the commission was entrusted to VV Kuibyshev?. As a result, the commission developed a "List of Decrees of the Presidium of the State Planning Committee Not to be Printed" directly related to Gosplan documents and a "Procedure for Publication of Information" common to all departments<sup>3</sup>. In the developed lists, it was noted that in order to determine the economic and military interests of the RSFSR, to determine what is not subject to publication, be guided by the List of information constituting a secret and not subject to distribution, developed by the commission of the Central Committee. Supervision and responsibility for the publication of information violating the political, economic and military interests of the RSFSR should be assigned to Glavlit,

I RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 84. D. 311. L. 5. 2 See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 329. L. 8. 3 See ibid. L. 6-7.

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which was supposed to extend its activities to all publications of state bodies. For the possibility of exercising control on the part of Glavlit, certain organizational measures were planned. Thus, all people's commissars had to appoint a responsible representative, without whose visa the information coming from this department could not be published. Glavlit previously provided these representatives with a list of information not to be disseminated. Responsible representatives of departments associated with Glavlit, if necessary, had to provide him with an additional list of information violating the interests of the state or department in connection with the operation carried out by this department (seasonal ban, etc.). This additional (seasonal) "List of Information Prohibited for Publication", after approval by Glavlit, was reported to them in the editorial offices of newspapers and publishing houses, as well as to responsible persons of the people's commissariats. All the editorial offices of newspapers and publications singled out a representative responsible for publishing information that goes without a visa of responsible representatives of departments and information provided for by the list or reported additionally by Glavlit, as well as information "particularly delicate or dubious concerning any department". In case of doubt, agencies were advised to apply for permission from Glavlit. In conclusion, it was noted that all of the listed organizational measures imply a corresponding reorganization and strengthening of Glavlit!.

The change in the situation associated with the end of the Civil War also required a change in attitude towards military, state and party secrets, already in relatively peacetime. At a meeting of representatives of censorship on October 23, 1922, the issue of preparing a military list for censorship was raised. This meeting was attended by: from the Agitprop of the Central Committee - Ya. A. Yakovlev, I. V. Vardin; from the GPU - Ashmarin; from Glavlit - N. L. Meshcheryakov, B. E. Etingof; from the State Publishing House - P. I. Lebedev-Polyansky; from the newspapers "News of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee" - Lithuanian; "Working Moscow" - B. M. Volin; "Economic Life" - Stoklinsky?. Further, this issue was submitted to a meeting of the heads of departments of the Central Committee. On November 2, 1922, it was considered, along with other issues related to censorship, Glavlit and ROSTA. As a result, at a meeting of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the RCP (6) on November 10, 1922, the issue of censorship was heard, reported by the head of the Agitation and Propaganda Department of the Central Committee A.S. Bubnov. As a result, the meeting adopted the following resolution: "1. Instruct the commissions composed of TT. Bubnova, Vardina (Agitprop of the Central Committee), But

ÿ See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 329. L. 6-7. 2 See ibid. F. 17. Op. 112. D. 385. L. 100.

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Vitsky (Press), Etingof (Censorship) and Ingulov (Central Committee of the press workers) to revise the military list of censorship within ten days. Commissions to involve in the work of responsible representatives of departments (members of the party). Convocation of the Commission for Comrade. Bubnov. 2. Strengthen the Heads of Lito with 5 communist workers!

The result of the work of the commission was the publication of a secret "List of information constituting a secret and not subject to distribution"<sup>2</sup>. Further, the list was presented by A.S. Bubnov at a meeting of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the People's Commissariat of Culture (6) on December 14, 1922, at which it was decided: "To take note of the report. The commission's work is considered completed. This list determined information constituting the state secret of the RSFSR of a military and economic nature, not subject to publication in two sections: in wartime and in peacetime. We do not know if it managed to reach the execution of the censorship authorities, but it was the last list of the RSFSR, since the Soviet Union was soon formed and it was necessary to develop a union list. But, it should be noted that the last list of the RSFSR was taken as the basis for compiling the first list of the USSR. So at the meeting of the Secretariat of the Central Committee on May 25, 1923, the composition of the commission for the revision of the list was approved, chaired by V.I. Narbut. "To revise the list of information constituting a secret and not subject to disclosure in the press, form a commission in the following composition: Chairman Comrade Narbut; members tt. Lebedev - Polyansky (Glavlit), Ingulov (Press Bureau), Danilov (Revolutionary Military Council), Bokia (GPU), Popov ("Pravda"), Vilensky-Sibiryakov ("Izvestia"), Volin ("Workers' Moscow"), Krumin ("Economic life"). The term of the commission is a week. As a result of the work of the commission, the first all-Union list was proposed to the Secretariat of the Central Committee for consideration. At a meeting of the Secretariat of the Central Committee on June 15, 1923, the following resolution was adopted: "a) No objection to the proposed "List of information constituting state secrets and not subject to publication in the press." 6) Submit the issue for resolution in the Soviet order"<sup>5</sup>.

As a result, after consideration of the issue in the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, from July 1, 1923, the first union list was put into effect. There were minor changes in the new list. The differences were mainly in the editorial

1 See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 112. D. 385. L. 4.

2 See Kurenkov G. A. 1922 What was a state and military secret in the RSFSR // Domestic archives. 1993. No. 6. S. 80-86.

3 RGASPI. F.17. Op. 112. D. 397. L. 6.

4 Ibid. F. 17. Op. 112. D. 452. L. 6.

5 RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 112. D. 456. L. 4.

6 See ibid. LL. 40-46.

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and connecting individual paragraphs. Most of the editions were in section "B" - "in wartime." Information, mainly of an economic nature, was removed from the list. For example, such as: On the estimates of the State Planning Commission; conclusions of the Presidium of the State Planning Committee on export and import plans (but the conclusions on the export-import plan of the USSR as a whole remained); on the reorganization of people's commissariats, on the distribution of appropriations for agriculture; conclusions of the Presidium of the State Planning Commission on specific issues of industrial immigration; major changes in financial policy; conclusions on the work of the sections of the State Planning Commission. This information was no longer secret, but it was allowed to print them only with the consent of the Presidium of the State Planning Commission, the STO, the Council of People's Commissars. Excluded from the union list and made public (but with the permission of the relevant head of industry) criticism of the economic bodies, which was recognized as necessary, but without undermining the authority of the economic bodies; information on court cases and audit cases after their completion; information about the clashes between the authorities and the peasants in the collection of the tax in kind and all the ensuing circumstances; digital data on the disabled and wounded of the RSFSR; information about foreign policy steps without the consent of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. As already noted, items of an economic nature related to the jurisdiction of the State Planning Commission were removed from the all-Union list. But this does not mean that they were completely declassified. This information was included in the "List of resolutions of the Presidium of the State Planning Committee that are not subject to publication" previously adopted by the commission of V. V. Kuibyshev specifying

the section of the list "In wartime", with the permission of the RVSR, issues of the naval budget were introduced; on the condition and availability of spare parts and preparation of the reserve.

Thus, in the union list, information of a military and political nature remained secret, but some economic information was subject to departmental restrictions. It should be noted that the all-Union list was somewhat "democratic" compared to the list of the RSFSR, which was determined by the end of the Civil War. But, it should be noted that already two years later: "by the summer of 1925, a new, more complete and developed "List of information constituting a secret and not subject to distribution in the USSR in order to preserve the political and economic interests of the USSR" was created. .. After Glavlit submitted this next list to the Press Department of the Central Committee, it was approved in the Press Department with one amendment, which was reported to Glavlit on June 6, 1925! This was one of the ways in which the Bolshevik Party directed the censorship

ÿ See Zelenov M.V. Apparatus of the Central Committee of the RCP (6) - VKP (6) ... S. 203.

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policy in terms of protecting information in the media. In principle, according to the information from the above lists, one can quite definitely and specifically judge what was a state secret in the RSFSR - USSR until the mid-1920s? Comparing the information from these Lists with the specific political situation, we can try to answer the question of how justified the classification of this or that information was. In our opinion, the classification of most of the information in the listed lists, at that historical moment, was politically and economically expedient and justified.

The problem of disclosing secret information of a military nature through printed publications, especially during the years of the New Economic Policy, when the work of private publishing houses was allowed, naturally, due to the performance of their functions, worried the state security agencies. So "F. E. Dzerzhinsky was concerned that information constituting state or military secrets would not leak into the press. When, in 1923, articles about the Red Army appeared in some newspapers, which gave a description of its combat strength, organization, quartering places and other information of interest to the enemy, he sounded the alarm. In agreement with the Revolutionary Military Council, Felix Edmundovich ordered the organs of the GPU to take decisive measures to ensure the preservation of state and military secrets. From now on, it was allowed to publish in the open press only articles that contained information of a general nature, without specifying a specific military unit or subdivision!

Simultaneously with the new list, the commission chaired by V.I. The document confirmed the entry into force with | | July 1923 "List of information constituting state secrets and not subject to publication". All previously issued decrees of a secret nature on censorship with the approval of a new list were considered annulled. Supervision and responsibility for the publication of information that violated the political, economic and military interests of the USSR were assigned to Glavlit. Glavlit's activities extended to all publications, both private and private-legal (cooperative), as well as state-owned. Glavlit was given the exclusive right in emergency cases to apply temporary additions to the list caused by the need, with their subsequent introduction within 24 hours for approval by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. It was also decided to create as part of the Heads

1 F. E. Dzerzhinsky. Biography. L. 279.

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litas a special secretariat with night duty for communication with interested departments and editorial boards!. Glavlit was entrusted with control and responsibility for the publication

information that is not subject to disclosure throughout the country. Thus, it became the highest state censorship instance, with certain rights and functions, thus, departmental disunity in censorship was overcome.

Along with the general and departmental lists of information not subject to publication, there were other censorship documents of a similar restrictive nature, including those relating to Glavlit itself, the decision on which also passed through the highest party bodies. So, for example, following the decisions of the Orgburo, on November 22, 1922, Glavlit sent for approval to the Central Committee the composition of the editorial board of the Secret Bulletin of Glavlit. This letter was addressed to the head of Agitrop of the Central Committee, A.S. Bubnov, who submitted consideration of this issue to a meeting of the heads of departments of the Central Committee. At this meeting, the composition of the editorial board was considered, consisting of Ashmarin (head of the foreign department of Glavlit - representative of the GPU), I.V. . The composition of the editorial board was finally approved by the Secretariat of the Central Committee on December 7, 1922.

The absence of a law that legally regulated the work of the press organs entailed certain difficulties and departmental anarchy, when the department itself, based on its own understanding, determined the procedure for publishing information. There was no general law on the press in the state. The solution of this important issue became the subject of discussion of the Central Committee. So substantiated the need for the adoption of this law, head. In a letter to the Secretariat of the Central Committee on November 21, 1922, I.V. Vardin, a sub-department of the press of the Agitprop of the Central Committee, wrote: "A law on the press is especially necessary at the present time in order to ensure the freedom of the workers' press and its workers. The persecution of members of the press, which (for example, the assassination of the worker correspondent Spiridonov) has lately taken on a mass character, can only be stopped if the press receives legislative protection.\* On the other hand, the law on the press will have to provide for and punish mercilessly any abuse of the press\* \* (malicious lies, slander, insinuations, etc.).

\* The emphasis is underlined by IV Vardin.

\*\* The emphasis is underlined by IV Vardin.

1 RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 112. D. 456. L. 38.

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The law must be based on the resolutions and circulars of the congresses and the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party. The development and publication of the law is desirable, if possible, before the All-Russian Congress of Soviets!

State protection, protection by law always implies certain regulation, restrictions and sanctions for violation of the rules stipulated by this law, which all legal and physical subjects of law are obliged to comply with. During the period under review, the mechanism for making state decisions on censorship policy was such that the decisions of the party were taken as a basis, and then carried out in the state order. In order to comply with the formal passage of the legislative initiative and the adoption of a state decision, this issue had to be considered at the Soviet level. At that time, it was common practice to pass and consider issues, first by the party, and then by the state order, or vice versa. Many state issues were taken, for example, by joint decisions of the Central Committee of the party and the Council of People's Commissars. So, specifically on this issue, at a meeting of the heads of departments of the Central Committee on November 21, 1921, the head of the Agitprop of the Central Committee A.S. Vardin "2. As a result, the question "On the fundamental law of the press" was considered at a meeting of the Secretariat of the Central Committee, at which a decision was made: "Submit the question in the Soviet order"3. In party documents of that time, the word "Soviet" was identical to the word "state". It can be seen from the above that, formally, this was a joint decision of the party and the government. Along with the decision to move from a preliminary to a punitive form of censorship, the adoption of the law on the press strengthened the positions

Bolsheviks and the state as a whole in this matter. By the adoption of this law, the control of the state and the party over the press was actually and legally fixed.

An important side of the issue in determining the degree of secrecy of information, as in any professional field, it was necessary to determine the terminology. So, in March 1925, on behalf of the Central Committee, the Special Department of the OGPU and Glavlit developed and defined the terminology for deciphering the restrictive stamps of issued departmental publications. Two types of information were identified: unclassified, which included stamps: "as a manuscript" and "not

subject to

1 RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 112. D. 390. L. 77. 2 Ibid. L. 76. 3 Ibid. L. 3.

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Shenia" and secret: vultures - "secret" and "top secret". The content of the vultures (what they meant) was also revealed, and the places for printing secret publications were determined. Moreover, the vultures "secret" and "top secret" were presented as material interpreting in general the issues provided for by the nomenclature of secret correspondence published by the Special Department of the OGPU! As a result, the letter of the Special Department of the OGPU was sent to the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), all people's commissariats and central institutions for execution.

In August 1926, the Special Department of the OGPU specified information that was not subject to disclosure and prepared an indicative list of "top secret", "secret" and "issues not subject to disclosure"<sup>2</sup>. Issues of a military nature were divided into "top secret" and "secret", financial and economic issues were divided into "secret" and "not subject to disclosure". Questions of a political nature were singled out according to special provisions. These included, in particular, the correspondence of party organs and other secret party documents. "Top secret", for example, were information reports and reviews of the OGPU and other supervisory bodies - only 10 points, "secret" ~ also 10 points. Information about unrest and White Guard and foreign literature were considered "not subject to disclosure". Letters "A", "B" and "C", respectively, received this information in secret office work. After receiving these documents for execution, it became much easier for the censorship authorities, without introducing initiative, to control, prevent distribution and punish (recall the transition from preliminary to punitive caesura) for possible cases of leakage of secret information into the press. For this, a regulatory and legal framework for the work of censorship bodies was created.

Work on maintaining secrecy in the press, in general, as well as on individual issues and directions, continued to be the subject of discussions and decisions of the Central Committee, especially when it came to information about the military or military-industrial potential of the country. So, at the end of 1925 - beginning of 1926, the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic approved the minutes of the interdepartmental meeting on the encryption of the location of military plants of the state administration of the military industry. It was necessary to revise the decree on censorship of information from military factories. Therefore, at a meeting of the Secretariat of the Central Committee on June 18, 1926, the issue of revising the directive to the control authorities on censorship of information from military factories was considered, at which it was decided

1 See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 84. D. 1004. L. 26-26v. 2 See ibid. F. 17. Op. 85. D. 170. L. 13-18.

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wili: "a) Recognize it necessary to revise the resolution approved by the RVSR on censorship of information from military factories in the spirit of providing the possibility of coverage in the press of party and everyday life, cultural and educational work of military factories, in order, however, to ensure absolute secrecy of those aspects of the work of factories that require this secrecy. 6) Entrust Comrade Unshlikht

within a 2-week period, agree on the final text of the directive to the control bodies on this issue by the Secretariat of the Central Committee! On June 28, 1926, Unshlikht, Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR, submitted to the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6) Kosior for approval a draft clarification for the control press on the encryption of the location of factories of the Main Directorate of the military industry with a list of encrypted factories. Unshlikht believed that this project would only be of real significance if the new encrypted plant names were approved. At a meeting of the Secretariat on August 13, 1926, a draft directive was considered with clarifications on this issue<sup>2</sup>. As a result, the Secretariat of the Central Committee decided: "Do not object to Unshlikht's proposal on directives to the censorship authorities, as well as the encryption of the names of factories"<sup>3</sup>. And two days later, on August 15, the Central Committee, by its resolution, finally resolved the issue of the procedure for publishing in the press information relating to the factories of the military industry. The head of the special department of the OGPU and at the same time the representative of the Revolutionary Military Council in Glavlit, G. Boki, was sent this resolution in order to be able to give the Glavlit the necessary instructions and eliminate the existing ambiguities. A further solution to the issue of defense enterprises was continued in the Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6) of May 26, 1934 "On Defense Plants", the order of the People's Commissar of Heavy Industry S. Ordzhonikidze "On the organization and procedure for hiring workers, employees and engineers for special Important Defense Plants", a joint order of the OGPU and the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry "On streamlining and strengthening the security of military industry plants", as well as in the regulation "On security and the regime of passes at military industry plants"<sup>4</sup>.

The Central Committee and the OGPU constantly monitored the materials of the foreign press. Thus, "All publications coming to the Soviet Union from the capitalist countries were viewed by censorship, over the work of which F. E. Dzerzhinsky exercised constant personal control. He asked to examine and report on viewing foreign

1 RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 113. D. 219. L. 46.

2 See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 113. D. 219. L. 42.

3 Ibid. L. 3.

4 See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 945. L. 3, 61-72.

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mail, about the state of affairs, about the successes achieved, about what was discovered, and also how large foreign mail is in general by type of transfer. On March 13, 1921, Felix Edmundovich wrote to V. R. Menzhinsky: "We have several censors for publishing information about events. But it would be useful if you took it upon yourself to convene a meeting to resolve this issue! The author of the work did not set the task of revealing all aspects related to the distribution of foreign literature in the RSFSR - USSR in this period, but I would like to note the adoption by the highest government and party bodies of some organizational and administrative measures related to this issue. These are, first of all, restrictive and prohibitive measures. So the Bolsheviks banned all White Guard and counter-revolutionary publications, and also determined a new procedure for the import and distribution of foreign literature and publications. All these issues were regulated by decrees of the Soviet government and party decisions. So, for example, on February 2, 1922, a decree of the Council of People's Commissars was adopted from

"On the procedure for the acquisition of foreign literature by state institutions." On February 10, 1922, the Organizing Bureau decided: "1) The admission of all foreign newspapers to Russia is considered premature. 2) Allow for free circulation in Russia: a) periodicals published abroad com. parties and socialist groups or organizations sympathetic to communism and Soviet power. 3) To entrust the compilation of the list of these publications to the NKID and 6) books and journals of scientific and technical content"<sup>2</sup>. The decision of the Organizing Bureau confirmed the prohibition of importation and receipt of White Guard literature for the masses, but it was allowed to receive it for a narrow circle of users - members of the Central Committee, members

Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, people's commissars and members of the boards of people's commissariats, the ECCI, the GPU, the GIZ, the Intelligence Agency, the editorial offices of communist newspapers in Moscow and Leningrad, and some individuals personally. As you can see, the final decision was not for Glavlit or the OGPU, but for the Orgburo. Thus, all foreign literature and information from the foreign and white émigré press that came to Soviet Russia and the USSR was strictly rationed. The right to receive this information could only be the highest functionaries of the party and the state, as well as responsible employees according to the nomenklatura principle. This information was considered secret with all the ensuing restrictions on its receipt and responsibility for its use. In the Central Committee, for example, there were special divisions that were in charge of distributing such information. Mostly foreign and white émigré press was presented

ÿ See F. E. Dzerzhinsky. Biography. P. 280. 2 See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 112. D. 287. L. 3, 33.

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users in the form of summaries and bulletins. Work with these sources was strictly regulated. So there were certain instructions on the procedure for obtaining, using and storing White Guard literature! This literature, for example, until 1927 was obtained only with the permission of Glavlit through Litizdat of the NKID. The list of users within institutions was determined by the head of the institution. Once every six months, the used publications were handed over to the Political Control Department of the OGPU for disposal. Control over compliance with the rules for the use of these publications was assigned to the secret parts of institutions. Those guilty of non-compliance with the requirements of the instructions could be subject to party and even judicial responsibility. At the beginning of 1927, the Information Department of the Central Committee initiated in the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6) the question of the procedure for the storage and use of the White émigré press and presented a draft of new rules, which were approved at a meeting of the Secretariat on March 4, 1927. The rules for use and storage became stricter. In the same year, the Secretariat of the Central Committee, by its decree of May 27, approved the list of senior officials of the apparatus of the CPSU (6) to receive another document not subject to disclosure - the TASS bulletin "Not for Print", which contained 50 people

Thus, it can be stated that only a narrow circle of responsible party and Soviet workers, party members, had the right to receive foreign literature. It was believed that these were people who were especially hardened in a political sense. Ordinary party members, not to mention non-party members, in 1920-1930. this information was not provided and was considered anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda.

In 1930, in order to strengthen control over literature, the press, radio broadcasting and public speaking, reorganize the publishing business in the center, and grow the grassroots press and broadcasting, it was decided to reorganize Glavlit. It was necessary to free the central office of Glavlit from any operational work on the preview of printed material. The institute of commissioners, which was being created, was to become the main link in the field of preliminary control over literature, radio broadcasting, etc. Moreover, the entire preview of the printed material had to be carried out in the publishing houses themselves, which were obliged to ensure the maintenance of the necessary staff of authorized Glavlit. In district newspapers, the editors of the newspapers themselves could be commissioners.

1 See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 85. D. 170. L. 117-118. 2 See ibid. F. 17. Op. 113. D. 270. L. 14. 3 See Ibid. F. 17. Op. 113. D. 296. L. 18.

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According to the decision of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of September 6, 1930, the decision on the issue "On Glavlit" was submitted to the Politburo. The Politburo, in turn, instructed the People's Commissariat for Education to reorganize Glavlit within two weeks. The meaning of the reorganization was that, having freed itself from preliminary work, entrusting it to authorized representatives, the apparatus of Glavlit

retained the main functions, such as: general unification of all types of censorship, general leadership and inspection of subordinate bodies and authorized representatives, subsequent control over published literature both from the political-ideological and military-economic points of view, permission and prohibition of publications and publishing houses, issuing rules and orders to ensure the requirements of the party and the government in the field of censorship, considering appeals against decisions of bodies and authorized representatives of Glavlit, developing, together with other departments, lists of information that are, in their content, a specially protected state secret, compiling reviews of the literature and the phenomena taking place in it, bringing to justice those guilty of violating the requirements of Glavlit and its bodies in the field of censorship, submitting to the NCP for approval and removal of commissioners and heads of krooblits, providing editors and editors for approval by the NCP editorial board!. At the same time, control was strengthened and the procedure for publishing documents of the highest bodies of the party was regulated, for example, on December 30, 1934, a resolution of the Orgburo of the Central Committee "On the procedure for publishing and covering in the press the decisions of the Orgburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee" was issued.

The aggravation of the international situation, the increased interest in military issues in the press, required the party and the Soviet government to pay closer attention to military censorship. Thus, according to the decision of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee "On military censorship" of September 19, 1933, military censorship is separated into an independent body - the Office of the Commissioner of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR for the protection of military secrets in the press, directly subordinate to the government of the USSR. B. M. Volin, who in the 1920s was the editor of the newspaper Rabochaya Moskva, was approved as the authorized representative. The Glavlit RSFSR group on military censorship was separated into an independent department under the Plenipotentiary Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. In the Union republics, under the chiefs of Glavlit, departments for military censorship were created, which were also subordinate to the Commissioner of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. B. M. Volin, together with the Revolutionary Military Council and the OGPU, was instructed to prepare and publish instructions for the protection of military secrets, unified for all Union republics, within two decades. By the decision of the Politburo of December 5, 1933, a resolution was approved

ÿ See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 114. D. 185. L. 6-7.

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decision of the Council of People's Commissars on the release of 49,730 rubles from the reserve fund of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR for the maintenance of the apparatus authorized for military censorship at the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR!.

In personnel and political terms, the censorship bodies, in 1918-1941, also depended on the Central Committee. So, for example, on the party line, the Kultprop of the Central Committee and B. M. Volin, together with the Central Committee of the national communist parties, regional committees, regional committees, were instructed to review the entire personal composition of workers for the protection of military secrets in all republics and regions within a month. The Central Committee recommended that persons who, in the opinion of the committees, do not meet the requirements for employees of these bodies, be released from work and strengthened with seasoned party members and qualified workers. It was especially important that the entire personnel of the departments for the protection of military secrets was considered to be in active military service, with the ensuing rights, duties and responsibilities? On the one hand, this spoke of a rather high social status for that time, and on the other hand, to a certain extent, it limited personal freedom.

Employees of other censorship bodies were also not military, but "service" people. Since 1937 newspaper censors have been introduced into the party nomenklatura. So, in the resolution of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of October 21, 1937 "On the censors of the central, republican, regional, regional and district newspapers" it was said: "1. Include in the nomenclature of workers approved by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (6) censors of central newspapers. 2. Include in the nomenclature workers approved by the Central Committee of the National Communist Parties, regional committees and regional committees, censors of republican, regional and regional newspapers. 3. The censors of regional newspapers are approved by the district committees of the party. 4. To the Department of Press and Publishing Houses of the Central Committee, within a month, submit the censors of central newspapers for approval by the Central Committee. 5. Oblige regional committees, regional committees and the Central Committ



of the National Communist Parties to complete their work with the approval of the censorship within two decades and to notify the press and publishing department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6) about the results of the work done.

At the beginning of 1940, grass-roots censorship bodies were strengthened with cadres. In February 1940, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6) obliges the Central Committees of the national communist parties of the republics, regional committees and regional committees to staff local censorship bodies with "members and candidates for such work which had to be approved by the Bureau of the respective party committees. It was also established that the district committees did not have the right to remove and transfer authorized Glavlit to another

1 See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 935. L.9. 2 See *ibid.* F. 17. Op. 3. D. 930. L. 6. 3 RGASPI F. 17. Op. 114. D. 631. L. 46.

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I do work without the sanction of the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the Union Republics, the regional committees and regional committees of the CPSU (6)!

Work on the protection of state secrets in the press was especially relevant in the pre-war period, when it became clear that war, in general, could not be avoided. At a time when the threat of war was growing, and in Europe and Asia it was in full swing, it was especially important to keep military and economic secrets. The facts of the disclosure of secret information in the press required an even more thorough approach to this problem. Due to these circumstances, just before the war, a commission was created to develop rules for the protection of state (military and economic) secrets in the press. The composition of the commission was impressive. The members of the commission were A. A. Zhdanov, A. S. Shcherbakov, G. M. Malenkov, A. A. Andreev, L. Z. Mekhlis. On May 30, 1941, at a meeting of the Secretariat of the Central Committee, a draft of the rules was presented. The Secretariat instructed the Department of Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6) to send and request feedback on the project from the people's commissariats of Defense, Navy, Foreign Affairs, Internal Affairs and State Security and submit the project to the Secretariat of the Central Committee by June 10, 1941 as amended 2. The author of the work has no information about whether these rules, together with the amendments of the People's Commissariats, were submitted by June 10 or even by the beginning of the war, whether they were changed taking into account wartime, whether the censorship authorities were approved and guided by these rules, but the fact The drafting of these rules spoke of the concern of the party and the government with the problem of protecting state secrets in the press and in the mass media in general before the war, when its threat was clearly felt.

Thus, it can be stated that the problem of protecting state and party secrets in the media arose almost immediately after the formation of the Soviet state. The facts of the disclosure of secret information through the press and radio messages reached the top leaders of the party and government. It was necessary to create certain bodies and apparatus to carry out the censorship policy. The general leadership and control over this activity was to be carried out by the Central Committee of the party. From the beginning of the 1920s, the Main Directorate for Literature and Publishing under the People's Commissariat of Education (Glavlit) became the main censorship body of the country, by decision of the party. The author of this work set the task of showing the censorship activities of the Central Committee and the party from the point of view of organizing and carrying out activities to protect the party-state

ÿ See *ibid.* F. 17. Op. 116. D. 29. L. 135. 2 See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 116. D. 93. L. 1.

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secrets in the press, as one of the activities of the RCP(b) - VKP(b) and the state to protect secret information, as well as to show the implementation mechanism and the level of decisions made. In this sense, the creation of Glavlit was an organizational formalization of the censorship policy of the Bolsheviks in the field of protection and dissemination of information. Issues of censorship were considered and resolved at the highest party and state levels.

One of the areas of activity for the protection of military and economic secrets was also the development under the leadership of the RCP (b) - VKP (6) of fundamental, normative and regulatory documents for censorship, such as lists of information constituting a secret and not subject to publication, various kinds instructions and rules. The first list was created during the Civil War, in wartime conditions. In connection with the end of the war, at the end of 1922, the question arises of creating a list focused not only on wartime, but also on peacetime. Such a list was developed, and it also became the basis for the creation of the first all-Union list of 1923, and then the list of 1925. To develop such fundamental documents for the censorship authorities, by decision of the Central Committee, commissions were created, as a rule, from representatives of the Agitprop of the Central Committee, Glavlit, the press, the Revolutionary Military Council, and the OGPU. The submitted lists were approved by the Central Committee, and then sent for further processing and putting into effect by the Soviet order. Only after that they entered into force and were sent to the censorship authorities for guidance in the work. Classification was subject not only to information of a military and economic nature, but of a certain political and ideological nature. All this was determined by the historical and political moment, the specifics of the state structure and the essence of the class and internal party struggle.

Along with the general lists, other censored documents, including departmental lists, passed through the Central Committee. These are, for example, the "List of Decrees of the Presidium of the State Planning Commission that are not subject to publication", approved by the Central Committee in 1923, as well as "Development of questions on the procedure for publishing information of any department, methods for exercising control over such messages in the press", "Instruction on the development of issues in the order of publishing information that is not subject to disclosure in the press", "The Secret Bulletin of Glavlit", "On censorship of information from military factories" and others.

Directly under the leadership of the Central Committee, a basic law on the press was developed, the adoption of which legally streamlined the work of publishing houses and censorship bodies. The law was based on the resolutions and circulars of the RCP (6), which reflected the real situation and

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the importance of the party in the state structure of the country. In 1930, in connection with the reorganization of the publishing business, Glavlit was also reorganized. The central apparatus was freed from the preview of printed material and this function was assigned to the established institute of authorized Glavlit in publications. Glavlit was left with general management and basic functions. In order to strengthen military censorship, on September 19, 1933, the Politburo approved a resolution on the basis of which the apparatus of the Commissioner of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR for the protection of military secrets in the press was created with its structure throughout the country. Thus, a unified instruction for the protection of military secrets was developed. Employees of military censorship bodies became servicemen. Thus, military censorship was separated from other censorship structures and became an independent body, which increased its importance and status in the prewar decade. In December 1934, a resolution of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee was issued concerning the procedure for publishing and purely party documents - resolutions of the Organizing Bureau and the Secretariat of the Central Committee. This resolution determined the rule for the publication of documents of some of the most important higher party organs. Before the Great Patriotic War, by a decision of the Central Committee, the censors of the central republican, regional, regional and district newspapers were introduced into the party nomenclature, approved by the party committees of the appropriate level. In February 1940, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (6) instructed local party committees to "strengthen local censorship bodies with verified party cadres", their transfer, dismissal, etc. henceforth it was allowed only with the approval of the party committees. Thus, the Bolsheviks exercised leadership and control over the activities of the censorship bodies not only as an organ of the party and state administration directly, but also through staffing. Most of the employees not only were, but also had to be members of the party, representing not only a state shield from the leakage of military and economic secrets, but also cutting off ideological and political information of an undesirable orientation, thereby pursuing the official line of the party. This was then seen as a combination and unity of state and party interests. The last, before the Great Father

A civil war, an undertaking by the party and the state to protect party-state secrets, was the development of rules for the protection of state (military and economic) secrets in the press. The commission, chaired by A. A. Zhdanov, was instructed to submit the draft rules to the Secretariat of the Central Committee for approval by June 10, 1941.

As a result, we can draw a quite definite conclusion that the ongoing censorship policy of the party, among other things, was one

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from the areas of activity for the protection of classified information. In order to carry out measures to ensure secrecy in the press and other mass media, bodies and means were created to carry out this activity, a legal and regulatory framework was developed, and personnel were selected and placed. Thus, the Bolsheviks exercised complete control over information and protected not only purely party, but also state secrets and interests. All more or less significant issues in this area were resolved at the highest party level. What was a secret in the Soviet state during this period can be judged from the lists of information constituting state secrets and not subject to publication, developed in the early 1920s, and other documents for censorship. Moreover, all issues related to censorship, regardless of who was the initiator, whether they came from the state or party instance, were first discussed and approved by the Central Committee of the party and only with a positive result were transferred to the decision of the state authorities. In order. In fact, the decisions of the Central Committee were taken not only as a basis, but also for strict implementation. All issues related to the protection of state and political secrets in the press and other media were resolved by the party in close cooperation with the state security agencies, which exercise overall control over the work to protect information.

## 2.7. INTERACTION OF THE PARTY COMMITTEES WITH THE AUTHORITIES OF THE VChK - NKGB TO ENSURE THE PROTECTION OF INFORMATION

The protection of classified information in the state as a whole, first of all, is entrusted to special state security agencies. Despite the fact that the protection of state secrets is one of the prerogatives of the state, it was specific that under the existing system of state structure in Soviet Russia - the Soviet Union, the main decisions on the protection of information were made and approved first at the party, and only then implemented at the state level. That is, the Bolshevik Party was controlled not only through the party apparatus, but also through it, as well as through state structures. The state security agencies in Soviet Russia - the USSR, being one of the structures of the executive power, implemented decisions on the protection of information taken at the highest party-state level. But there was also movement in the opposite direction. The state security organs were the initiators of many questions concerning their competence to protect information and then submitted for consideration and approval to the highest bodies of the party. After the decision was made by the highest party organs, the party committees themselves had to fulfill the instructions of the state security organs. And those, in turn, were obliged to check their execution.

From the very beginning of their existence, the state security organs of the Soviet republic were, according to the figurative expression of V. I. Lenin, "an armed detachment of the party." "The Cheka has been created, exists and works," noted the Central Committee of the RCP (6) in an address to all communists - employees of emergency commissions, "only as direct organs of couples

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Tii, according to her directives and under her control! The Bolsheviks with pre-revolutionary underground party experience were at the head of the Cheka. F. E. Dzerzhinsky, being a member of the Central Committee, acted exclusively on the directives of the Central Committee of the RCP (6). From the very beginning of its existence, the highest bodies of the party and the provincial party committees regularly considered issues

associated with the activities of the VChK. So, after the formation of the Politburo in April 1919, at almost every meeting, which took place twice a week, it resolved issues that were directly related to the security agencies. Only from May 1918 to 1920 inclusive, they were 26 times on the agenda of meetings of the Central Committee and joint meetings of the Politburo and the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (6)<sup>2</sup>. So, for example, already on May 3, 1919, Dzerzhinsky submitted a proposal to the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (6) that a representative of the Special Department of the Cheka monthly report on the fight against counter-revolution and espionage in the Red Army directly to the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee. This proposal was accepted.

One of the directions of counterintelligence work to suppress the activities of counterrevolutionary organizations and foreign intelligence services was the protection of secret information from unauthorized access by organizing measures to maintain secrecy and carrying out secret security measures. In this work, in the previous chapters, quite a lot of examples of interaction between party and state security agencies in the field of information security were presented. Naturally, the problem of maintaining secrecy and protecting information was of great concern to the country's leadership. This was in the interests of both the party and the country as a whole. In the early 1920s, towards the end of the Civil War, when Soviet power was already firmly established in the center of Russia, but hostilities continued on the outskirts, the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars carried out a number of organizational measures to protect information. So, on May 5, 1921, by order of the Small Council of People's Commissars, a Special Department was created under the Cheka (then the OGPU). But he actually did not submit to the leadership of the security agencies, enjoyed autonomy and was under the control of the party. Moreover, the Central Committee insisted that the head of the Special Department should be a member of the Collegium of the Cheka.

One of the main functions of this unit was to protect state and party secrets from disclosure and leakage of information, to control the conduct of secret files

ÿ Quoted from the Red Book of the Cheka. T. 1. S. 10. 2 Citation. There.

<sup>3</sup> F.E. Dzerzhinsky. Biography. S. 171.

<sup>4</sup> See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 84. D. 176. L. 37.

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leadership, both in party bodies and in Soviet institutions and departments. In addition, the task of the Special Department (SPECO) was to work on cryptography and cryptanalysis, protect information by technical means (encryption, decryption), and carry out intelligence and counterintelligence activities. Employees of the Special Department compiled ciphers for party and state institutions both for work inside the country and abroad. The special department also carried out checks of cipher units, and carried out training of cryptographers. So, for example, in 1923, cipher-coders of the Central Committee of the RCP (6) studied at the cipher-file courses. The courses were taught by the 3rd branch of the Special Department of the OGPU. Cryptographers of all institutions of the country reported directly to the Special Department. The work on deciphering foreign ciphers, as noted in a number of works, was carried out by the Special Department at the proper level. On a monthly basis, he compiled summaries of deciphered telegrams for distribution to the heads of departments of the OGPU and members of the Central Committee.

The work of the department was classified. Employees were forbidden to talk about what institution and where they work, and their location. They were not allowed, for example, to visit restaurants in view of the fact that their conversations could be overheard. The first head of the department was Gleb Ivanovich Bokiy, a party member with underground experience since 1900, a participant in the revolutions of 1905 and 1917, who served twelve terms in tsarist prisons and was twice exiled to Siberia. In addition, being one of the leaders of the revolutionary underground in St. Petersburg, G. I. Bokiy gained vast experience in conspiratorial and organizational work,

rallied a group of reliable and competent associates around him. G. I. Boki led the Special Department for more than 15 years. Since the mid-1920s, G. I. Boki has been in opposition to I. V. Stalin. As a result of the political struggle, he was among the first victims of repression in the state security agencies. At the end of 1937, G. I. Boki and his deputy P. Kh. Kharkevich were shot!

The author of this work was not tasked to present the whole history of the Special Department, but only to highlight some aspects of the interaction of state security bodies with party bodies on issues of interest to us. But, nevertheless, I consider it expedient to briefly present the history of the Special Department and its successors in the period under review. Until 1936, the Special Department was part of the OGPU. Control over the conduct of secret office work, observance of the regime of secrecy and protection of state secrets was in charge (at the end of the 1920s) of the U department (head of the department Tsibizov)

ÿ See Anin B., Petrovich A. Radio espionage. pp. 252-259.

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Special department. According to the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of November 27, 1936, the Main Directorate of State Security was reorganized, and in its new structure (most likely from SPECO), after 1936, a Special (secret-encryption) department was created. By order of the NKVD of the USSR No. 00383 dated November 28, 1936, 10 departments were created on the basis of the Main Directorate. G. I. Boki was appointed head of the 9th Special Department. By order of the NKVD dated June 9, 1938, the head of the 9th Special Department (cipher) | Directorate of the NKVD was appointed captain of state security D. A. Balamutov. As you know, by decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of February 3, 1941, the NKVD was divided into independent NKVD and NKGB. The 5th encryption department was formed in the NKGB. In February 1941, the decryption section of the Special Department became part of one of the departments of the NKVD. On April 14, 1941, the famous "SMERSH" was formed, within which the 5th encryption and decryption department was

From the very beginning of the emergence of the Special Department, one of its functions was to check the observance of secrecy and keeping secret records in state institutions, departments and party committees of the RCP (b) - VKP (b), as well as to investigate, on behalf of the Central Committee, cases disclosure of secret information and loss of secret documents in party bodies, state structures and officials. At meetings of the Politburo and other higher party bodies, these facts served as the subject of detailed investigations. Investigations took place when information was received about the unfavorable state of affairs in the field of secrecy in the party committees.

The special department of the OGPU, together with the Secret Department of the Central Committee, also controlled the cadre of secret employees of the Central Committee and state structures and persons admitted to party state secrets. For example, in July 1923, the Special Department of the OGPU sent a secret circular to the Central Committee of the RCP (b), as well as to all people's commissariats and central departments, prohibiting contacts with foreign missions and with foreigners in general, employees of the secret parts of these institutions. The Special Department motivated this by the fact that: "... in every foreign mission and representative office there is a branch of foreign intelligence in Russia, and that the intelligence officers of these missions not only resort to open methods of recruiting agents, but also use their acquaintance with citizens of the USSR for disguised extortion through private "friendly" conversations of information of interest to them "The Special Department prepared a number of proposals and warned all employees dealing with classified information

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decision of the relevant departments, on criminal liability for non-compliance or disclosure of this circular!. Institutions and departments, in turn, had to read this letter to their employees against receipt. In the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, this letter was read to each secret employee of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) and part of the proposals

of the Special Department of the OGPU was reflected in the paragraphs of the Instructions to Secret Officers of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, prepared by the Central Committee in September 1923.

With the participation and under the control of the OGPU, party committees developed normative and instructive documents to ensure secrecy. So, for example, the commission for the development of instructions on the procedure for storing and moving secret documents of the Central Committee, approved on August 30, 1922, included the head of the department (for checking the conduct of secret office work and maintaining secrecy) of the Special Department of the OGPU - Tsibizov. On May 11, 1923, to develop instructions on the issue of working with secret documents of the Central Committee, a commission was created, in which, along with the Head of the Bureau of the Secretariat, member of the Central Committee A. M. Nazaretyan (he was the head of the Bureau of the Secretariat for a short time) the head of the Special Department of the OGPU, G. I. Boki, was also included. As a result of joint work, in June 1923, the instruction "On the procedure for mailing and familiarizing with secret documents of the Central Committee of the RCP (6)" was adopted. On November 21, 1927, the Secret Department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (6), together with the OGPU, submitted draft rules for conducting secret office work and handling secret materials of the Central Committee in party committees. The overall supervision of the organization of secret office work in party organs was to be entrusted jointly to the Secret Department of the Central Committee and the Special Department of the OGPU (in this case it was referred to as the Special Department of the Political Control of the OGPU) and the GPU in the localities. According to the decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (6) of May 16, 1929 "On conspiracy", the commission, with the participation of representatives of the OGPU G.I. Boki and M.A. composition of the Secret Department of the Central Committee. According to the decision of the Central Committee on May 5, 1927 "On the Use of Secret Materials", the Special Department of the OGPU was instructed to monitor the correct use of the ciphers available to institutions, departments and responsible employees. General control over the implementation of the decisions indicated in this resolution was assigned to the OGPU.

ÿ See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 84. D. 587. L. 8. 2 See *ibid.* F. 17. Op. 84. D. 491. L. 28-28v.

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Another direction of the joint work of the Bolshevik Party and state security agencies in the field of ensuring the regime of secrecy was the forwarding of secret correspondence. The mailing of all party secret correspondence was carried out through couriers who were checked by the special services, and correspondence from other cities was sent through the OGPU courier corps. By a decree of the Secretariat of the Central Committee on December 7, 1922, the People's Commissariat of Posts and Telegraphs was invited to enter the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR with a proposal to determine the procedure for sending secret correspondence of all departments through the OGPU *feldsvyaz* located abroad. This issue has always been under the control of the Politburo.

In certain cases, the Central Committee corrected the activities of state security agencies. For example, at a closed meeting of the Politburo on May 12, 1927, the issue of weakening control by the OGPU over the work of Soviet embassies and representative offices abroad was considered. In this case, the Politburo decided: "a) Consider it necessary to radically improve in that part of the work of the OGPU that is connected with foreigners and abroad, giving all work greater flexibility and taking into account the political consequences arising from individual measures. 6) Draw the attention of the OGPU to the poor organization of the case of political control over correspondence. c) Oblige the OGPU to take urgent measures to organize work in this area. d) Create a commission composed of TT. Janson and Kosior to investigate individual incidents in this area of political control over correspondence and develop measures to punish the perpetrators"<sup>2</sup>. As you can see, the Politburo had to resolve these issues with its own power, including directing the activities of the OGPU.

The Central Committee paid special attention to verifying the conduct of secret paperwork and compliance with secrecy, as well as to investigating cases of loss (theft) of secret documents and disclosure of secret information. In party committees, checks were carried out jointly by bodies

State Security and the Secret Department (Bureau of the Secretariat, Special Sector) of the Central Committee of the Party. In the beginning, these checks took place on a case-by-case basis, in connection with investigations into the facts of the loss or receipt of information about the unfavorable position in ensuring secrecy in certain party committees. But according to the decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6) on January 29, 1926, the Secret Department of the Central Committee and the Special

1 See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 112. D. 395. L. 6. 2 RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 5. L. 2-3.

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The main department of the OGPU was entrusted with carrying out inspections in a planned manner. In party committees and institutions, verification was carried out by the Secret and Special Departments jointly, and work with secret party documents in Soviet institutions was carried out by SPECO, in agreement with the Central Committee. The mechanism of checks was as follows: On behalf of the Central Committee, the Special Department of the OGPU carried out the check directly. Based on the results of the audit, the OGPU drew up an act, gave an opinion, its proposals and recommendations for correcting the shortcomings. The SPECO acts recorded both negative and positive aspects. As a rule, inspections took place according to plan almost simultaneously in several party committees. After the inspections carried out, the OGPU sent a summary with the enlisted documents to the Secret Department (Bureau of the Secretariat) of the Central Committee. Reports with recommendations were signed by the head of the Special Department and the head of the unit that conducted the checks / in the second half of the 1920s, signed by G.I. Boki and the head of the G department Tsibizov - G.K.] submitted a draft resolution for consideration to the Secretariat, the Orgburo, and sometimes even to the Politburo of the Central Committee, for a final decision.

The available facts speak about the amount of work. So, for example, in October - May 1926, SPECO and the Secret Department of the Central Committee checked the People's Commissariat of Education, the State Planning Commission, the People's Commissariat for Labor, the People's Commissariat of Health, the State Institute of the West, the Communist University of the Working People of the East, some members of the Central Control Commission; in August 1926 - NKTrade; 1927-30s Samara, Tambov, Ryazan, Voronezh, Saratov provincial committees, a number of senior officials of the Central Committee, the Central Asian Bureau of the Central Committee, Sibkraikom, Kazakhkraikom, Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Uzbekistan, Central Committee of the Communist Party (6) of Turkmenistan, Kirghiz OK, Kokand OKRK, Buryat-Mongolian OK, OK Nemtsev-Povolzhya, Plenipotentiary in Berlin Nemtsev-Povolzhya, NKVneshtorg, Glavaviaprom, NKT Heavy Industry, Kaluga and Arkhangelsk OK (lost 11 secret documents), Courses of Marxism, senior officials of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission, heads of Soviet institutions, delegates to party congresses (those who lost their documents), etc. Both the organization of secret work as a whole and the regime-secret and encryption divisions of party committees were subjected to verification.

Based on the results of inspections, individuals, institutions, and party committees had to notify the Central Committee and the OGPU of the measures taken and eliminate the identified shortcomings within 2 weeks. Most of the leaders were subjected to fairly mild party penalties in the form of staging and reprimands. In addition to scheduled inspections, naturally, cases of loss, theft or disclosure of secret information were investigated. In dan

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In some cases, the punishments were severe. In any case, SPECO and the Secret Department of the Central Committee warned of the adoption of special strict measures. So, for example, on August 3, 1926, when considering the results of an audit of the People's Commissariat of Trade, submitted to a meeting of the Central Control Commission, which was attended by Boki and Tsibizov, who recommended continuing the development of the case and, if the perpetrators were found, transfer their cases to the prosecutor's office.

In general, in the 1930s, strict measures began to be applied more often - dismissal from work, arrest, criminal prosecution. In my opinion, this was due to the ever-increasing responsibility to strengthen performance discipline and tougher preventive measures in the state as a whole.

Particular attention was paid by the Central Committee and the OGPU [in the early 1920s, the 3rd branch of the Special Department of the OGPU - G.K.] to checking the work of the cipher units in the party committees. So, at the end of 1922, in connection with the entry of the Far Eastern Republic into the RSFSR, the head of the Special Department of the OGPU G.I. . The secretariat of the Central Committee, on December 7, 1922, suggested that the OGPU send an employee to the Far East to examine and set up cipher paperwork in Soviet and party bodies there. Directly in the local Party committees, the verification of the conduct of cipher work was carried out by the Special Department of the OGPU together with the cipher division of the Central Committee. In 1926-27, for example, inspections were carried out in the Tambov, Saratov, Samara, Kara-Kalpak regional committees, and the Fergana regional committee. In June - July 1927, a violation of the rules for checking and hiring secret cryptographers was revealed in eight regional party committees. As a result, on October 24, 1927, the Secret Department of the Central Committee, together with the Cipher Bureau, sent to all party committees a secret letter signed by Tovstukha (Head of the Secret Department of the Central Committee) and Chechulin (Head of the Cipher Bureau of the Central Committee) on the procedure for agreeing on the candidacies of cipher workers and sending the relevant documents for registration in the Central Committee. In addition, on May 30, 1927, in a circular letter signed by Kossior, it was pointed out that there was a violation of the rules for the movement of cipher workers and their frequent turnover. The letter noted that the transfer and appointment of cipher workers should be made only with the consent of the Secret Department and only after checking the candidates in the bodies of the OGPU. Thus, the implementation of inspections of secret and cipher production in party committees and the conduct of verification activities in relation to candidates for positions related to secrecy was, first of all, the prerogative of the state security authorities.

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sti and secret divisions of the Central Committee. As for recruitment to the secret divisions of party committees and the Central Committee, only after an appropriate test for professional suitability and loyalty to power, and only with the consent of the state security agencies, could a candidate count on a positive result. All this was carried out as part of measures to ensure the regime of secrecy until the beginning of the Great Patriotic War and later.

The state security agencies, together with the Central Committee, also took a direct part in the work to ensure the regime of secrecy in the press and other mass media, and in the preparation of normative and instructive documents on this issue. So, for example, Ashmarin was in the work of the commission of representatives of censorship for the preparation of the Military List of Censorship from the OGPU; in 1923, the commission to revise the 1922 list of information constituting state secrets and not subject to publication included the head of SPECO G. I. Boki; The composition of the editorial staff of the Secret Bulletin of Glavlit, approved by the Central Committee, also included Ashmarin, who was the head of the Foreign Department of Glavlit and at the same time a representative of the OGPU. As an example, one can cite the participation of the OGPU in the development and implementation of the directive to the control authorities on the censorship of information from military factories in 1926, and Boki and Unshlikht were directly involved in this. The VChK, and then the OGPU and the NKGB, constantly monitored the materials and activities of the foreign press, and with the introduction of the institution of a commissioner for the protection of military secrets in the press. Volin, authorized by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, as well as the Revolutionary Military Council and the OGPU, were instructed to issue a single instruction on the protection of military secrets for all Union republics within two weeks.

Together with the NKGB, the Department of Agitation and Propaganda of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (6) and other departments, in May - June 1941, the Rules for the Protection of State (Military and Economic) Secrets in the Press were developed, which were to be submitted for approval by the Central Committee by June 10 1941

In addition to everything else related to state security, at the meetings of the Central Committee in 1920-1930, specific issues of an operational intelligence and counterintelligence nature were considered. So, for example, at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee on January 11, 1923



years, proposals of the deputy chairman of the OGPU Unshlikht were considered and accepted, on approving the tasks of the Bureau of Disinformation created under the OGPU, on collecting and further using information about the degree of awareness of foreign intelligence services about Russia. The tasks of the Bureau were to include: "1) Accounting for applicants as

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The GPU, as well as the Intelligence Agency and other institutions of information on the degree of awareness of foreign intelligence services about Russia. 2) Accounting for the nature of information of interest to the enemy. 3) Finding out the degree of awareness of the enemy about us. 4) Compilation and technical production of a whole series of false information and documents that give an incorrect idea to the opponents about the internal situation in Russia, about the organization and state of the Red Army, about political work, leading party and Soviet bodies, about the work of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, etc. 5) Supplying the enemy with the above material and documents through the relevant bodies of the GPU and the Intelligence Department. 6) Development of a number of articles and notes for the periodical press, paving the way for the release of various kinds of fictitious materials into circulation, submitting them in each individual case for consideration by one of the Secretaries of the Central Committee!

Particular attention and the object of joint efforts of party bodies and state security agencies was not only the protection of secret and other information, but also the collection of it. To collect information, the Central Committee used its party channels, in particular, by sending informational, political and "closed" letters from local party organizations. Party committees especially valued the information received from the state security agencies, for example, through the reports of the Cheka and the OGPU, which objectively reflected the state of affairs on the ground. This was especially important from the point of view of strengthening the state and party apparatus as a whole, control over the political, social and economic life of society. On March 17, 1921, at the direction of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) and the Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR, a special state information service was created in the Cheka. In all gubernias, state information troikas are formed, consisting of a representative of the provincial party committee, the provincial executive committee, and the provincial Cheka. The responsibilities of the troikas included compiling information summaries according to the standard form developed by the Cheka. Since 1923, the functions of the state information troik were completely transferred to the provincial departments of the GPU, within which special information units were created. The GPU began to prepare reports exclusively on its own, including in these documents both official information and secret information obtained by agents. Naturally, these materials were classified. Party committees at all levels were obliged to support the Chekists in covert coverage of events about the state of affairs in the country. Thus, in the process of collecting information, negative aspects were revealed in the work of state institutions and enterprises, whose leaders tried to hide administrative and economic errors. Party

1 RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 329. L.9.

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The committees knew about such facts from the GPU and took measures to assist and support the work of the special services in this direction. Thus, "in 1925, the Vitebsk District Committee of the CP (B) addressed a special letter to all district party committees of the district, where he drew attention to the importance of the activities of the GPU in collecting political and economic information. The document proposed to bring to party responsibility those communist leaders who are trying to deliberately hide shortcomings in the work of institutions, enterprises and organizations from the special services!

The author of the presented work does not specifically touch upon the activities of information troikas and information units, but it should be noted that all special services: the Cheka, the OGPU, the NKVD, the NKGB and the Intelligence Agency, constantly sent reports to the Central Committee on the state of affairs in the country and abroad, and information often obtained by operational means and was more reliable and complete than from official state and party sources. The materials of the information troikas and information departments of the GPU were sent from the localities to Moscow to the Central Committee of the party, in

the central apparatus of the Cheka is the OGPU, and their copies are in the Central Committee of the national republics and the provincial committees. After appropriate study and analysis, the party bodies took concrete decisions on them. "So, on June 20, 1922, having considered the materials of the state information troika under the GPU, the bureau of the Gomel provincial committee of the Communist Party (6) adopted a detailed resolution in which it obliged, in particular, the commission for work in the countryside under the provincial party committee to study sectarianism in the countryside, as harmful to Soviet power. It also considered it expedient to form a special commission to revise the profiles of the Mensheviks, since, according to the State Information Troika, many Gomel Mensheviks, refusing in words from the political struggle against the Bolsheviks, actually continued it. As an example of assessing the work of local security agencies in providing information to party committees, one can judge from the report of the Vitebsk provincial department of the GPU for 1925. "The Vitebsk district committee of the Communist Party (6) stated that "the coverage given in the reports of the GPU quite correctly reflects the political and economic state of the district." The district committee of the CP(b) stressed the importance of the information work of the state security agencies. "The main core in the work / department of the GPU. - Ed. /, it was noted in his decision, - is now the activity of the information apparatus, in

depending on the post

1 Maidanov I.I. From the history of the activities of the Soviet special services in 1921 - 1929. On the material of the Byelorussian SSR. P. 49. 2 Ibid. S. 48.

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novki and the state of which can be judged on the work of the organs as a whole. The attention of the Chekists was drawn to the comprehensive coverage of the political situation in the district, and especially the mood of the workers, with unflagging coverage of the state of affairs in the countryside!

The reports of the state security agencies were sent to the Central Committee through the Bureau of the Secretariat (Secret Department), registered as secret correspondence in compliance with secrecy measures. Naturally, the Central Committee responded appropriately to the incoming information from the security agencies. So, at a meeting of the Secretariat on January 22, 1926, a draft Central Committee circular on the use of OGPU reports was considered, which was proposed to be included in the next circular instructions of the Central Committee? Apparently, the OGPU reports were officially recognized by the party as one of the reliable sources of information that formed the basis some party decisions.

One of the directions of joint activities and decisions of the highest party instances and bodies was the provision of security, as well as the protection of information about party, government officials and objects. This question arose especially sharply during and after the Social Revolutionary rebellion, the assassination attempt on V. I. Lenin and the anarchist terrorist attacks. As is known, the protection function was entrusted to the organs of state security, initially to the Cheka. The chairman of the Cheka received reports about the intensification of counter-revolutionary activities. "In a letter to Ksenofontov at the end of June / 19192. - G.K.] Dzerzhinsky reported that the White Guards and anarchists were preparing terrorist acts and proposed to strengthen the protection of the Kremlin, to timely identify and suppress the anti-Soviet activities of right-wing socialists, cadets and Polish spies. Dzerzhinsky's letters and telegrams were carefully considered at meetings of the Presidium of the Cheka and its collegium. For example, on June 8, 1920, Felix Edmundovich's proposals were discussed to intensify the fight against the White Guard elements in the rear, and on July 2, measures were developed to more effectively protect the Kremlin"3. When carrying out operations to neutralize counter-revolutionary organizations, along with others, Soviet documents with classified information fell into the hands of the Chekists. So, "... In July-August, the Special Department of the Cheka saw the Petrograd branch of the National Center, which was headed by cadet V.I. Shteininger. Many documents were confiscated from the conspirators containing information about the 7th Army [Red Army. - G.K.], correspondence with Yudenich's headquarters, a report on the activities of the Petrograd and

I cit. according to Maidanov I.I. From the history of the activities of the Soviet special services in 1921 - 1929 Based on the material of the Byelorussian SSR. S. 51.

2 See RGASPI. F.17. Op. 113. D. 160. L. 9.

3 F. E. Dzerzhinsky. Biography. S. 190.

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Moscow spy organizations! During interrogation by Dzerzhinsky on September 23, 1919. Arrested member of the Moscow organization of the "National Center", former colonel of the Guards V. A. Miller, said: "that in conversations they made plans how to take Lenin and Trotsky some estate outside the city of Moscow. Although the Bolsheviks took security measures to protect the members of the Central Committee and the Government, the real danger was not yet fully recognized. It is known that V. I. Lenin took this lightly at first. So, for example, "V. I. Lenin's personal bodyguard consisted of two people. Only after he was wounded by Kaplan, the number of bodyguards was doubled.

The Central Committee and the state security agencies were also concerned about the problem of leaking information about members of the Central Committee and the Government, transmitted in the press. For example, in June 1926, the Politburo discussed a draft circular to the press, proposed by the OGPU. Special services, concerned that it was difficult for them to organize work and ensure security, when it becomes known in advance about the place of stay and events with the participation of members of the Government. In a circular developed by the OGPU and announced to the Politburo by the deputy chairman of the OGPU Yagoda, it was noted that recently the local press (magazines and newspapers) published information indicating in advance routes from the center, stops, places of performance (congresses, conferences, rallies), as well as the place of treatment and the return route for members of the Government of the USSR, the RSFSR and members of the Central Committee of the RCP (b). The circular also noted that some editors, chasing sensations, sent, without the knowledge of the OGPU, not only reporters, but also photographers who made entire surveys of places of residence. According to the OGPU, the appearance of this information in advance in the press facilitated the activities of all kinds of spies and agents and made it extremely difficult to protect members of the Government and could at any time lead to sad consequences. Based on this, the OGPU suggested not to give such information without their agreement with the political control department of the OGPU, except when the trip is made for propaganda purposes. Coordination by the editors should take place in advance before the material is sent to the set, the sending of reporters, photographers should take place only after a special visa and with the presentation of an issued certificate from the OGPU, which gives the right to engage in this activity. Suggest

1 F. E. Dzerzhinsky. Biography. S. 175.

2 Red Book of the Cheka. T. 2. S. 451.

3 See Sudoplatov A. The Secret Life of General Sudoplatov. Truth and fiction about my father. Book one. P.81.

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It was expected that editorial offices that sent their employees without an OGPU visa would be fined, and reporters, photographers, and other employees should be arrested! The Politburo, having considered this draft, had no objection to sending this circular on behalf of the OGPU. In my opinion, this is a completely acceptable and justified reaction, especially considering the realities of that time, and the practice today.

A special task for the OGPU was to protect the Kremlin, other government and party institutions, as well as members of the Central Committee and the Government as the main carriers of state secrets. From the very beginning of the functioning of the Kremlin as a government residence, the entrance was carried out by passes. The passage system has changed over time. So, for example, by 1925, the system of passes and the established procedure for entering the Kremlin no longer satisfies the security service and, in their opinion, "deprived it of the opportunity to prevent the penetration of an unnecessary element into the Kremlin and nullified the entire protection of the Kremlin." "

By that time, there were twelve different types of passes: 1. Members of the Presidium, members and candidate members of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, 2. Members of the Presidium, members and candidate members of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, 3. Members of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (6), 4. Candidate members Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (6), 5. Members of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (6), 6. Pass of a responsible employee (annual), 7. Annual pass to the Government building, 8. Three-month day pass to the Kremlin, 9. Night pass to the Kremlin, 10. Dismissal badge of cadets and Red Army soldiers, 11. One-time pass to the Kremlin, 12. One-time pass to the Government building.

A large number of passes made it difficult to check them and, in addition, there were a large number of lost passes. The OGPU, in a secret letter sent to the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6) and the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, proposed to reduce the number of passes to eight. It was proposed to reduce four types: for members and candidate members of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (6). Members and candidate members of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (6) and the Central Control Commission, who are not members of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, were recommended to obtain a single pass for a responsible worker. Deputy Chairman of the OGPU Yagoda asked the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (6) to approve the proposed procedure<sup>2</sup>. The Central Committee considered this proposal at a meeting of the Organizing Bureau of the Secretariat on June 22, 1925. To study the issue, a commission was formed consisting of Guzakov, Mekhlis, Belenky, Shkiryatov, Peterson, that is, representatives of the OGPU, the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission. The Commission was asked to

1 See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 445. L. 5. 2 See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 113. D. 176. L. 191-198.

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submit your draft resolution for approval by the Secretariat! As can be seen, in fact, this issue was resolved more by the party than by the Soviet order.

Naturally, the Central Committee also regulated the passage to the building of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6). In the initial period, access to the building of the Central Committee was simple and carried out on party cards, i.e., each ordinary member of the party could freely enter his Central Committee. But in 1925, as a result of the work of the commission, it turned out that 30 thousand party cards were officially listed as stolen. There were cases of transferring party cards to other persons to enter the building of the Central Committee, erasure of party cards and non-payment of membership fees for more than 3 months, the presence of party cards in the expelled and mentally ill, whom he served only to enter the building of the Central Committee with various requests. In the Central Committee, people were detained who had various documents in their hands with different surnames. For example, one detainee was found to have 60 different documents with different surnames. As a result, to develop the issue, a commission was created with the participation of Head. Bureau of the Secretariat of Tovstukha, as well as Guzak, Belenky, Peterson. At a meeting of the Secretariat of the Central Committee in March 1926, two proposals were considered: the commission of the Central Committee and the proposal of the OGPU. In the end, a compromise was chosen. The secretariat of the Central Committee approved the proposals of the commission, but with the proposals of the OGPU. It was decided to keep the passes on party cards. But it meant that at that time the old party cards were being replaced - with a new one (1926 model), where there was already a photograph. With the introduction of new party cards, admission to the building without photographs on party cards was prohibited, and the number of types of passes was reduced. Members of the Central Committee, candidates and members of the Revision Commission proceeded according to their mandates; members of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR and candidates - on mandates with the presentation of party cards; members of the Central Control Commission - according to their mandates; members of the MK and members of the IWC, members of the Comintern - on a general basis; members of the Central Committee of the RKSM and candidates - according to their mandates. The Kremlin pass for entering the Central Committee building was valid only with a special mark on the pass<sup>1</sup>. At a meeting of the faction of the All-Union Communist Party (6) of the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on May 20, 1926, the issue submitted by the Secretariat of the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee was considered, proposing to the commandant of the Kremlin to leave in force the current procedure for passing to the Kremlin and the building of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on the mandates of members of the Presidium, members and candidates for membership of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. General control and responsibility for admission to the building of the Central Committee was assigned to the Pass Bureau of the commandant's office of the Administration of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6). But in 1928 the Pass Office

1 See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 113. D. 176. L. 200. 2 Ibid. L. 10. 3 See ibid. L. 199.

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office of the Administration of the Central Committee was liquidated. The manager of affairs was instructed to organize the protection of the building of the Central Committee on a contractual basis with the OGPU. The entrance to the building of the Central Committee instead of passes was established only with party cards!.

Thus, any ordinary member of the party could enter the building of the Central Committee with his party card. In general, until the mid-1930s, access to the building of the Central Committee and the opportunity to communicate with ordinary party members with party leaders was quite democratic, and security was minimal. This is evidenced by the fact of the murder of Kirov, who remained unguarded at the time of the assassination attempt. I don't even think it's worth comparing the protection of the current state leaders with a whole army of guards and unprecedented security measures. "In the 1920s, the security of Soviet leaders was quite modest. After 1929, when Stalin finally established himself in power, the staff of guards in the Kremlin began to increase. However, not yet enough to strike anyone's imagination with its scale"<sup>2</sup>. Further, A. Sudoplatov notes the fact that: "Before the assassination of Kirov, Stalin could be met on the Arbat, accompanied by Vlasik, the head of personal protection and two bodyguards. He often visited Demyan Bedny, sometimes visited his acquaintances who lived in communal apartments. Employees of the NKVD and veterans who had the "Honorary Chekist" badge ... and a certificate for it could freely enter the Lubyanka. They had the right of passage everywhere except prisons. But he goes on to write: "The whole system was immediately changed. The assassination of Kirov was a pretext for tightening control, which never weakened again.

Above, only a small part of the examples relating to issues of safety and security that were discussed and approved by the Central Committee was given. It seems that the main material on the issues of this interaction can be found in the funds of the Cheka - OGPU - NKVD.

As a result, a system of interaction between the highest party bodies and the state security services in the field of secrecy, protection of state secrets, and the conduct of regime-secret events was formed and strengthened. Such cooperation was defined as the interaction of the highest bodies of political and state administration of the country with the executive structures and was determined by political expediency from the very beginning of the existence of the Soviet state. Members of the Central Committee of the party were in the highest posts of the state security organs. Appointment and relocation

1 See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 113. D. 621. L. 14. 2 Sudoplatov A. The secret life of General Sudoplatov. Book. 1. L. 80. 3 See *ibid.* Sudoplatov A. The Secret Life of General Sudoplatov. S. 76.

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The appointment of leading employees was approved by the Central Committee or local party committees. Personnel distribution and political and administrative influence on the executive structures by party committees was the main lever not only for interaction, but also for actual management. The circle of interaction was determined by the performance of functional duties, both by the structures responsible for the security of the country as a whole, and by political interests. The party, on the one hand, delegated security and its own security to the authorities, on the other hand, at the same time, directed their activities in the right political direction. The security agencies, performing state functions of protecting state and military secrets both in peacetime and wartime, carried out measures to access secret information, check employees of party institutions, protect information with technical means in party instances, and organize training for party cipher workers and cryptographers participation and creation of regulatory party documents to ensure secrecy and work with secret documents, carried out checks of compliance with the secrecy regime and secret office work in party bodies and departments where secret party documents could be, protection of secret information in the press and other means mass media, protection of state and party institutions, members of the Government and the Central Committee, as the main carriers of state and party secrets. This paper provides examples of this interaction. The entire complex of the above-described issues was resolved jointly by the party bodies and state security services. Of particular note is the cooperation between, established in May 1921

years by the Special Department under the OGPU and secret subdivisions of the Central Committee (Bureau of the Secretariat, Secret Department, Special Sector of the Central Committee). Naturally, the Special Department under the OGPU carried out its work on the decision of the highest party organs and together with the secret divisions of the Central Committee. For example, the encryption business was also carried out jointly with one of the structures of the Secret Department of the Central Committee, which deals with the protection of information by technical means - the Cipher Bureau, the Cipher Department. Employees of the Special Division participated directly or supervised the development of secret instructional and regulatory documents. Based on the results of joint work and the conclusions of the Special Department and the secret divisions of the Central Committee, decisions were made by the highest party bodies.

In principle, taking into account all the realities and specifics of the relationship between the ruling party and the security services, this cooperation did not allow major leaks of information. The facts show that, despite certain negative aspects in the activities of the Soviet counterintelligence, the intelligence services of the states competing with the Soviet Union, according to their admission, had

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it is very difficult to work in our country. The strengthening of the influence and power of I.V. Stalin and the aggravation of the international situation in Europe in connection with the coming to power of the Nazis in Germany and the actions of the Japanese militarists in Asia required and contributed to the tightening of measures to ensure the regime of secrecy. In the USSR, a kind of system of mutual control was formed, when the party controlled and directed the activities of the security services, but at the same time, the bodies were obliged to control the activities of party committees and state structures. The initiators of certain decisions of the highest party or state bodies on the issues of ensuring the secrecy regime in some cases were the party bodies, and in others - the security services. The measures that the Bolsheviks took to protect secrets and ensure secrecy, including in party bodies (without affecting the internal political struggle), which especially intensified in the 1930s and before the Great Patriotic War, as subsequent events showed, turned out to be by no means not redundant.

## CONCLUSION

The political doctrine of the Bolsheviks after coming to power determined that "the world is divided into two camps, the camp of capitalism and the camp of socialism", "surrounded" by capitalism. It was this environment that justified the ongoing foreign and domestic policy. Therefore, this circumstance dictated the need to create certain structures and take measures to ensure the protection of military, state and party (political) secrets. The experience of conspiratorial work was accumulated by the Bolsheviks even in the pre-revolutionary period, while working in an illegal or semi-legal position. The Bolshevik Party in the pre-revolutionary period is, first of all, a party of professional revolutionaries with a paramilitary organization, hence the certain political and social thinking of the party leaders. When the question of organizing an information security system was put on the agenda, the Bolsheviks adopted both the traditions and principles of their previous secret work. With the coming to power and the creation of the Soviet republic, the Bolsheviks were faced with the task of creating a new, theoretically substantiated by V. I. Lenin, type of state. In order to retain power, to create and strengthen a new social system, to protect it from internal and external counter-revolution, Soviet Russia was in vital need of a new state apparatus. Already on October 26 (November 8), 1917, V. I. Lenin said in his report on peace that the imperialist war cannot be ended by abandoning it. He warned that the capitalist governments and the bourgeoisie would make every effort to crush the workers' and peasants' revolution, as history had shown more than once before. And reality proved these assumptions. The outbreak of the Civil War, intervention, counter-revolutionary conspiracies and rebellions confirmed the assumption that the ruling circles of foreign

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states and the overthrown forces of Russia will try to unite in order to destroy the power of the Bolsheviks. An example of this was the counter-revolutionary organizations already created in the first months after the October Revolution and then actually existing and discovered by the Bolsheviks, such as Azbuka, the Union for the Defense of the Motherland and Freedom, the Council of Public Figures, the Union of Land Owners, "Commercial and Industrial Committee", "Right Center", "Renaissance Union", "National Center", "Tactical Center", "Union of Russian Youth", etc., also "Conspiracy of Ambassadors", Left SR rebellion in July 1918 in Moscow, an explosion prepared and carried out by anarchists in Leontievsky Lane in Moscow on September 25, 1919, and then the Civil War and intervention. Surrounded in the center of Russia, the new young state made titanic efforts to repel internal and external counter-revolution. The fate of the Soviet Republic was literally in the balance. To counter armed intervention, economic blockade and subversive activities and sabotage, the Bolsheviks created emergency authorities that took the most decisive measures of a military, administrative and punitive nature. The Red Army, the Cheka and the Military Revolutionary Tribunals were created. It was also necessary to organize certain structures and take measures to ensure the protection of first military, then state and party secrets. The socio-economic crisis, exacerbated in connection with the imperialist war, two revolutions and, finally, the Civil War, greatly increased the trend towards secrecy. With the coming to power, the Bolsheviks were faced with questions of conspiracy not only in the party, but also in the state as a whole. Most of the tasks related to defense, the economy, foreign and domestic policy were solved in secret. The Bolsheviks, in practice, solved the issues of protecting party information based on state interests in general. It should be noted that in the period under review, in the party and state apparatuses, secrets were not distinguished into party and state secrets, it was understood as a whole. The organization of information protection was dictated, in many respects, by the conditions of wartime, and after the Civil War, by the struggle against external and internal threats. Countering external and internal threats is, in general, the main and main goal of information protection. It was the foreign policy factor and the protection of the interests of the state in this period that was decisive. This was especially true in the historical period under consideration. The main unspoken law was the observance of the rule: "The fewer people have access (in one form or another) to classified materials, the more guarantees the preservation of conspiracy

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tion. Information protection was achieved through the organization of a special information protection system designed to counteract existing threats or significantly reduce their dangerous consequences. The main source of destabilizing influence for secret party and state information at that time was the human factor. Based on the understanding of existing threats and destabilizing factors, the party created conditions that limited the dissemination of classified information and narrowed the circle of persons admitted to it to the maximum. The main methods and forms for the protection of secret information at that historical period were the organization of secret office work, control of execution, legal and technical support.

At the beginning of their state activity, the Bolsheviks did not plan to work on the protection of information. One of their first decrees was on the publication of the secret treaties of Tsarist Russia and the opening of archives to the public, and in 1920 the General Provisions for the Rules for the Use of Archival Materials for State, Scientific and Private Needs were issued, which established the principle of publicity and availability of documents. But, on the other hand, the new nascent state, military, diplomatic structures in the course of their activity limited access to documents within the limits of their competence. But if we consider secrecy as a manifestation of state policy at that historical moment, then it was fully justified. Here we can quote the words of the historian M. V. Zelenov with which the author of this work fully agrees: "The civil war recreated the regime of secrecy at every step ..."! But still, as was stated in this work, the reverse side of the issue, despite these circumstances, especially in the twenties in the Soviet

In state and party institutions in Russia, there were still enough difficulties and shortcomings, carelessness and misunderstanding in the matter of ensuring secrecy. Reports of the leakage and dissemination of secret information, the reading and interception of Soviet military-political and diplomatic information by foreign and White Guard special services were known to the Politburo. This was reported to the Central Committee by party, military leaders and other authorities.

The organization of information security has always been a complex and expensive task, both in organizational and technical terms. In tsarist Russia, there was no centralized information security system.

1 Maidanov I.I. Apparatus of the Central Committee of the RCP (6) - VKP (b), censorship and historical science in the 1920s. S. 372.

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existed. Each department solved this problem independently, which led to negative nuances on a nationwide scale. Although, for example, in some departments and institutions, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Justice, the gendarmes, the information security system was at the proper level. The Bolsheviks, in principle, could not accept a decentralized system, both organizationally and politically. They focused on the organization of a unified and centralized system of information protection. This concerned both state and party structures.

In a broad sense, the organization of information protection for the entire period of the 1920s-1930s proceeded within the framework of the so-called "catching up model" of state building, in conjunction with the tense international situation. As a system, the protection of information in party structures took shape by the end of the 1920s. It was by this time that the main organizational, personnel, methodological, methodological and legal base for information protection in the Soviet Union was created. The 1930s saw an increasing trend towards greater secrecy. It was during this period that criminal liability was established in the country for disclosing state secrets, and party sanctions were strengthened in the party apparatus, up to expulsion from the party for disclosing secret information. More and more issues were resolved at closed meetings of party structures. In party office work, many issues that in the 1920s were reflected in open protocols and other documents of the party, in the 1930s were increasingly put aside in secret "special folders".

Here it is necessary to pay attention to the Bolshevik understanding of political expediency in relation to state secrets. The Bolsheviks in the initial period of their state activity considered political expediency quite acceptable and justified. But over time, the approach changes. If at the beginning, the Bolsheviks widely used the criterion of political expediency, then by the second half of the 1920s, political expediency and "political flair" in the field of information protection were increasingly replaced by legal norms. Does the criterion of political expediency to restrict information have the right to exist as legitimate and justified in relation to state secrets? Since the beginning of the 1990s, there has been a discussion among specialists in the field of information security to the present day about the modern understanding of state secrets and the criteria for its evaluation. Various characteristics are given in the Soviet period and new options are proposed at the present stage. But a matter of political purpose

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compliance as a criterion in the validity of state secrets is almost not touched upon by them. Among the majority of historians and especially publicists (not specialists in this field), there is a negative attitude towards state secrets as a system that, in their opinion, infringes on the freedom of dissemination of information and human rights, using which you can hide anything, up to crimes. But, as historical experience and



political reality, whether we like it or not, this criterion was present and is present to this day, and not only in the Soviet Union and Russia, but also in the "most democratic countries". And the notorious "double approach" should not be discussed at all as a fact that is quite obvious. From the beginning of the 1920s, on the one hand, documents of the tsarist government and the revolutionary movement were published, archives and funds closed under the tsar and the Provisional Government were opened, on the other hand, certain criteria for secrecy were developed, including politically topical issues. From the point of view of politics, the author of this work does not see a contradiction in this, since the Bolsheviks, having come to power, taking over state functions, at the same time remained a political party.

After the end of the Civil War, the international and internal situation of the Soviet Republic remained very difficult and tense. It was caused by the beginning of the Cold War [According to the author, it did not start with Churchill's speech in Fulton in 1946, but immediately after the end of the Civil War, without stopping throughout the Soviet period and switching from time to time to local sections from the "cold" to the "hot" phase, and so on from one phase to another - G.K.] and intra-party struggle over the issue of further domestic policy and development of the country until the start of the Great Patriotic War. Under these conditions, the ruling party had to pay close attention to ensuring the constant military-political readiness of the state and the party for any situation. And it is in connection with this that we can talk about the organization and creation in the late 1920s. and further development in the 1930s. systems for protecting information and ensuring the safety of not just party or state secrets, but precisely party-state secrets. This is also due to the fact that this specific process took place within the framework of the functioning of not just a state system, but a party-state political system with one ruling party at the head.

The history of the development of the party secret protection system is directly related to party building. The author of this work did not find among the studied open materials of the Politburo, Orgburo, Secret

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tariat, the Department of Affairs and secret divisions of the Central Committee of the document, which directly speaks of the creation of a secret or regime-secret division of the Central Committee, with the functions of ensuring the regime of secrecy in the Central Committee and party bodies since the formation of the apparatus of the Central Committee, the Politburo. Organizing Bureau and Secretariat. For the first time, we find units with special functions in the names - the Special Department of the Secretariat of the Central Committee in 1919, as well as the existence in the structure of the Central Committee of 1920 of the Secret and Secret Department of the Secretariat of the Central Committee. Maybe it's the same department. There is also a mention of the Secret Directive Section (Secret Department or the Central Committee Affairs Department) and the Secret Operational Subdivision of the Secret Directive Part, and then an independent Secret Operations Department, whose functions are not known. Most likely, all of the listed units were part of the Central Committee Affairs Department. With the formation in 1921 of the Bureau of the Secretariat from a part of the Secret Department of the Administration, the history of an independent secret division of the Central Committee began, consisting of assistants to the Secretaries of the Central Committee, a technical apparatus, a cipher division and other services, serving, at first, only the highest party organs of the Central Committee, then who took over, in whole or in part, the functions of the regime-secret organ of the party. In 1926, the Bureau of the Secretariat is renamed into the Secret Department. In 1930, the Secret Department was transferred to the Kremlin. In 1933, its reorganization was carried out, as a result of which secrecy was strengthened, functions and

directions of the work of the department, and in 1934, after the XUP party congress, it became known as the Special Sector of the Central Committee. The functions of these divisions did not change much. The number of employees was, in comparison with other divisions of the Central Committee, large, yielding only to the Administration. Repeated reductions in the apparatus of the Central Committee, for the most part, did not affect these units. It should be noted that the terms "secret security agency" or "secret security measures" did not exist at that time, and in most cases the words "conspiracy" and "secrecy" were used to denote "secrecy" in the party apparatus.

used by the Bolsheviks since underground times. The secret subdivisions of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) - VKP(b) in their development went through the dynamics from the technical subdivisions that ensure the work of the Secretaries of the Central Committee to the secret subdivisions of party committees at all levels. In fact, these units carried out operational security-secret work. They were always headed by I. V. Stalin's assistants: first (for a short time) A. M. Nazaretyan and L. Z. Mekhlis, then I. P. Tovstukha, and since 1930 - A. N. Poskrebyshch. According to the functional distribution of duties between the Secretaries of the Central Committee, I. V. Stalin was invariably entrusted with the overall leadership of these units,

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which speaks of their importance and role in the apparatus of the Central Committee. In the hands of I.V. Stalin, they were the source of obtaining operational (mostly secret and therefore the most truthful and least biased) information and the corresponding influence on the adoption of adequate decisions, conductors of domestic policy and executors of the decisions and plans of the Secretary General.

The main activities of the Bolsheviks in the protection of information in the party structures of the RCP (b) - VKP (b) at all levels in 1918 - 1941. were: the organization of information protection units, the creation of a legitimate legal and regulatory framework for ensuring the secrecy regime and secret office work, the staffing of secret party units, the implementation of information protection through organizational forms of work and the creation of special types of secret documents, the organization and provision maintaining the safety of secret party documents by organizing secret storage, organizing access to secret party and state information, ensuring the protection of information by technical means, exercising party control over the observance of the secrecy regime, pursuing a censorship policy, implementing interaction between the Central Committee and local party committees with bodies state security.

The main principles of information protection in the period under review were: 1. The principle of reasonable access to secret information; 2. The principle of personal responsibility; 3. The principle of material interest of persons admitted to secret information. The main organizational form of information protection in the RCP (b) was the VKP (b) in 1918 - 1941. was the organization of "secret office work", as well as the holding of closed meetings of the highest party organs and the formation of permanent closed commissions of the Central Committee. There were also special types of secret party documents. Along with the well-known "special folder", "closed letters" were strictly secret documents. The author of this work finds the first mention in the minutes of meetings and materials of the highest party bodies of "closed letters" in 1922, and of "special folders" in 1923.

The international situation in 1920-1930 was generally tense. Although the civil war ended, the military and political confrontation between the USSR and the capitalist countries did not stop. As noted above, in fact, the Cold War began immediately after the Civil War in Russia. In addition, the First World War did not resolve the contradictions between the European countries. In principle, the world was constantly on the verge of "smoldering wars" and, as further events showed, local wars

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and global controversy quickly escalated into the outbreak of World War II. All countries were guided by the current situation when developing their military-political concepts of national security. The Soviet Union, realizing the danger of war, mainly a hostile environment, was forced to take appropriate countermeasures and protection, including organizing a system for protecting state and political (party) secrets. "The concept of total war gives rise to the concept of total intelligence activity... The third function or form of intelligence activity can be considered what is called irregular warfare. This concept includes the organization and support of groups

resistance, subversive propaganda and sabotage, which are closely linked to the intelligence service! In this regard, not only military concepts changed, but also the very nature of the preparation and conduct of war, including intelligence activities, and obtaining information of interest is the main work of intelligence.

In addressing information security issues, we see a political solution and state regulation of this issue on the part of the party. In this historical period, and taking into account the specifics of the party-state political system, this was quite natural and fit into the legitimate framework then in force. Here the Bolshevik Party acts both as a political organization that regulates the activities of its structures and as a "leading and guiding" body exercising party and state power in the country. To determine secret information, the corresponding "Lists of information constituting state secrets and not subject to publication" were developed. All work to protect party and state secrets was carried out in close cooperation between the Central Committee and the state security agencies of the country. The closest cooperation in the field of information protection was between the special secret divisions of the Central Committee represented by the Bureau of the Secretariat - the Special Sector of the Central Committee and State Security represented by the Special Department of the Cheka - the GPU (OGPU) - the NKVD. On special issues of information security, the party apparatus had to obey the requirements of the security agencies, thereby mutual control and joint work to ensure secrecy were carried out, which made it possible, in general, to avoid serious leaks of information from party organs.

The activities of the Bolsheviks to protect information (conspiracy) can be divided into illegal pre-revolutionary and legal, under the conditions of the ruling party, period.  
Information security organization

1 Cited. by Mader Y. The secret becomes clear. S. 24.

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in the Soviet period, it was closely associated with party building, with activities to create a party apparatus, starting from the first legal UP congress in 1918, which determined new conditions for the functioning and creation of a new program and party structures. In this regard, the work of the party on the protection of information as a whole has changed radically. During the Civil War and until 1922, in their work, these structures were guided by general military and state (Soviet) guidelines. Only starting from 1922, according to the decision of the Orgburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (6) dated November 30, 1922, after the separation of party records from the Soviet and trade union and the adoption of the resolution "On the procedure for storing secret resolutions of the Central Committee of the RCP (6)" in party began to create a regulatory framework for the protection of information. As a system, the protection of information in party bodies, in our opinion, took shape in the second half of the 1920s, continuing to develop over the entire period under review. But it should be noted that the initially formed basic principles, forms, methods, directions of activity for the protection of information in the party structures of the RCP (6) - VKP (6) in 1918 - 1941. operated throughout the study period. The organization of information protection passed in its dynamics an evolutionary path within the framework of the established party-state system, the path of gradual accumulation of a qualitative and quantitative component. Information protection activities were of a purposeful nature and looked like a continuous process, stabilizing or activating in a given period.

In terms of protecting information, the party bodies had a "double" task. It was the protection of both state and party (political) secrets. It is extremely difficult to classify the secret information of the historical period under consideration into purely state or purely party (political) information. Under the conditions of the existing system of party-state structure, it is impossible to separate it.

What are the reasons for secrecy? It is in the foreign policy factor and the protection of the interests of the state. But there are other opinions on this matter. Their essence is that measures to ensure secrecy made it possible to disguise internal political and even "criminal" goals and acts that were committed under the cover of secrecy, and the dissemination of information, on the contrary, was strictly punished. All this is perceived as an infringement of democracy, freedom of speech and human rights. It seems that the truth "lies in the middle", in this case, the criteria, motivation and direction of this activity are important. Information security has been and remains one of the most important

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areas of activity of any state on certain issues of its functioning. In the past, as in the present, there were and still are purely political, ideological motives for protecting information. For political reasons, almost a large or at least a very significant part of the information is classified. The motive is important - for what purpose and in whose interests this work is being carried out. This is recognized both in the West and in the East. Thus, the English intelligence officer Stevenson, in his book, "The Man Called Fearless" about the intelligence operations of the Second World War, writes in the preface: "Secrecy rightly repels us, it is a potential danger to the principles of democracy and free government ... although it may be unnecessary to emphasize so obvious, it must be remembered that the weapon of secrecy loses its effectiveness as soon as it is abandoned. One of the conditions of democracy is freedom of information." Then he concludes, essentially justifying secrecy, - "However, it is worth making this information public, as we will be disarmed"!

Recognizing the internal political motives of secrecy, when moments of the internal political struggle, the struggle for power, play a certain role, nevertheless, in my opinion, the foreign policy factor should be considered the main one. This was especially true in the studied historical period. Noteworthy are the lines from the book by A. Sudoplatov: "It is absolutely clear that today's moral principles are incompatible with the cruelty characteristic of the period of struggle for power that follows the revolutionary coup and the Civil War." As we know, this was typical not only for Russia, let us remember, at least the Great French Revolution, etc. Giving an example of the struggle between Stalin and Trotsky, the author writes: "Stalin and Trotsky opposed each other, resorting to criminal methods to achieve their goals..."<sup>2</sup> Further, the author draws a very definite conclusion, with which one cannot but agree: "...But the difference lies in the fact that in exile Trotsky opposed not only Stalin, but also the Soviet Union as such. This confrontation was a war of annihilation. Stalin and his entourage could not treat Trotsky in exile simply as an author of philosophical writings. He was an active enemy of the Soviet state.

The further course of history showed that the attitude of Stalin and the leaders of the CPSU (6) towards political degenerates and rivals in the struggle for power was justified. decisive political blow to

1 Cited. by Yakovlev N. N. CIA against the USSR. P. 324. 2 See Sudoplatov A. The Secret Life of General Sudoplatov. Truth and fiction about my father. Book one. S. 225.

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The CPSU and the Soviet Union were inflicted precisely from within, by a group of former party leaders. At the same time, these figures disguised the initial narrowly selfish interests of the struggle for power with slogans borrowed from Trotsky and the struggle against bureaucracy and the domination of the party apparatus! Unfortunately, we can't help but agree with this.

In principle, states have always competed with each other, regardless of the socio-political system, and therefore the issues of maintaining secrecy and protecting their own secrets are still relevant. Human civilization has not yet reached such a level of development when conflict issues would be resolved only by peaceful means. The idea of a global

domination. The current level of development of states does not yet know any other way than economic and political rivalry. This was especially true during periods of overt and covert confrontation between various socio-economic systems. As already noted, the main criteria in determining the degree, expediency and justification of secrecy are, first of all, external factors. Based on this factor, already in the first lists of information constituting state secrets and not subject to publication, the main part of classified information was of a military, economic and foreign policy nature.

When asked about the ratio (or share) of secret and non-secret information in the activities of party bodies in Soviet Russia and the USSR in the 1920s and 1930s, it can be noted that this ratio changed depending on the factors determining external circumstances and internal situation of the country. Naturally, the volume of classified information increased during the Civil War, the foreign policy crises of 1923 and 1926–1927, and the general aggravation of the international situation from the second half of the 1930s until June 1941. Party information had its own specifics, determined by the presence of state and political interests, reflected in the party complexes of documents, in which it is difficult to develop an objective approach to its differentiation into state and party information. This was due to the fact that in terms of protecting secret information, the party bodies had, as it were, a “double” task. This is the protection of both state and party secrets. In the conditions of the existing system of party-state structure, it is almost impossible to separate them. But it can be quite definitely stated that in Soviet times, especially in the “Stalin

1 See Sudoplatov A. The Secret Life of General Sudoplatov. Truth and fiction about my father. Book one. S. 225.

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period", the society was closed. This had its pros and cons. On the one hand, this did not fit into the framework of the so-called democratic freedoms and made it possible to hide negative aspects, but on the other hand, it complicated the work of foreign intelligence services. This was of particular importance with the coming to power of the Nazis in Germany and the aggressive actions of militaristic Japan. In general, the work to ensure the regime of secrecy was aimed at ensuring the external security of the country. But to a certain extent, it was of a class nature and was aimed at preserving the dictatorship of the proletariat and the power of the Bolsheviks.

The largest number of documents of the highest bodies of the party and secret divisions of the Central Committee, covering this topic, in the period under review, we observe in the 1920s. It was during this decade that the open protocols of the Politburo, the Orgburo, the Secretariat, the documents of the Bureau of the Secretariat and the Secret Department of the Central Committee contain material of interest to us. This is determined by the relative democracy of internal party life, the struggle of opinions in the country's leadership, the relatively “calm” international situation in Europe after the end of the Civil War in the USSR, which was reflected in the documentary layer reflecting the events of this period. From the end of the 1920s to the beginning of the 1930s, right up to the Great Patriotic War, the issues of secrecy became more and more closed. Discussion of these problems usually takes place at closed meetings of the highest party bodies and commissions of the Central Committee, documents on them are postponed in closed complexes, - closed protocols of the “Special Folder”. We practically do not find documents (or there are few of them) for the 1930s on cipher work, checking employees admitted to state and party secrets, checking compliance with the secrecy regime and secret office work, developing instructions and rules (basic regulatory documents on these issues were developed in the 1920s), censorship policy, the relationship of state security agencies with party structures on these issues.

We have seen increased secrecy across the board since the 1930s, especially since the second half. And it was well justified. So, for example: "German anti-fascists in a timely manner

exposed the aggressive plans of Nazi Germany, warning the world about them. "In one documentary publication, published in Paris in 1935, German emigrants named 2,450 professional Nazi agents, about 20,000 non-professional agents, and indicated the presence of 24 Nazi cells in different countries of the world"! Hitler in front of

1 Cited. Mader Yu. The secret becomes clear. S. 33.

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fall on France in 1940, he said: "When I start the war ... then one fine day, even in peacetime, I will ensure the appearance of our troops in Paris. They will be dressed in French uniforms and will march through the streets in broad daylight. No one will delay them.... They will go to the General Staff building, occupy the ministries, parliament... I will establish contact with the people who form the new government in advance. The government that suits me. We will find such people, we will find them in any country. Our strategy is to destroy the enemy from within, to make him eliminate himself! Although, as we know, Hitler was a great master of this kind of insinuation, in some ways he turned out to be a clairvoyant.

Counterintelligence activities also involve the organization of measures to prevent the leakage of information, i.e., the observance of secrecy. The Soviet state was also concerned about intelligence cooperation against the USSR. So, to the chief of the fascist German intelligence, Schelenberg: "... it seemed ... a federation of European secret services, which was supposed to form a kind of information pool. The main principle of its work should have been the resolute use of all secret services against Russia, and preference should have been given to the own interests of the secret services"<sup>2</sup>. The secret services of the pro-fascist forces of Finland, Hungary, Croatia, Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey gave their consent to the implementation of this plan, with the secret services of France, Spain and Portugal, negotiations were held on this issue. That is why the issues of protecting party-state secrets were resolved at the highest party-state level and in close cooperation with the state security services.

The main task is being carried out - ensuring the safety of party-state secrets in party bodies and state structures. The circle of information to be classified in party bodies was determined during the Civil War. In principle, state secrets protected issues of a military and economic nature, international relations, and party secrets, in addition to those listed, also questions of party and state building, and domestic political struggle.

From a modern point of view, it seems that in the 1920s and 1930s, insignificant secondary issues were also subject to classification, which in themselves did not contain state secrets. But it is worth noting to

I cit. Mader Yu. The secret becomes clear. P. 30. 2 Cited. There. S. 30. 3 See ibid. S. 37.

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For example, Denikin's counterintelligence paid close attention to studying the personalities of Soviet leaders. For this purpose, detailed data were collected, characteristics, outlining their political and human appearance. In the report of the Denikin Service on the political situation in Russia at the end of January 1919, we read: useful is the support of Trotsky's party, which, thanks to its policy of no compromise, will sooner lead Bolshevik Russia to collapse! And further, what is the secret to say in information about elections to the Soviets, the sale of crops, in the mandate during re-elections to the Soviets, in the admission of peasants to the party, ice drift, collective farms, etc. Now let's turn our attention to the information collected before the war by German intelligence about the USSR. For example, Gehlen's service compiled reports on all areas of Soviet life. Their reports and studies included, for example, such as:

"Urals as an economic and industrial region", "Steel production", "Arms industry", "Power industry", "Review of the top military commanders of the Red Army". The interest in this information is understandable, but they were also interested in such questions as "Stalin's career and everyday life", "Ice drift in Russia", "Agriculture and collective farms"<sup>2</sup>. Thus, from such seemingly disparate unclassified and secret information, all information about Soviet military resources and intentions and, in general, about the military-economic, political, moral and psychological potential of the country was collected. Especially before the war. They needed as much accurate information as possible. All this had an impact on the ability of the USSR to resist the German invasion. But, as you know, Nazi Germany did not receive it in full and made a mistake, and, not least, thanks to the information protection system created by the Bolsheviks, not only in state, but also in party bodies, as a carrier of information on all issues of life. states. First of all, because, in the party bodies, as well as throughout the country, a certain system of protection of party-state secrets has developed, which, without some shortcomings, was quite reliable.

Naturally, at the present stage, the issues of protecting state secrets are very relevant. As long as states exist, intelligence services also exist, although the priority areas and areas of activity

1 Cited. by Soboleva T. A. The history of encryption business in Russia. P. 391. 2 See Jeffrey T. Richelson, The history of espionage in the 20th century. S. 264.

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are changing. Today, first of all, it is the fight against international and local terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking, etc. But still, the "old priorities" remain - military and economic espionage, the work and functioning of state structures and special services, diplomatic, international activities, etc. Answering the question of how justified the system of protecting party-state secrets in party bodies was, one can quite definitely say that, despite the shortcomings highlighted in this work, the information security system in the party bodies of the RCP (b) - VKP (b) in 1918 - 1941. on the whole corresponded to the conditions and requirements of the historical moment, based on the realities of that time, the socio-economic domestic and foreign political situation. Analyzing the change in politics in the late 1920s or 1930s, Western historians carefully avoid the fact that the Western world exerted systematic pressure on the USSR. The capitalist encirclement, which saw Soviet Russia as a threat to its existence, did not allow the new system to develop to such an extent that it could clearly demonstrate its advantages.

The secrecy skills acquired by the party apparatus and state bodies were useful, for example, in the creation of the Soviet atomic bomb. This is how Kurchatov's work with documents is described: "He had to write the texts of the documents in his own hand, and it was recommended that the information received from intelligence be communicated to his closest associates only orally. Everything was so classified that in intelligence itself, the originals of undercover messages were not trusted even by translators and typists, they remained forever in handwritten form. This was done in the name of minimizing the number of extraneous voices. Even the staff of the residencies did not know that Kurchatov was giving an assessment of their intelligence activities and new assignments on the atomic problem. His name as the project manager was at that time hidden under the surname "Borodin"! And one more illustrative passage: "Undercover intelligence materials returned from Kurchatov, presented in originals, were filed into the Enormoz file (translated as monstrous, colossal), and if these were second or third copies, then, at the direction of Kvasnikov, they were destroyed by a specially created commission. Thanks to such a well-established system of accounting documents and observing the rules of conspiracy in working with them, not a single Western intelligence service had any idea that the Soviet Union had also started working on an atomic bomb"<sup>2</sup>. And the goals of the rivals

1 Chikov V. M. Illegals. KGB Dossier No. 13676. Part 1. P. 118. 2 Chikov V. M. Illegals. KGB Dossier No. 13676. Part 1. P. 314.

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Soviet Union during the Cold War were quite definite and specific. So: "... in the directive of the NSS of the USA No. 20/1 of August 18, 1948, in a generalized form, but quite clearly indicated; "It is primarily about making and keeping the Soviet Union weak politically, militarily and psychologically in comparison with external forces that are beyond its control!". As we know, purely military plans for an attack on the Soviet Union were also considered. The "cold war" of the post-war period did not develop into a "hot" one, and humanity had enough common sense not to destroy itself. But as in any war, it turned out that there are losers and winners. This is how the former Chairman of the KGB of the USSR V. Kryuchkov assessed some negative aspects in the work to ensure the secrecy regime in the USSR in the 1980s: "Flaws in our personnel work have become more obvious. In almost all cases, one sad truth came to light: the damage could be much less if the established norms of operational activities, secret office work were strictly observed, if in the accounting and processing of information, as well as in its implementation, all the rules of conspiracy. The reasons lay not in the system itself, but in that laxity, negligence, loss of vigilance, which, unfortunately, manifested itself in many of our employees....»2.

So, the author of this work tried to highlight and analyze one of the little-studied aspects of the activities of the Central Committee and the Bolshevik Party as a whole, the mechanism and level of decision-making on ensuring the regime of secrecy and protecting party-state secrets in party bodies, the range of issues that make up state secrets and information not subject to disclosure, the conduct of regime-secret events, gave a description of the secret sets of documents that were deposited in the activities of the Central Committee. To what extent was the system of protection of party-state secrets justified in the USSR? Such a formulation of the question is also relevant at the present stage, when it is necessary to maintain a reasonable and justified balance of open and closed information, when it is obvious that excessive openness can cause certain harm to the national interests of the state and lead to serious consequences. Archival and operational information, "... Falling into the hands of unscrupulous and biased individuals who do not spare colors and interpret history for speculative purposes. Publicizing and publishing, for example, after August 1991, intelligence and

I cit. by Yakovlev N. N. CIA against the USSR. P. 40. 2 Kryuchkov V. Personal file. Part one. S. 166.

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counterintelligence activities, reports to the leadership of state security agencies, especially the operational methods of work of the special services and the party, containing top secret information marked "ss" and "s", through which it was easy to get into our intelligence and trusted connections and sources, expose individuals, organizations and entire countries, those who faithfully helped our state, risked themselves, cannot be justified by any considerations. After that, according to press reports, we lost many important positions. And finally, returning to the question of a cautious attitude not only to operational, but also to archival documents "...And the main question: who will have access to the archives, at what level will responsibility for the safety of secrets, for their non-disclosure or on the contrary, publicity? Careless handling of archives can cause irreparable damage ... to the state as a whole! It seems that in this case one can fully agree with the words of the former head of the KGB of the USSR.

Taking into account the changes in policy in the late 1920s or 1930s, the fact of mutual pressure from Western countries and the USSR, in order to overcome the country's lag, ensure "homogeneity and internal unity of the rear and front in case of war," required increased



attention to the issues of information protection in the structures of the ruling party. The protection of information in party structures, based on the specifics of the party-state structure, was part of the general centralized system of information protection in the country as a whole, being its integral part. In this sense, the organization of information protection in the ruling party was a necessary measure in the period between the two world wars and is a fact not only of Russian history, but also the result of the development of the entire world political system in the first half of the 20th century.

1 See Kryuchkov V. Personal file. Part 1 .S. 377.

## APPS

### Annex I.

States of the Bureau of the Secretariat [ Approved by the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the RCP (6) November 22, 1922 ]

"Bureau of the Secretariat - 3 Politburos - 3 Orgburos - 5 Secret office work - 18 Cipher Bureaus - 6 In total, there are 35 people in the Bureau of the Secretariat ...

States of secret office work:

9. Manager - 1 person. 10. Senior clerks - 2 11. Clerks of the 1st category - 2 12. Typists - 7 13. Telephone operators - 2 Couriers - 4 Total: - 18 people. Code Bureau: 15. Head - 16. Deputies - 17. Clerks

-

18. Typists - 19. Coders -

OU m —= ---

Total: - [ Total: 59 ]

See RGASPI. F. 17 Op. 112. D. 302. L. 6.

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### Annex P.

Structure and staffing of the Bureau of the Secretariat

[since the second half of 1924]

"Bureau of the Secretariat:

Assistant Secretary of the Central Committee comrade. Stalin ..... 5 Assistant Secretary of the Central Committee Comrade. Molotov ..... 3 Assistant Secretary of the Central Committee comrade. Kaganovich ..... 2 Room. 5 Andreeva ..... 2 Assistant Secretary of the Central Committee (including 2 on duty) Reception .....2....02.... | Head Bureau of the Secretariat .....

..... Technical Secretariat of the Politburo: Secretary of the

PB ..... | Duty Secretary 1 Room. Duty secretaries ..... 7 Head.

Archive .....0.2...7. 1 Room Head Archive ..... 2 Archivist.....2... 3

typists ..... .2.7.... 4 Stenographers ..... 4 /25

..... Technical secretariat of the Organizing Bureau:

Secretary .....0.7.... 1 Secretary on duty 3 Pom. Duty secretaries .....

4 Archive .....2.2.2.2.2 2.2. 1 Art. Clerk ..... 1 / 12 Code Bureau: Head.

Cipherburo ..... 1 Deputy. Head Cipherbureau ..... 1 Compiler of

ciphers ..... | Cyphercode .....2..... 2 /5 Secretary of the Bureau of

..... the Secretariat: Referents ..... 2 Translators .....7.... 2 Art. clerk 4 Se

Journalists ..... 5

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Head Archive ..... | Archivists .....0.2....2... 4 Bureau of Typing 1  
..... Typists .....0...0.207022.. 9 Stenographers 1 Telephone  
..... Operators .....2.... 6 Couriers .....2...2.7.g.....  
15 Total: 112 people.

See RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 112. D. 590. L. 28

Appendix Sh.

## C. SECRETLY RULES FOR CONDUCTING SECRET DOCUMENTS AND HANDLING SECRET MATERIALS IN PARTY COMMITTEES.

### J. GENERAL PROVISIONS.

1. — The main prerequisite for conspiracy is the observance of the rule: the fewer people have access (in one form or another) to secret materials, the greater the guarantee of conspiracy.

2. - To conduct secret office work, the Party committees have secret departments or secret units. In party committees, where the number of secret materials passing through is small, this work is entrusted to a separate comrade (trusted) specially allocated for this purpose.

NOTE: Cipher communication and encryption office work at party committees is carried out in accordance with special instructions.

3. - The duties of secret organs include:

a) Expedition, printing, forwarding, conducting and storing files, returning and destroying secret materials, etc. d.). —

6) Observation, instruction and verification of secret paperwork, verification and registration of employees admitted to secret correspondence in subordinate party organizations and factions of the CPSU (b) in local Soviet, economic and public organizations.

4. - On the basis of this instruction, the higher party committees teach the lower organizations the appropriate rules of conspiracy.

5. - Persons guilty of violating secrecy (disclosure, loss and negligent handling of secret documents) are responsible on the basis

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decision of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR out of court through the Collegium of the OGPU.

6. - When changing secretaries, as well as when the secretary hands over cases to the deputy for the duration of a long business trip, or the first person's vacation, the handing over is obliged to familiarize the receiving case with this instruction.

NOTE: Acceptance and delivery of cases is carried out according to the act, a copy

which is reported to the Secret Department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (6).-

## P. PERSONNEL.

7. - Employees of secret organs or persons in contact with secret materials in party committees can only be members of the party.

8. - The appointment of heads of secret bodies or authorized persons for conducting secret office work is carried out by a decision of the bureau of the corresponding party committee, which is notified to the Secret Department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

9. - All employees of secret organs or persons related to secret materials are appointed by party committees after prior approval of candidates from the local bodies of the OGPU.

NOTE: All employees of secret agencies, as well as persons in contact with classified materials, must be registered with the local department of the OGPU.

NOTE: All employees admitted to secret work submit a statement about their connections with foreigners living both outside and in the USSR and the nature of these connections. Foreigners include all those who do not have Soviet citizenship.

10. - For the reception, storage and return of secret materials of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6), both of a directive and informational nature, the Bureau of the Party Committee, by a separate resolution, appoints a special authorized person (preferably the head of the secret part of the party committee or authorized to conduct secret office work or the head of the encryption part ), having previously agreed on the candidature with the Secret Department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6).

NOTE: 1. The Central Committees entrusted with the handling of secret materials are divided into two categories: the 1st category enjoys the right to open packages, the 2nd without the right to open, however, the latter can store and return documents in the event that the addressee instructs her to do so.

NOTE: 2. In the resolutions of the bureau of party committees on the appointment of a trustee, it should be indicated for which category the party committee proposes to approve.

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11. — For coordination with the Secret Department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6) of the candidates specified in paragraph 10, it is necessary to send 2 completed questionnaires (form No. 1) for secret work and the removal of his predecessor, indicating the motives for his removal and the recommendation of 2 party members with 10 years of party experience.

12. - When employees of secret agencies or persons in contact with secret materials leave, they are removed from this work: 1) a non-disclosure agreement and 2) an obligation to inform the party committee about a change of residence within 2 years.

13. - It is strictly forbidden for employees of secret units to dedicate their acquaintances, relatives about the nature of the work performed, about the composition of secret workers, as well as to indicate in the certificates or certificates issued to these employees the positions and secret bodies, instead it is indicated: "Employee of the Party Committee."

Sh.

14. - All incoming mail to the party committee, with the exception of paragraph 15, is received directly in the secret department (part) of the party committee or authorized.

15. - Packages of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (6) for the series "K", addressed personally to the secretary of the party committee, are accepted personally by the secretary of the party committee, and in his absence (business trip, vacation, illness)

a deputy or authorized person approved by the Secret Department of the Central Committee for dealing with secret materials of the Central Committee.

NOTE: If the secretary of the party committee is also a member or a candidate member of the Central Committee, or a member of the Audit Commission of the AUCP (6), then secret materials of the CC of the AUCP (6), addressed to him as a member of the Central Committee, or the RK, are accepted by him personally, or by a trusted party committee.

16. - The employee accepting secret mail is obliged during acceptance to check the integrity of the package shell, seals and symbols, if any. If any damage is detected, as well as in case of suspicion of the possibility of a package being perused, the recipient of the package and the one who delivered it draw up the corresponding act in 3 copies, indicating exactly what defects were found. The acts are transferred to the local department of the OGPU for investigation. For information, sent to the institution from which the package was sent and one copy remains in the secret authority.

17. - An employee who receives secret mail is obliged to sign a receipt for a package lit. "A" and "B" and on the shell of the "K" series package put the date and time of receipt of the package. Receipts for packages of the Central Committee of the CPSU (6) "letter A"

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must be returned to the Central Committee no later than 3 days, shells from "K series" packages with receipts for them no later than the next day after receiving the package.

18. - The mail specified in paragraph 14 is opened personally by the manager. by a secret body or authorized body and immediately submitted for registration. The most secret materials are registered personally by the head. secret part. If the secret part consists of one authorized person, then all mail is registered by him personally.

19. - Registration of incoming secret papers is carried out in magazines or on special cards. If the number of secret papers received by the party committee per year is less than 1,000 - 2,000, then registration is made in journals, if more, then on cards (forms of the journal and cards are attached).

20. - Registration and accounting of the movement of secret materials of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (6), as well as materials on mobilization issues, is personally authorized by the party committee for handling secret documents of the Central Committee, in a special journal (the form of the journal is attached).

21. - Sheets of magazines must be numbered, sealed with a wax seal and certified by the secretary of the party committee. The cards must also be numbered. Storage of magazines and cards is carried out on a par with secret documents.

22. - Secret papers are transferred directly by an employee of a secret agency or authorized to execute only against receipt in a journal or on a card.

23. - During the execution of secret papers, they must be in the possession of the person who signed for the secret body to receive the paper. Any transfer of secret paper to another person must be made only through the secret part.

24. - Any transfer of a secret paper from one performer to another is marked by a secret part in a journal or on a card. In the latter, it is also noted to which case the paper is filed, and if the paper is destroyed, then the number of the act of destruction.

#### GU. OFFICE PRODUCTION OF OUTGOING PAPERS.

25. - Upon completion of the development of a secret document, the original, rough sketches and everything related to it, are transferred by the performer to the secret part. On document

the degree of secrecy ("secret", "s. secret") and urgency ("urgent", "very urgent", "especially urgent") are necessarily affixed.

26. - Secret correspondence is printed only in the premises of the secret part. In party committees where the secret section does not have its own typists, one of the common typists is assigned to it—a member of the CPSU (6) is a must.

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27. - The transfer of drafts of secret documents by typists is carried out personally by the executor or through employees of the secret department.

28. - The printing of secret materials under dictation is permitted only if the placement of the secret part is guaranteed against eavesdropping.

29. - Familiarization by a typist of other employees, even secret ones, with the work performed or performed by her, is strictly prohibited.

30. - For the analysis of incomprehensible words, the typist turns only to the person who gave her the job.

31. - The person transferring secret material for printing is obliged to indicate on the draft the number of required copies, addressees and their initials. The typist types all this on the document and, in addition, also puts down her initials.

32. - The printed work is returned by the typist to the person who gave it. Reconciliation with the draft is carried out personally by him or on his behalf by an employee of the secret unit.

33. - For shorthand secret and top secret reports of meetings, articles, special notebooks are started. Sheets of notebooks must be numbered, sealed and signed by the head. secret part. Notebooks are issued to stenographers for the duration of their work, and after deciphering they are returned to the secret section. If the transcription is not made on the same day, then the recording of the speech is left overnight in the secret part. After using the notebook, the latter are stored along with secret and top secret materials for a year, after which they are destroyed.

34. - At the beginning of the transcript, it is indicated by which system the transcript was conducted.

35. - Transcription of transcripts is allowed only in the secret section with typists of the secret section.

The deciphered secret transcripts are stored along with other secret materials.

36. - After signing, the secret papers, together with the drafts, are returned to the secret part.

37. - Each secret paper, except for the signature, must have marks about the surname and initials  
the signatory.

38. — Drafts, damaged and superfluous printed copies, as well as used carbon paper, must be burned every day at the end of work by an employee of the secret unit.

39. - Work unfinished by typists, as well as used copying at the end of classes, is handed over to the head. secret part.

40. - Reproduction of secret documents (on a rotator, glass printer, shapirograph, etc.) is carried out only in the premises of the secret part.

Reproduction of secret documents by typographical method is carried out in secret printing houses or secret parts of the printing house according to the rules established by the local bodies of the OGPU.

41. - If the work is done in a rotary way, then all the waste paper, together with waxes, is burned. In the case of reproduction on a glass graph, the print on the glass is washed off, and the damaged prints are burned. When propagated on a shapirograf, the tape is stored in a secret part until it is used to the rest, after which it is destroyed.

42. - To register outgoing secret papers, no magazines or cards are started, but an extra copy of the outgoing paper is printed. Numbered copies are filed in order of receipt in separate folders and replace the outgoing journal. Copies selected in order are kept on a par with all secret documents.

43. - The secret materials of the party committee, sent out for review by the members of the bureau and the party committee (protocols of party committees and other information material) must be returned by local comrades within a week, by nonresident comrades - within a month.

NOTE: 1. In exceptional cases, these materials may be destroyed by the addressees by burning. Acts of burning must be signed by 2 persons and forwarded to the appropriate party committee.

NOTE: 2. Some secret materials of the party committee, sent for review or guidance to lower party organizations, may remain in the secret files of the latter.

#### U. EXPEDITION.

44. - All secret outgoing correspondence of party committees is sent through the secret part.

45. - After registration of the sent correspondence, an envelope is prepared. The following must be indicated on the envelope: 1) last name, first name, patronymic (or at least initials) of the addressee; 2) exact address - city, street, house number; 3) the name of the institution or organization and the outgoing number. In addition, the degree of secrecy and urgency of the package is indicated on the upper right corner of the envelope in accordance with the inscription on the outgoing paper - ý) for local city correspondence "secret" or "top secret" and "urgent" or "very urgent", for non-resident correspondence sent through the field corps of the OGPU - the letters "A", "B" and "series K".

46. - Near the outgoing number on the package, the initials of the person preparing the package for shipment are affixed.

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47. - Addressing secret correspondence only to an institution without indicating the position of the recipient is not allowed, it is also desirable to indicate the name of the addressee.

48. - For lettering secret packages, the following letters are established: "K series" must be sent top secret, secret (urgent and non-urgent) correspondence, intended, due to its special importance, to be delivered only to the addressee's own hands (under a personal receipt on the envelope); for Lit. "A" - top secret, secret urgent correspondence and for lit. "B" - all other top secret and secret correspondence. Arbitrary lettering is not allowed.

49. - Then the correspondence and receipt form, if the package is non-resident lit. "A" is put into a tight envelope, it is sure to be laid with special release paper and the envelope is sealed. The package is sewn (if only the volume allows it) with a hard thread crosswise or with wire (preferably closer to the corners of the package) and sealed with one wax seal.

party seal. 3 seals are applied to unstitched local city packages, and five to non-sewn ones.

NOTE: 1) The seals must be superimposed so that they are visible, covering the firmware without residue, and, moreover, in a thin layer so that it is not possible to remove it without damage.

2) It is recommended, having previously agreed with the addressees, to change the color of the sealing wax and samples of wax seals, setting certain signs.

3) Secret packages must be lined with opaque paper and sealed with five seals, regardless of the firmware.

50. - The finished package is recorded in the control log (the form is attached) and is handed over against receipt in the log to the local field department, if the package is from out of town, or to the mail order - if the package is urban.

NOTE: The admission of individuals to the distribution of secret packages is checked on an equal footing with other secret employees.

51. - City packages are rented against a separate receipt (see sample) or - against a receipt on the envelope.

52. - Correspondence from other cities is sent only through the courier service. Local urban - through couriers or scooters, necessarily members of the CPSU (6).

NOTE: In points where there is no field communication with Komi, secret correspondence is sent through specially verified comrades. Forwarding by chance is not allowed.

53. - It is forbidden to send unclassified correspondence under the guise of secret.

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54. - Party committees draw up a list of questions that should be held with them in a secret, s.-secret and not subject to disclosure order, and periodically this list is supplemented and change.

NOTE: Correspondence not subject to disclosure is processed in a common office.

55. - During the delivery (delivery) of packages, scooters and couriers should avoid any traffic or public traffic jams, since theft of packages is possible. When carrying out assigned tasks, scooters and couriers are strictly prohibited from visiting the homes of acquaintances and, in general, to any places that are not related to the assigned task. It is also forbidden to stop idle on the way or engage in extraneous conversations with anyone.

56. - Packages are handed over personally to the addressee or his representative in secret correspondence. Transfer instances are strictly prohibited.

57. - Scooter or courier when handing over secret packages, if the addressee is unfamiliar to them, they look through his documents or party card. In case of doubt, the package is not surrendered, but returned to the secret part with an indication of the reasons for non-delivery.

58. - Scooters and couriers delivering classified material, as a rule, must be armed with revolvers.

59. - As receipts (both urban and non-resident) are received, the control journal notes the time of delivery of the package and the name of the recipient.

60. - Genuine receipts are selected in numerical order and kept for a year. After this period, a commission consisting of representatives of the secret part of the party committee and the local department of the OGPU checks the availability of receipts, an appropriate act is drawn up about this, and the receipts themselves are burned.

#### VI. STORAGE OF MATERIALS AND MANAGEMENT OF CASES.

61. - All completed secret papers are filed in the appropriate files (secret folders). On the card (in the journal) of the incoming paper or on the copy of the outgoing paper, the number of the case to which this paper is filed is marked.

NOTE: It is strictly forbidden to attach secret documents to unclassified documents.  
affairs.

62. - Cases are brought against correspondents (party committees, institutions, organizations), as well as on certain major issues (for example, wages, grain procurements, etc.). Papers, both incoming and outgoing copies, are filed in chronological order.

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63. - If there are duplicates of secret papers, they are subject to burning. Duplicates are collected approximately in a month, an inventory is compiled on them, which is given for approval by the secretary of the party committee and, if there are no objections from his side, they are burned, with the drawing up of an appropriate act, which is kept on a par with other secret and with secret documents as current material during 3 convocations.

64 – – Business is conducted from Party congress to Party congress and kept in secret parts.

NOTE: The transfer of secret archives of party committees to Soviet institutions is strictly prohibited.

65. - In each case, a detailed inventory of papers must be kept according to the attached form. The inventory is started simultaneously with the establishment of the case. Each filed paper is immediately entered in the inventory.

66 – Giving information about the content of secret correspondence by telephone is strictly prohibited.

67. - Information can be given by the head. secret part orally only to members of the Bureau of the Party Committee. Written certificates on the content of secret materials are issued only with the signature of the secretary of the party committee. The issuance of an extract or a copy of secret documents is prohibited.

NOTE: Extracts can be issued only by order of the secretary of the party committee.

#### UP. ORDER OF ACQUAINTANCE WITH SECRET MATERIALS OF THE CC AND ON MOBILE QUESTIONS.

68. - All members and candidates of the party committee receiving the said materials and members of the CC are acquainted with secret materials of the Central Committee of a directive or informational character.

69. - It is strictly forbidden, under the responsibility of the secretary of the party committee, to hand over the documents specified in paragraph 68 for familiarization with them and keeping them in apartments.

70. - Each party committee should have a special room, sufficiently isolated, where the comrades referred to in paragraph 68 get acquainted with the materials of the Central Committee individually or in groups. After reading, the personal signatures of the readers are made indicating the date of familiarization.

71. - Familiarization with the materials of the Central Committee of persons beyond the circle specified in paragraph 68 is allowed only with the permission of the Central Committee.



72. - Familiarization with the materials specified in paragraph 68, regional committees, provincial committees and regional committees of grassroots organizations, is carried out by familiarizing the secretaries of these organizations in the manner specified in paragraph 70.

73.- Familiarization with the secret documents of the Central Committee of wider party strata is carried out after a special instruction of the Central Committee.

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#### UI. PREMISES, ORDER OF STORAGE, PROTECTION.

74. - The secret part must necessarily be located in a room isolated from other parts of the apparatus. Access to the premises of the secret part of persons not associated with secret correspondence is strictly prohibited.

75. All repositories of secret documents of party committees should be concentrated in the premises of the secret section.

76. - Storage of classified materials should be carried out only in fireproof or iron cabinets. In party committees, the secret correspondence of which is extremely insignificant (for example, in some ukoms), as an exception, storage in iron-studded chests screwed to the floor is allowed. Cabinets and chests must be equipped with reliable locks. Under no circumstances are padlocks allowed.

77. - Secret materials of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (6) must be stored in a fireproof cabinet, or at least in a separate compartment of a fireproof cabinet, the key to which should be kept by the secretary of the party committee or by the head. secret part (trusted).

78. - Unfulfilled by the departments of the party committee during the day, secret correspondence is handed over at night for storage in a secret part. No member of the party committee is allowed to leave secret correspondence in his desk or closet.

79. - In no case is it allowed to carry secret materials to an apartment or carry them with you on business trips. It is also not allowed to leave classified materials on the table when leaving the room.

80. - Each employee of the secret part, when leaving the service at all or temporarily (business trip, vacation), is obliged to hand over his affairs to the successor according to the act.

81. - At the end of classes in the secret part, drafts, waste paper, used carbon paper and all other unnecessary paper must be burned. Everything except stationery should be cleared from tables.

82. - Fireproof or iron cabinets must be locked and sealed with a wax seal or sealed with a special seal of the secret part. The premises of the secret part itself must also be locked and sealed or sealed.

NOTE: Sealing of cabinets and premises is carried out by the head. secret part, or with the permission of the secretary of the party committee, by another employee of the secret part.

83. - For the protection of the secret part, a military guard or watchman, equipped with firearms, is posted for the night. Guard (or watchmen) stamps or seals on the doors of secret parts  
surrender under

ROMA it was imported exactly one ooo NEON O AY NOVIN aar dai

POLICE WORKER!

YOU KK KA MIKUTU DON'T HAVE THE RIGHT TO RELEASE YOUR CASTORAGE

236 P. Formation of the mechanism and activities for the protection ...

receipt. It is advisable to set up police posts near the buildings of party committees.

84. - The key to the premises of the secret part and the wax seal or ice cream, with which the premises are sealed, is kept by the manager. secret part (trusted).

85. - Only the secretary of the party committee or the head of the guard is allowed into the premises of the secret part at night (after sealing). secret part; other persons - only with the permission of the latter. The guard is obliged to inform the secretary of the party committee in writing about each such admission the next morning.

86. - Every day at the beginning of classes head. the secret part checks the integrity of the seals (seals) on the doors of the room and cabinets, and then accepts the seals from the guard against receipt.

If traces of damage to seals or seals are found, an appropriate act is drawn up signed by the head. secret part and guard, and then sent to the local department of the OGPU for investigation.

87. - Cleaning of the premises of the secret part is carried out only in the presence of employees of the secret part.

88. - In addition to these rules, it is the responsibility of the leaders of the party committees to take additional measures in each individual case to ensure, depending on the circumstances, the maximum secrecy in the conduct of secret office work and the handling of secret materials of the Central Committee.

Head Secret Department of Tovstukh Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6) Kosior 7. U - 1928

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 113. D. 608. L. 99-113

Application "SUBSCRIPTION"

I, the undersigned ..... give this signature to N. Siberian OK VKP (6) that I undertake to comply with the rules announced to me for handling classified papers and all state secrets that may be known to me, not to be disclosed anywhere and in any way, both from the moment of entering the secret (cipher) work, and after leaving it.

I undertake to timely notify the Secret Department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6) within two years about my new places of residence or temporary stay after leaving the secret (cipher) work in the above-mentioned party organization.

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I am aware that for non-compliance with this obligation, I bear strict responsibility in an extrajudicial manner, according to the secret Decree of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR of May 26, 1927, known to me.

[February 27, 1929] Signature

\* It was attached to the questionnaire of a candidate entering a secret body for work.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 85. D. 615. L. 34.

Appendix D

Copy of "Approved by the Secretariat of the 15LH - p. / pr. No. 39/". INSTRUCTION TO THE SECRET EMPLOYEES OF THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CCRKP /6/

1. Appointments and transfers of secret employees, as well as their release from work, are approved by the secretariat of the Central Committee on the provision of the Zavburo of the Secretariat of the Central Committee.
  2. None of the secret collaborators can negotiate and talk not in the order of fulfilling their direct duties regarding the resolutions of the party organizations or the issues discussed.
  3. A secret collaborator cannot tell his friends and relatives about the nature of his work, as well as about the composition of secret collaborators.
  4. At the end of work, secret correspondence must be locked in a fireproof cabinet or table and cannot be taken by an employee with him to the apartment.
- NOTE: Assistant Secretaries of the Central Committee may take correspondence with them with the consent of the respective secretary of the Central Committee.
5. Secret employees cannot visit foreign missions, as well as any of their members.  
on personal matters.
  6. Secret employees inform the Head Bureau of the Secretariat about all their acquaintances in foreign missions.
  7. About all relatives or acquaintances of their own or their family who are abroad, with whom contact is maintained, secret employees inform the Zavburo of the Secretariat.
  8. None of the secret employees can work part-time in another institution without the consent of the Secretariat of the Central Committee.
1. Violation of the instructions is considered as a violation of party DISCIPLINE.

ZAVBURO OF THE SECTARIA OF THE CC / NAZARETH..

September 14, 1923 Mt. Moscow.

RGASPI.F. 17. He. 84. D. 491. L. 28 - 28v.

238 PS. Formation of the mechanism and direction of activities for the protection of...

Appendix Pl. C. Secret Copy

PROCEDURE FOR SEALING AND PROTECTION OF THE PREMISES OF THE BUREAU OF THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CC

1. After finishing work, the officer on duty for assignments (comrades Gorbachev or Parshin), in the presence of the commandant on duty and the officer on duty for the Politburo, Orgburo, etc., seals cupboards and rooms with mastic seals according to a special list approved by the head. Bureau of the Secretariat.
2. For sealing, have two mastic seals for No. 1 and 2 of which No. 1 ut. Gorbachev and No. 2 ut. Parshina.
3. The duty officer for assignments, in the presence of the commandant, is obliged to inspect the entire floor before leaving, check all the locks and the correctness of the type.
4. As the cabinets are sealed by the commandant on duty, posts No. 1 Politburo rooms; post No. 2 - room of the Shifrburo corridor of the right wing of the floor; post #3 -

left side of the floor. The protection of the floor is carried out in accordance with the rules existing in the commandant's office of the Central Committee.

5. The keys to the rooms on the 5th floor are taken by an employee for instructions and stored in a special locker, the key to which is handed over against receipt to the officer on duty at the commandant's office of the Central Committee.

6. After the end of work and at any time, seals from the doors of secret rooms and cabinets can be removed in the presence of the commandant on duty, only on the personal order of one of the secretaries of the Central Committee, head. Bureau of the Secretariat or his deputy from the doors and cabinets of the technical secretariat of the Organizing Bureau can be removed from the seals by personal order of the 1st office. Secretaries of the Central Committee.

NOTE kp. 6th. In cases of fire and other natural disasters, the responsible duty officer takes all necessary measures with immediate simultaneous notification of the head. Bureau of the St. and the Director of Affairs of the Central Committee.

7. Assistant secretaries of the Central Committee, pom. Head The Bureau of the Secretariat of the Central Committee and the secretary of the Bureau of the Secretariat of the Central Committee may at any time / in the presence of the commandant / remove seals from cabinets in their office or the office of the corresponding secretary.

8. Premises and cabinets, the seals from which were removed (in accordance with sp. bi 7), are sealed with lead seals by the commandant on duty in the presence of the comrade who was removed seal.

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9. The commandant on duty about all the comrades admitted on the basis of these rules, in the premises of the Bureau of the Secretariat, is obliged to immediately inform the responsible duty officer about this and no later than 10 o'clock in the morning of the next day, together with him, in writing - head. Bureau of the Secretariat.

10. The removal of seals in the morning with the start of work from the doors of all secret rooms and cabinets is carried out by an employee on duty for instructions, in the presence of an employee of the relevant secretariat (Politburo, Orgburo, Shifrburo, etc.). The list of comrades, at the direction of which the seals are removed in the morning, is attached.

NOTE: In case of damage to the seals, they are removed in the presence of the commandant on duty, and the errand officer conducts an investigation with an immediate report to the head. Bureau of the Secretariat of the Central Committee.

11. All work in the Bureau of the Secretariat (floor polishing, repair work, installation of telephones, etc.) is carried out under the general supervision of an officer on duty for assignments.

12. Before the arrival (in the morning before 8 am) of an employee for assignments, the duty commandant has no right to let anyone into the premises of the 5th floor, the exception is t.t. listed in p.p. bi 7, which can also instruct the commandant's office to let the relevant employees of the Bureau of the Secretariat of the Central Committee pass.

13. About all violations of this order - the commandant of the Central Committee immediately reports the head. Bureau of the Secretariat and Managers of the Central Committee.

HEAD. BUREAU OF THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CC Mehliis 6/ TU [1922] CORRECT: Bremman

RGASPI. F. 17. Oh. 84. D. 696. L. 16-17

Annex YP. Secret REGULATIONS ON THE CHIFRBURO OF THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CC RCP

Compiled on the basis of the order of the Department of Affairs of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the RCP dated August 2, 1921, No. 27 par. 4. 1. The Cipher Bureau is established to conduct top secret ha-

Rakter, in encrypted form, correspondence of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the RCP: a / With subordinate organizations and individual employees of the RCP; 6/ With the Central Committee of communist organizations of other countries;

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c/ With the Executive Committee of the Comintern;

d/ With all departments of the RSFSR and their local bodies having encrypted communication.

2. The Cipher Bureau is in charge of:

a/ Production, storage, accounting and distribution of ciphers and instructions for storing ciphers and maintaining cipher correspondence for organizations subordinate to the Central Committee of the RCP;

6/ By instructing workers, organizations of the RCP in the localities that store the cipher and conduct cipher correspondence, by sending circulars and instructors of the Central Committee;

c/ Encryption of outgoing and decryption of encrypted correspondence received by the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the RCP;

d/ Issuance of brief information on the content of incoming and outgoing correspondence to the relevant /limited/ persons.

3. The work of the Cipher Bureau proceeds without time limits.

4. Responsibility for all work lies with the Head of the Cipher Bureau and, according to the specialty, with each employee of the Cipher Bureau.

5. The staffing of the Cipher Bureau is made from dedicated and experienced party workers with at least three years of experience and with the same recommendation, if possible, familiar with cryptography, in the following order:

The head of the Shifrburo is appointed by the CC Manager; employees are invited by the Manager of Affairs or the Head of the Secret Department according to the order for the reception of employees.

6. The Cipher Bureau is part of the Secret Department of the Office of De

larmy of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party.

1. The Cipher Bureau consists of: 1/ Head .....1...2..2.0.0.02. 1 2/ Alternate .....22.. | 3/ Clerk 1  
res. .... | 4/ Registrar .....2....1... 1 5/ Typist ..... 2.7.7.7... 1 6/ Cryptographers ..... 2

TOTAL - 7 people.

Courier-messenger .....4....2.. 1

Head of the Cipher Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP: Chugunov

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 84. D. 696. L. 2-4v.

yo no.

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IP application.

Secret circulars of the Central Committee of the RCP (6) for the period of the KhP - XIII congresses (May 1923 - 1924)

On the procedure for the admission of former Socialist-Revolutionaries to the party.

On the implementation of the golden winning loan.

About party work in transport.

On the fight against excess and criminal use of official position by members of the party.

Tentative order for the re-election of the Soviets.

On the celebration of the 6th anniversary of the October Revolution.

About work in the border zone among the Polish population.

On measures to combat the Mensheviks.

On the procedure for the storage and issuance of sums of money by party committees. On the procedure for admitting secret employees of the GPU to the Party.

On the procedure for sending secret correspondence by party committees. On the sale of the harvest.

On the international situation in connection with the events in Germany. About the next elections of the Soviets.

On the introduction of military-technical subjects into the program of Soviet party schools | and 2nd levels of communist universities. About the League of Help for the Children of the Working People of Germany.

On the registration of former employees of the GPU.

Instructions to the cells of the RCP under the Sov. authorities abroad.

On the fight against desertion from the Red Army.

On the voluntary recruitment of conscripts in 1902

About the conferences of the former Mensheviks.

On the military work of the RKSM.

On the involvement of members of the RKSM in the RCP.

On work among the demobilized Red Army soldiers and those drafted into the army.

On early conscription into the army in 1902

On the Permissibility of Teaching the Muslim Faith.

On the admission to the party of peasants.

On the work of the prosecutor's office and the court in national regions and republics.

About the work of the excluded.

On the chairmen of the commissions for the termination of investigation cases and the release of prisoners.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 84. D. 467. L. 2-16

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Appendix IX.

31.1. 27 [corrected copy]

List of incoming correspondence subject to registration in the Secret Registry.

1. All correspondence to the address of the PB, OB, Secretaries of the Central Committee.

Note: Correspondence addressed to the Cipher Bureau is registered in the Cipher Bureau.

2. All protocols and extracts from the minutes of the meetings of the Regional Committees, the Regional Bureau of the Central Committee, the Nat. Central Committee, Gubernia Committees, Regional Committees, Okrkoms and Ukomov, as well as minutes of meetings of the Bureau of District Committees of Moscow and Leningrad.

3. Verbatim records and [protocols] of the meetings of the party conferences listed in paragraph 2 of the organizations.

4. All closed letters [of secretaries of party organizations].

5. All reports of the secretaries of party committees on the survey of party organizations.

6. Answers to our secret outgoing nos.

2. All characteristics for partner partners.

3. Requests from judicial, punitive and investigative authorities about individual members of the party.

4. Information materials of the OGPU, NKJ, NKVD.

5. Reporting reports of the People's Commissariats and large [economic] and public organizations.

6. Correspondence about the movements and appointments of individual party comrades through the Organizing Bureau.

7. Correspondence about the debt of party members, if the debt is discrediting. Also correspondence about embezzlement.

8. Correspondence with the field corps of the OGPU, concerning the forwarding of secret correspondence and dislocation information.

9. Correspondence on the rules of secrecy, subordination of obtaining materials to the Central Committee, etc. P.

[16. All correspondence of foreign cells.]

Head Secret Registry Comrade Bremann

Revise, taking into account the current practice, as well as the relationship with legal [...] office work, analyzes and topics secret. Central Committee

Signature [probably Molotov] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 85. D. 542. L. 336

Applications

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Appendix X.

Annex: to paragraph 17 of the PB No. 54 dated 8. 3. 23

The following comrades receive closed letters and get acquainted with its contents:

Get acquainted:

Members and candidate members of the Central Committee Members and candidate members of the Central Control Commission

Members of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission Members of the URC

Head and deputy departments of the Central Committee and responsible employees under the responsibility of the head

Responsible instructors of the Central Committee

Editors: Pravda, Izvestia, Economic Life, The Poor, Rabochaya Gazeta.

Members of the Central Committee of the RKSM Chairman of the SRT Members (communists) of the Small Council of People's Commissars

Members (communists) of the boards of the People's Commissariats

Chairman of the Main Concession Committee

Board of the GPU

Members of the Board of the GPU

Beginning PUR and deputy. PUR faction members

Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee

Faction members

Presidium of SOCIK

Faction members

Presidium of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions

Members and candidates of the Central Committee, nat. Communist Parties, Regional Bureau, Regional Committee,

Get:

Each personally Presidium of the Central Control Commission

in the amount of 3-5 letters Each personally Each personally Head. department

Head Organizing department Managing editor of each of the mentioned newspapers

Secretary of the Central Committee of the RKSM Each personally Chairman of the Small SNK People's Commissar

He is the Chairman

Head of DUR Secretary

Secretary Secretary

Secretary of the Central Committee, regional committee, Gubkom:

Gubkom, GKK, Gub.Rev. Com, Reply

stvenny instructors of the Gubkom, Head. Departments, Secretary of the CC RKSM, Editor, Members of the Presidium faction

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GPS, the Presidium of the CEC and the Presidium of the State Electoral Commission, Chairman and Deputy. Chairman of the GO GPU, commander of the district troops and the beginning. PU of the district Members of the district committees of Moscow and St. Petersburg Secretary of the district committee and other industrial centers according to the list of the Organizational Department

At the same time, the commission considers it necessary to indicate in the forwarding to the closed letter:

1). That the secretary of the Gubkom has the right to acquaint the secretaries of the Ukoms who come to the Gubkom with the contents of the letter.

2) What can the secretary of the Gubernia Committee or a member of the Bureau of the Gubernia Committee make an instructive report at a meeting of active workers, using the material and conclusions of the letter.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 340. L. 7-8

Appendix XI.

The circle of persons and organizations to whom the transcripts of the Secretariat, the Organizing Bureau, the Politburo and the Plenums of the Central Committee are to be sent. (Approved by the Secretariat of the Central Committee at the meeting of January 30-25)

1. Members and candidates of the Central Committee; member TsKK and member. Audit Commission of the Central Committee.
2. Apparatus of the Central Committee: a) Head. departments of the Central Committee, 6) responsible instructors of the Central Committee, c) Deputy. Head Orgraspred vol. Khataevich and Kozlov and d) Secretary of the Central Committee of the RLKSM.
3. Secretaries of the Gubkoms, Regional Committees, Region. Bureau, Regional committees, Nat. Central Committee, Okruzhkomov (according to a special resolution of the Central Committee of September 26, 24, pr. No. 32. P. 30; the district committees of Moscow and Leningrad, the Grozny City Committee and the Baku Committee.
4. Secretary of the Society of Old Bolsheviks; Institute. Lenin (comrade Tovstueh)
5. Secretary of the ECCI; Zavagitprop of the ECCI and the General Secretary of the Profintern.
6. Nachpuokram, Nachmorsil, Zamnachpura.
7. Bureau of Cells of the Communities: a) KUTV, 6) Com. Academy, c) Zinov. University, d) Sverdlovsk University, e) Institute of the Red Professorship,
8. Rectors of universities: a) im. Zinoviev, 6) im. Sverdlov, c) KUTV.
9. Central owls. institutions: a) Members and candidates Pres. Central Executive Committee of the USSR; 6) People's Commissars of the USSR and their deputies; c) Prev. Administratively

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Fin. Commissions and Commissions Proposals of the USSR; d) Deputy Chairman of the OGPU; e) Prev. State Bank of the USSR; e) Prev. Top. Courts of the USSR; g) Prosecutor Verh. courts of the USSR; h) Members and Candidates Pres. All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR; i) People's Commissars of the RSFSR; j) Deputy Previous Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR; k) Prev. Small Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR.

10. Prev. Factions of the Centrosoyuz and the Selskosoyuz.

11. Print. Editors: a) Rosta, 6) Pravda, c) Izvestia, d) Economic life, e) Bolshevik, f) Rabochaya newspaper, g) Gudok, h) Trud.

12. Plenipotentiaries: Germany, England, France, Italy, Sweden, China, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Turkey, Persia.

13. Members of the faction of the Presidium of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions and Pred. Central Committee of the Union.

14. Personally (with the permission of the Secretariat of the Central Committee) Demyan Poor.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 112. D. 635. L. 20

HI application.

Circle of persons and organizations to whom secret circulars of the Central Committee were sent: [February 13, 1925]

"126. Send secret circulars of the Central Committee to:

1. Members and candidates of the Central Committee, members of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission and members. Revision. Commissions of the Central Committee.

2. Apparatus of the Central Committee: a) Head. departments of the Central Committee and deputy. Head Orgrasedom of the Central Committee vols. Khataevich and Kozlov, 6) Secretariat of the Orgburo, c) Secretariat of the Politburo, d) Secretary of the Central Committee of the Komsomol, e) Deputy. Beginning Pura.

3. Secretaries of Gubkoms, Obkoms, Regional Bureau, Regional Committees, Nat. Central Committee, Okruzhkoms (according to a special resolution of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of September 26, 24, pr. No. 30, item 32), district committees of Moscow and Leningrad.

4. To the Secretary of the ECCI and Gen. Secretary of the Profintern.

People's Commissars of the USSR and the RSFSR, Secretaries of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR and the RSFSR, Pred. Top. Court of the USSR and the Procurator Verkh. Ships of the USSR

RGASPI. F.17. Op.112..D. 637. L. 18

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